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ABSTRACT
Software mobile agents is a new distributed computing paradigm which was 
developed to support efficient computing over the Internet. Since its inception there has 
been a significant research effort to produce concrete agent-based artefacts. This 
phenomenon resulted in the proliferation of a large number of agent systems, mostly 
based on proprietary programming languages, each with its own characteristics, 
peculiarities and assumptions. Hence the agent technology has largely remained hidden 
and incomprehensible by Internet end users. Moreover the issue o f interoperability and 
integration of agents with existing legacy software has only just started to be addressed 
by the agent research community in a rather ad hoc way. In this thesis we attempt to 
design an agent architecture which is independent of any programming language and 
therefore is directly suitable fo r  Internet end users. The proposed architecture, labelled 
as Mobile Agent System fo r  Internet Computing (MASIC), addresses several important 
contemporary issues in agent research. It defines an agent as a container of reusable 
components that can be copied or moved to other agents. Each agent has a symmetric 
I/O access control module and is also equipped with associative access collaboration 
facilities. Additionally every agent contains a navigator module which stores the agent’s 
itinerary plan and provides an inteiface via which the agent itself or other authorised 
agents can dynamically adapt the plan to reflect run-time events and constraints. The 
agent system provides an integrated access control architecture which enables an agent 
to define customised access control structures that can be fully or partially shared with 
other agents. Existing access control structures can be combined to create new 
structures that represent more complex access mechanisms. Agents can discover other 
agents offering pertinent services via an adaptive, customisable agent discovery 
architecture incorporated in MASIC. This discovery architecture enables the full 
interaction of links with queries and supports the definition of access paths which are 
tightly coupled with access control and other customised services. MASIC also provides 
the conceptual architecture o f a message-oriented agent communication system 
integrated with a mobility management scheme. Finally, this thesis presents the design 
and implementation of a prototype graphical inteiface which enables the potential user 
of the system to create, manage and interact with agents in real time. In conclusion the 
research presented in this thesis aims to provide a comprehensive, language-neutral, 
secure, collaborative environment within which mobile agents can interact with their 
peers in order to perform their tasks efficiently while human operators can oversee and 
manage these activities through a user friendly inteiface. The architecture is generic in 
nature as it can support general-purpose, agent-based computations. Its concepts, 
entities and mechanisms can be fully or partially re-used to provide architectural 
solutions to challenges in various application domains such as Knowledge Management, 
the GRID and E-Commerce.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The information explosion and overload phenomena that occurred during the past few 
decades signalled the start for the design and development of the largest computer 
communications infrastructure system, the Internet. The Internet can be thought of as a 
vast, physically distributed set of interconnected resources (software and hardware). In 
the early years (early 1980’s) the Internet was small and restricted into interconnecting a 
number of academic institutions across the world. At that time the number of hosts 
connected to the Internet was in the order of a few hundred. With the invention of the 
TCP/IP the Internet started growing exponentially and by 1999 the number of Internet 
hosts was more than 57 million. This incredible growth is accredited to the fact that not 
only did computers start becoming cheaper and more powerful but the need for computer 
communications became more urgent because of the fast growing desire for information 
sharing and exchange. Furthermore it was realised that the Internet could provide basic 
communications facilities on top of which any network (distributed) application could be 
implemented. This realisation changed the perception of the Internet from a simple 
computer communications infrastructure to a medium that supports distributed processing 
on a global scale (Internet Computing). Nowadays, the Internet offers great business 
opportunities and is open to commercial exploitation, facilitating the very rapid growth of 
Internet computing during the last decade.
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Until the beginning of the 90’s, the predominant computational paradigm on which 
Internet computing was based was the client-server. According to this approach a
dedicated machine, the server, contains a number of programs that can be remotely
invoked via Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) by programs running on other machines, the 
clients. The central mechanism of this paradigm, the RPC, was designed with the aim of 
providing transparency for remote procedure calls such that the invoking program does 
not observe any difference in both the invocation mechanism and the performance 
between local or remote procedures. In reality this aim was never achieved because of the 
unreliability and bottlenecks of the underlying communication infrastructure. Moreover 
RPC was inherently inefficient for two reasons. Firstly clients were forced to use only the 
existing server functionality which could not be adapted to suit the needs of each 
individual client. Secondly ongoing interaction between the client and the server required 
ongoing communication. The latter characteristic becomes a serious drawback in the 
context of Internet computing where the cost of local processing is negligible compared to 
the cost of communication. Efficient Internet computing should be based on the 
aforementioned principle and therefore minimise the need for communication while 
perhaps paying the small price of extra local processing.
The RPC’s inherent inefficiencies shifted the focus of research into developing new
computational paradigms that better match the Internet’s characteristics. The result was 
the notion of programs that can migrate from one physical machine to another during their 
execution. Such programs are called software mobile agents and offer the strategic 
advantage of minimised communication over the traditional RPC. In reality the concept of 
agency has existed for several decades within the artificial intelligence community. 
However it was only in 1994 when the distributed computing research community realised 
that the mobility of programs can be a serious candidate in minimising communication. 
The same year also witnessed the birth of the first commercial, general-purpose, agent- 
based system : Telescript. This development signalled the start o f a massive research and 
development frenzy in the area of mobile agents and agent-based systems. This process 
resembles the gold rush experienced in the United States during the 18'*’ century. 
Individual researchers, research groups, institutions together with major commercial 
companies grabbed this research opportunity and got involved in the production of more 
and more agent models, languages and systems.
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The result as expected has been rather chaotic. Each researcher/group of researchers 
viewed the software agents from a different perspective according to which agents were 
given different labels such as intelligent, autonomous, mobile, collaborative, mobile 
objects, personal assistants, robots, etc. Each agent system was based on its own 
assumptions and sometimes it was oriented towards specific applications. Most of these 
agent systems were strongly coupled with a proprietary programming language frequently 
with ackward semantics thus severely restraining their usability and applicability. 
Moreover various aspects of agent-based computing such as security and agent 
organisation were neglected as these systems’ main objective was to support code 
mobility.
In general there are four main characteristics of this agent research effort. Firstly the 
existing agent scenery does not exhibit any interoperability. The development of the Java 
programming language and its adoption as the de facto standard for distributed computing 
triggered the development of Java-based agent models and systems which could 
theoretically interoperate with each other. Such interoperation has not been realised until 
then because the developers of each agent system were competing against each other as to 
who will first produce the best, most complete agent system which will render the rest of 
the agent systems obsolete. Secondly most of the proposed solutions for issues such as 
security, discovery, communication, etc. are already existing approaches in other domains 
of the computer science which have been just re-labelled as agent solutions. Thirdly the 
current agent systems are not integrated at all to the existing software scene since most of 
them provide no portals to existing legacy software. Fourthly standardisation is clearly 
missing from the area of software agents. It was only in 1997 that the first international 
body FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) was formed to promote 
standardisation of several agent-based techniques, models and architectures. A similar 
effort started earlier in the area of distributed objects and has resulted in a set of 
specifications collectively labelled as CORBA (Common Object Request Broker 
Architecture) that nowadays every distributed object system developer is eager to comply 
with. The reason for the wide adoption of CORBA, which comprises more than 750 
organisations, as the standard in distributed objects is that this standardisation effort was 
embraced from the beginning by all prominent academic institutions and companies. In 
contrast FIPA has unfortunately remained largely in the background of agent research and 
as a result its agent specifications have had very little impact in the agent world until now.
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The immaturity of the agent world clearly shows if we observe that the agent research 
community is more influenced by the developments in Java which is essentially a 
distributed object programming language rather than the work of its own standardisation 
body (FIPA).
All the aforementioned characteristics of the agent revolution indicate that this field is 
still in its infancy. A lot of ground work is needed and more successful real world agent 
applications are required before this field becomes stable and mature. Ultimately, like any 
other software, the software agent’s success will depend on whether this technology 
reaches the big mass of Internet users or whether it will stay within the boundaries of 
research laboratories as yet another one proprietary intellectual artefact.
There are some necessary conditions that agent software must satisfy in order to 
maximise its social impact and thus its usefulness. Firstly agent-based technologies must 
retain a good level of adoption. This in turn depends on addressing issues such as 
integration, interoperability and portability. Moreover their design must take into account 
the end user and thus it should empower the user to monitor, update and manage this 
technology (usability). Secondly the agent technology must ensure that it clearly exhibits 
strategic advantages over other software technologies. Programming efficiency is the 
keyword here. A user or a business will definitely consider deploying agent technologies 
within their infrastructure only if there are some clear efficiency gains for doing so. The 
issue of programming efficiency should be embedded in both the data representation and 
the program representation and execution. The object-oriented technology quickly became 
a success because of the software reuse mechanism they incorporate (inheritance). In 
conclusion agent technologies can persuade of their usefulness if they show their 
adoptability, programming efficiency and usability.
One approach to address the aforementioned challenges in the area of software agent 
research is to design and develop language-neutral frameworks that provide an 
environment within which agents can execute, interact and perform their tasks efficiently. 
Although the agents can act as completely autonomous entities, the agent research 
literature indicates strongly that there are a number of services that need to be offered to 
agents on a group-basis because of their nature/importance. Examples of such services 
include security, agent organisation/discovery and mobility management. Agent 
frameworks offer a natural context within which these services can be offered.
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1.2 Motivations
The main aim of this thesis is to design a framework for general-purpose Internet 
computing based on autonomous, mobile, software agents.
Firstly the framework as a whole should satisfy the conditions mentioned in the 
previous section. Namely it should integrate well with existing legacy software which is 
often written in a plethora of programming languages. It should also possess a high degree 
of usability by enabling the end-user to manage and use the framework. It should 
incorporate the concept of software re-use as a means of efficient data representation. 
Finally it should also provide program representation and execution schemes.
Secondly the framework should support several important services that the agents can 
use in order to execute their tasks. Four services have been identified as being necessary 
to facilitate the harmonic and efficient operation of the individual agents as well as the safe 
collaboration and interaction among them. Specifically the services that the proposed 
framework must offer are as follows:
• Agent collaboration and co-ordination. Agents frequently need to collaborate with 
each other in order to accomplish a given task. The mobile agent paradigm provides a 
good foundation for decomposing a task into a number of concurrently/parallel 
executing agents thus reducing the overall time required to complete the task 
compared to traditional monolithic applications. However the more sub-tasks a task is 
divided into the more complex and time consuming becomes the problem of 
synchronising and co-ordinating the individual sub-tasks, especially when there are 
strong interdependencies among them. The agent framework therefore must provide 
the agents with simple, efficient collaborative facilities that minimise the overhead of 
intertask co-ordination.
• Agent organisation and discovery. Single-agent frameworks do not need this service. 
However as the number of user-defined agents as well as service-offering agents 
increase, the issue of how to find agents that possess certain expertise becomes more 
important. Like a human society, an agent society (group of agents) must be organised 
in such a way that individual agents can discover efficiently other pertinent agents.
• Access control. Any computation roaming across the Internet poses serious security 
hazards to its recipient since the underlying communication network is untrusted.
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Security must therefore be treated as being of at least the same importance as the 
computational model of the framework. The security mechanism must be flexible, 
allow for user customisation and keep the processing overhead to a minimum.
• Mobility management. Mobility is itself the characteristic that gives the mobile agents 
paradigm a strategic advantage over other approaches. Unfortunately, though, the 
existence of mobility creates a series of other problems such as how to ensure 
continuous access to a mobile entity (agent), etc.
The aforementioned points together with the general requirements identified in the 
previous section form the set of objectives for this thesis.
1.3 Contributions
The contributions of the work presented in this thesis are:
• Design of the conceptual model of an architecture-based (thus language-neutral) agent 
framework that offers the aforementioned four services.
• Design of an individual agent model that possesses symmetric access control (input 
and output), contains onboard collaborative facilities, represents the agent’s state as a 
set of re-usable, movable, components expressed in XML and enables the efficient 
representation of flexible, dynamic navigational plans of the agent.
• Design of a general purpose agent organisation and discovery mechanism. The 
mechanism is adaptive through the peer-to-peer interaction of the queries and the 
organisation nodes. Moreover existing organisation nodes can be used to create new 
and more complex ones (organisation knowledge re-use).
• Design of an integrated access control mechanism that supports the distribution and 
re-use of security knowledge can be customised on a per agent basis and enables the 
agents to take more knowledgeable access control decisions. The proposed 
mechanism is also well integrated with the agent organisation and discovery facility of 
the framework.
• Provision of a number of different types of agents to enable the user to utilise any 
mixture of these in order to represent its task (program) more efficiently.
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* Design of the conceptual architecture of an integrated message-oriented and mobility 
management communication component. This component enables inter-agent 
communication, guarantees continuous access to the moving agents and allows for 
run-time customisations/modifications such as the creation/deletion of message- 
passing nodes, the addition of new participating system servers, etc.
• Design and prototype implementation of a graphical interface via which the users can 
create/delete/interact with existing agents. The user-agent interaction is mutual 
because agents can also send messages to users which are then displayed directly on 
the graphical interface.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows;
Chapter 2 contains the literature review. The review is divided in two parts. The first 
part gives a primer on mobile agents covering the definition, characteristics and 
applications of mobile agents. The second part presents and analyses the two predominant 
approaches in designing mobile agent frameworks ; the language and the architecture 
approach. The general characteristics of each approach are identified and criticised. Each 
of the approaches is then compared against the objectives of this thesis. The results of this 
comparison are used in following chapters to justify certain design decisions.
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual model of the proposed framework which consists of 
an agent facilitator (cell) and the agent system. An abstract model of the agent facilitator 
is then presented and it is used to build a more concrete model of the facilitator. The 
design and functionality of the facilitator’s components, namely, the token store, the 
information store and the agent navigator, is described in detail.
Chapter 4 presents the models of the mobility management, communication and 
organisation layers of the agent system. The fust part of the chapter begins with an 
overview of the conceptual model of the integrated mobility management and 
communication layer of the agent system. Next it presents the supported addressing 
schemes for mobile agents, which is followed by a brief description of the contents and 
functionality of the main entities of the model. The second part of the chapter starts with a
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general overview and criticism of the current approaches in the area of information and 
resource discovery. It then proceeds by presenting an abstract model for the organisation 
of agents. Similar to chapter 3, this abstract model is then used as a basis to build and 
describe the design of a concrete model of the organisation and discovery layer of the 
agent system. The chapter presents in detail the architecture of the organisation nodes 
(group managers), the internal structure of the links (the building blocks of the group 
managers), the structure of the queries (discovery messages) as well as the query-link 
interaction. It then continues to present how existing group managers can be used to build 
new ones (composite group managers). Throughout the chapter there is an analysis of the 
consistency mechanisms the described model provides to ensure the integrity of the 
organisational structure.
Chapter 5 presents the access control model of the framework. The presented model 
contains two layers. The first layer is the access control facilities embedded within the cell. 
The second layer is the access control facilities (lock cells) the agent system provides to 
support security knowledge sharing and re-use. Like chapters 3 and 4 this chapter begins 
with the presentation and analysis of an abstract model for access control based on the 
idea of locks and keys. It then describes the semantics of the locks and keys as well as the 
operations that can be performed on them. The chapter continues with the presentation of 
the concrete access control model including the description of the contents and 
functionality of lock cells. Finally it is shown how lock cells can be combined to produce 
composite lock cells in a similar fashion.to the process of creating composite group 
managers from existing ones in chapter 4.
Chapter 6 presents the design and prototype implementation of a GUI via which 
potential users could interact and manage an implementation of the framework. The first 
part of the chapter shows and justifies the main components of the GUI. The second part 
outlines its prototype implementation in Java 1.1.
Finally chapter 7 has the conclusions of the thesis and briefly describes possible 
avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature survey
2.1 Definition of agents
Humans have always been fascinated with the idea of anthropomorphic artificial 
beings such as robots, cyborgs, androids, etc. The word robot, derived from the Czech 
word for drudgery has been used extensively to describe a whole range of intelligent 
mechanical machines from factory workers to digital butlers. The public image of robots 
has two sides. On the one hand there is profuse excitement about the new quality o f life 
that these artificially intelligent beings will bring into the human society. On the other 
hand there is serious scepticism regarding the building and deployment o f highly 
intelligent machines at a massive scale. This scepticism stems from the fact that the more 
intelligent robots become the more doubtful it becomes that these robots will obey their 
human masters. Although no-one can be absolutely sure, there is a danger that the more 
humanlike the robots become, the more likely it is that the robots could exhibit certain 
unwanted or dangerous human behavioural patterns such as frailties and eccentricities. 
For similar reasons this scepticism has expanded in the area of software where the design 
and activation of powerful software robotic entities could pose serious threats especially 
in a human society whose main functions become rapidly fully dependent on computer 
software. These concerns must be taken into account in the design of the software agents.
Mechanical automata of various kinds and functionality have existed for a long time. 
However the notion of autonomous agents have recently begun to appear, concurrently 
with advances in the areas of control theory, computer science and engineering. Noiman 
[92] notes that probably “the most relevant predecessors to today’s intelligent agents are 
servomechanisms and other control devices, including factory control”. The focus of the
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research community has shifted from hardware to software during the past few decades 
(Negroponte [90]). According to Kay [65] the idea of a software agent actually originated 
with John McCarthy in the mid 1950’s who had a view of an autonomous system that 
would carry out the necessary computer operations in order to perform a user-defined 
task and interact with the user only to request some advice. In this context an agent 
would effectively be a software robot that lives and operates within a computer 
environment.
Agent research is classified by Nwana [93], who identifies two main streams o f work. 
The first originates in the late 1970’s and has its roots in the area of Distributed Artificial 
Intelligence (DAI). This research stream focuses on agent macro issues such as 
cooperation, communication and inter-task coordination. The second stream is relatively 
recent. It started in the early 1990’s and focuses on the study of a broader range of agent 
types. ^
The output of these two agent research streams has resulted in the proliferation of a 
wide variety of agent models, systems and applications. This in turn resulted in an 
explosion in the definition and use of the term agent. Nowadays there is a very long list 
o f agent definitions given by different researchers in different areas. This list represents 
the confusion and possibly conflicting views of the researchers as to what an agent is.
According to Bradshaw [24] this list is the product of two separate approaches to the 
definition of agents. The first approach is based on “the notion of agenthood as an 
ascription made by some person”. The second is based on “a description of the attributes 
that software agents are designed to possess”.
The ascription-based definition of agents proclaims that the notion of agency cannot 
be characterised as an attribute listing but as an attribution on the part of some person 
(van de Welde [118]). It is effectively the expectations and view point of an individual 
that determine what an agent is. These different view points can naturally be conflicting, 
for example one person’s “intelligent agent” is someone else’s “mobile object”. Dennett 
[35] observes that perhaps agents are a notion that developers use to define the behaviour 
of their software in the same way object-orientation is used to express certain algorithms 
more efficiently. The Collins New English Dictionary defines an agent as “one that acts 
or has the authority to act on behalf o f or represent another”. The term agent is derived 
from the latin verb agere : to act or do. Therefore, we can argue that a software agent is 
essentially a computer program which acts on behalf of a user and carries out a specific 
task that has been delegated to it. Dennett goes further and describes three predictive
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stances that people can take towards systems in general: the physical, design and 
intentional stances. Singh [114] utilises Dennett’s classification and claims that there are 
pragmatic and technical reasons for viewing agents as intentional systems.
The description-based definition of agents seems to be more attractive to agent 
researchers. Shoham [113] defines an agent as a continuous, autonomous, software entity 
that operates within an environment populated with other agents. There are three 
keywords in this definition: continuous, autonomous and agent environment. Continuity 
is a desirable characteristic of an agent because it is a necessary factor for embedding 
into the agents learning capabilities. Autonomy is also required because ideally agents 
should be capable of carrying out their tasks without direct, continuous assistance from 
their human users. The existence of a multi-agent environment (society) implies that 
individual agents are expected to communicate and interact with each other in order to 
achieve their targets perhaps more efficiently. Nwana [93, 94] claims that a multi-agent 
society is more powerful than an individual agent. He says that agents as individuals 
might have very restricted functionality but as a society can be powerful enough to 
simulate a “digital sister-in-law” as defined by Negroponte [90]. According to the 
requiiements of the problem they are assigned to, agents can possess several attributes to 
a certain degree. Several key agent researchers have attempted to provide a 
comprehensive list of such attributes. Etzioni and Weld [40] and Franklin and Graesser 
[42] propose among others the following key characterising attributes for software 
agents :
• Reactivity, The ability of an agent to sense its environment and react accordingly.
• Autonomy. An agent can also be pro-active and initiate certain actions in order to 
achieve a specific goal (goal-directed).
• Mobility. Agents can physically migrate from one host to another in order to perform 
their tasks more efficiently.
• Adaptivity. Agents can learn from their experience and adapt to a changing 
environment.
• Collaborative behaviour. Agents can collaborate with each other in order to achieve 
a common goal.
In a similar manner, Marc Belgrave [17] in his Unified Agent Architecture attempts 
to categorise such attributes into main and auxilliary.
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2.2 Agent taxonomy
A simpler way of char acterising all possible types of agents than would result if we 
attempted to describe all possible combinations of all agent attributes, is to attempt to 
provide various taxonomies of agents [29]. Moulin and Chaib-draa [86] classify agents 
into reactive, intentional and social categories. A reactive agent is the simplest type of 
agent since it only reacts to changes in its environment. An intentional agent is more 
sophisticated and possesses intentions and beliefs based on which it can reason and 
create different plans of action. A social agent builds on the intentional agent and 
contains explicit models of other agents which it can use to interact with them. Gilbert et 
al [50] (figure 2.1) classifies intelligent agents into a three dimensional space of agency, 
intelligence and mobility. Below a brief explanation of these dimensions is provided:
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Figure 2.1 Agent taxonomy according to Gilbert
Agency. The agency represents the degree of freedom an agent has. At the 
minimum level, an agent should be able to operate asynchronously without 
interacting or being guided by the user-owner. At the other end, an agent should be 
able to interact with other agents belonging to other user-owners, in order to 
accomplish the task in the most beneficial way for the owner.
Intelligence. The intelligence represents the ability of an agent to learn and possibly 
to reason as well. At the first level of intelligence, an agent should only be able to 
follow a predefined set of rules. The next level is to be able to follow a user-model 
which is not so strict and instead of specifying a set of rules for accomplishing a task,
12
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it provides a plan that the agent must follow. Finally, at the last level, an agent 
should be able to learn from its behaviour and adapt to its environment. Such an 
agent could make decisions on its own, reason about them and eventually produce 
information of higher value to its owner.
■ M obility. Mobility, as the word implies, represents the ability o f an agent to move 
among locations in the network while working to accomplish its task. Mobility 
increases the efficiency of an agent since it can visit remote sites and use remote 
resources which otherwise would have been unavailable or very costly in terms of 
communication bandwidth. On the other hand though, mobile agents are a security 
risk since in the real world agents can be generated to serve malicious purposes. 
Agents can be static, or simple mobile scripts created on one machine and transported 
to another, or mobile objects in which case they are transported from machine to 
machine in the middle o f their execution * carrying accumulated state data with 
them.
Nwana [93] proposes a different classification scheme (figure 2.2). According to this 
taxonomy agents are characterised by mobility, a symbolic reasoning model, ideal and 
primary attributes, roles, hybrid philosophies and secondary attributes. The Nwana 
taxonomy effectively creates seven agent categories : collaborative agents; mobile 
agents; reactive agents; hybrid agents; smart agents; information agents; and interface 
agents.
Smart
Learn
Interface
AgentsAutonomous
Figure 2.2 Agent taxonomy according to Nwana
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Franklin and Graesser [42] provide a hierarchical classification o f agents whose root 
element is the type of autonomous agents. Petrie [102] argues for a specific class of 
agents : the typed-message agents. Typed-message agents are different from other 
software because they can communicate with each other using a shared message 
protocol. An example of such a protocol is the Knowledge Query and Manipulation 
Language (KQML) [41]. He also specifies that the shared communication protocol must 
be application-independent and peer-to-peer.
In conclusion according to Bradshaw [24] the term agent, like many other computing 
terms, began with a metaphor but will end up representing concrete software artifacts. As 
time goes by the public exposure of agent-based software and technology will either 
eventually produce a globally agreed semantic of the term agent or will increase today’s 
confusion around this term even more. However, regardless of the success or failure of 
the term agent to denote something globally understood, it is certain that the motivations 
and advantages for building agent-based software will persist over time [24].
Indeed agent-based distributed computing offers several advantages over traditional 
approaches. Lange [75] describes seven important benefits of agents : reduction of 
network load because of their mobility; overcoming of network latency because agents 
can operate at the location of the data; encapsulation of protocols; asynchronous and 
autonomous execution; adaptivity; heterogeneity and robustness; and fault-tolerance. 
Furthermore according to Bradshaw [24] agents can provide intelligent interoperability in 
software systems and help overcome the limitations of direct manipulation interfaces.
2.3 Applications of agents
The agent model is very attractive and suits well the design of Internet-based 
applications. Areas in which agents have been applied widely include: 
telecommunications, interfaces for PDA systems, information retrieval, etc. [122]
Information retrieval is an excellent application area for agents since agents act on 
behalf o f the user and can automate routine tasks. Some of the problems in this area, 
which agents have been used to solve are:
= Automation of information filtering and retrieval tasks.
® Automation of navigation and processing in heterogeneous networks.
■ Modelling the user’s requiiements and preferences for information.
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■ Listing of available resources in a network.
■ User-friendly access to resources.
Apai't from information retrieval agents, at this moment there are hundreds of
different agents in the Internet. Some of the most common types o f agents are the
following:
1. Advisory agents. Advisory agents do not carry out tasks. Instead, they offer advice 
to facilitate users’ work. Initially such an agent does not know the work patterns and 
the preferences of its user. But gradually it starts learning and builds a user model 
which is persistent, in other words it remains associated with a user between different 
sessions [59]. A characteristic example of such an agent is the Coach, developed by 
Ted Selker at IBM, which tutors the Lisp programming language.
2. A ssistant agents. Assistant agents are agents which can actually carry out tasks for 
the users. They are more ambitious than the advisory ones since they can often 
operate without feedback by the user and they possess a higher level of artificial 
intelligence. Because of this fact, they are a controversial topic which is still under 
debate. Assistant agents are more independent than the advisory ones but this implies 
that the user-control on such an agent is lower. Trust and competence are equally 
important attributes that such an agent must possess in order to be maximally 
beneficial for its user.
3. W atcher agents. A watcher agent operates autonomously, looking for specific 
information. When information relevant to the user is found or when an event the 
user is interested in has occurred, the user is either diiectly notified (for example by 
Email) or the information is stored for future access. A characteristic example o f this 
type of agent is the M IT’s Fishwrap newspaper which collects stories and articles 
from different sources and then produces a personalised version of the newspaper.
4. Shopping agents. Shopping agents are doing comparison shopping for their users 
and finding the best price for an item. The best known shopping agent on the Internet 
is the Bargain Finder from Andersen Consulting. This agent does comparison 
shopping for CDs and finds the best price of the CD specified by its user. Retailers 
can protect themselves from this competition by actually denying access to a 
shopping agent.
There are various end-user taxonomies of agents and agent applications. [88]
classifies the agents into desktop, Internet and Intranet agents according to three factors.
Firstly the environment the agents operate within. Secondly the type of task they are
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designed to perform and thirdly their internal knowledge architecture. The three 
aforementioned agent types are decomposed into further sub-categories. The desktop 
agent type includes operating system agents, application agents, etc. The Internet agents 
include Web search, information retrieval and filtering, notification and mobile agents 
[69]. The Intranet agents include database agents, resource brokering agents.
2.4 Agent models
A wide range of agent models exists. Müller [87] classifies these models into 
deliberative, reactive and hybrid. Figure 2.3 shows a table of agent architectures 
classified according to the Müller taxonomy.
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Figure 2.3 Müller taxonomy of agent models
Deliberative agents possess an explicit model of their environment which they utilise 
as a basis for logical reasoning. The environment model these agents possess is typically 
static, predefined and very complex. Deliberative agents are not suitable for use in 
dynamic environments because their environment model is rigid and cannot be updated 
dynamically to reflect any changes that occur at run time. Probably the most important 
characteristic of deliberative agents is their ability to reason. During the decision-making 
process, the agent utilises the knowledge contained in its model to modify its internal, or 
often called mental, state.
Rao/Georgeff [104] argued that this mental state consists of three base components : 
beliefs, desires, intentions which resulted in giving the deliberative agents the alias BDI.
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Müller [87] extended the classical BDI concept with two new components: goals and 
plans. Below is a brief description of the semantics of these five elements o f the 
deliberative agents’ mental state:
■ Beliefs. These are the views the agent has of its environment. These views are used 
to express its expectations of possible future states.
■ Desires. These contain the agent’s judgements of future situations. The desires o f an 
agent can be unrealistic or even contradict each other.
■ Goals. These are a subset of the agent’s desires that the agent could fulfil in the 
future. Thus in contrast to the rest of its desires, the agent’s goals must be realistic 
and not contradictory. Essentially the goals define the agent’s potential future actions.
■ Intentions. These are a subset of the agent’s goals. When an agent decides to follow a 
specific goal then this goal becomes an intention.
■ Plans. The plans combine the agent’s intentions into consistent units [25].
The BDI agent model is a typical representative of deliberative agents. Figure 2.4 
shows the conceptual architecture of a typical deliberative agent.
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Figure 2.4 Conceptual model of a BDI agent
The rigid structure and complexity of deliberative agents have raised a number of 
serious concerns which lead eventually to a diametrically opposite concept, the so-called 
reactive agents. Reactive agents do not have any internal model of their environment and 
they do not have the ability to perform complex logical reasoning. Brenner [25] argues 
that “the reason for these restrictions lies in the creation of compact, error-tolerant and 
flexible agents”. Reactive agents obtain the necessary knowledge from their interaction 
with their environment. Therefore the intelligence a reactive agent exhibits is directly 
related to the level and amount of interaction the agent has with its environment. Figure
17
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2.5 shows a simplified architecture of a reactive agent. Sensors record information from 
the environment which is subsequently forwarded to a number of task-specific 
competence modules which in turn produce reactions that are transferred to the 
environment via the agent’s actuators. A typical example of a reactive agent is the 
Brooks subsumption architecture (Brooks [26]).
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Figure 2.5 Concepttial model of reactive agents
The reactive agents have a number of advantages over the deliberative agents 
including no centralised structures such as planners which results in better fault-tolerance 
and robustness, flexibility and simplicity. However reactive agents do have certain 
limitations in comparison to the deliberative agents such as no capability for planning. 
This results in the creation of a third agent model that attempts to integrate the reactive 
and deliberative agent models in order to harness the advantages of both approaches. 
Such agents are called hybrid agents. The Interrap architecture (figure 2.6) from Müller 
[87] is probably the most famous agent architecture that falls into the category of hybrid 
agents.
A typical hybrid agent contains a reactive and a deliberative module. The reactive 
module is used primarily for interaction with the environment whereas the deliberative 
module is used to provide the services of logical reasoning and planning. The hybrid 
agents are normally designed as a hierarchical architecture. The lower levels of this 
hierarchy are reactive modules which are used to sense and acquire information from the 
environment. The upper levels are occupied by deliberative modules which typically 
perform goal determination and planning.
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2.5 Approaches for the analysis and design of agent- 
oriented systems
Like any other software, the development of agent-based software goes through the 
phases of analysis, design and implementation. In this section we will present different 
methodologies for the analysis and development of agent systems.
Burmeister [27] specifies three models for the analysis phase of agent-oriented 
systems (figure 2.7): the agent model, the organisation model and the cooperation model.
The agent model specifies the internal structure of the agents. This structure defines 
the internal attributes and methods (in the object-oriented context) as well as the 
behavioural patterns and intentions of the agents. The organisation model specifies the 
static relationships between agents and agents’ categories. Such relationships can 
represent inheritance, aggregation or different roles that the agents assume within their 
environment. The cooperation model defines cooperation and interaction among the 
agents. Messages form the basis for the communication and cooperation processes. The 
model must specify the cooperation objectives, the message types and message exchange 
sequences (protocols).
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Figure 2.7 Burmeister’s agent-oriented analysis
Kinny [66] developped a similar methodoly to Burmeister. However whereas 
Burmeister’s approach focuses more on the agent interaction and cooperation, Kinny 
assigns more importance to the agent’s internal structure. Kinny’s methodology 
introduces two abstractions, the internal and external view, and consequently provides 
both internal and external models. Kinny separates the agent’s architecture from that of 
the agent system. The internal model specifies each individual agent’s architecture (i.e. 
attributes, knowledge, methods, etc.) whereas the external model defines the agent’s 
responsibilities and interaction with other objects. Kinny identifies two external models: 
the agent model and the interaction model. The agent model describes the static 
relationships between agents in the form of agent hierarchies. Essentially it has the same 
objectives with Burmeister’s organisation model. The interaction model represents the 
responsibilities, communication, services and cooperation among agents. This model is 
very similar to Burmeister’s cooperation model. In a similar manner Kinny defines three 
internal models: the belief model, the goal model and the plan model. These models can 
be used for the analysis of agent systems whose basic entities are BDI agents.
There are three predominant approaches for agent-oriented design: the facilitator and 
agent communication language approach; the language based approach and the 
architecture based approach.
Genesereth [49] provides a comprehensive methodology for the design of agent- 
oriented systems which is based on Kinny’s analysis model. In this approach agents are
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defined as entities that can communicate with each other by using a specific agent 
communication language such as KQML. Based on this definition he argues that there 
are three ways of designing an agent (or an internal agent model in Kinny’s 
terminology): rewriting; using wrappers or using transducers. An agent can be written 
from scratch so as to be able to use directly the standard agent communication language. 
Another way is to take an existing program and wrap it with specialised code so that the 
resulting code is capable of using the agent communication language. Alternatively there 
can be specialised software called transducers that mediate the communication between 
traditional programs and agents. The traditional programs are separate entities that 
communicate with transducers with a proprietary protocol. The transducers act as 
gateways and transform the proprietary messages from the traditional software into 
messages that satisfy the rules of the agent communication language. Genesereth also 
specifies that the agent system (external model in Kinny’s terminology) is either direct or 
federated. In a direct agent system the agents communicate with each other directly. 
Genesereth focuses though on federated systems. A federated agent system consists of a 
set of entities called facilitators. Agents do not communicate directly with each other but 
only through facilitators which act as message routers. Facilitators could also be assigned 
higher level functionality to make them capable of providing security, content routing, 
agent discovery mechanisms, etc.
In the language-based approach both the agents and the agent system are built upon a 
specific programming language’s characteristics, functionality and run-time 
environment. In the Genesereth sense agents are rewritten in a specific language and the 
agent system is federated in which the specific language’s run-time environment entities 
act as facilitators. Clearly in this approach the most important design decision that the 
developer has to take is the selection of the programming language that will form the 
basis of the design. Several researchers have attempted to identify the criteria that a 
programming language has to satisfy in order to be suitable for the development of 
agents and agent systems. Hohl [56] and Knabe [67] specified the following :
“ Object-oriented. Agents can be considered as objects whose internal state (data) can 
only be acessed and manipulated through the invocation of a method. Each agent has 
a public interface which comprises a set of publically available methods.
■ Platform independence. The agent programming language must possess a high degree 
of platform independence because agents should be capable of operating within
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different hardware and software platforms. The Internet, arguably one of the best 
application areas of agents, is a vast heterogeneous distributed environment.
“ Communications capability. The language must provide sufficient and efficient 
mechanisms for implementing inter-agent communication.
■ Security. The agent language must provide a very high degree o f security for the 
execution of agents. Security after all is one of the primary concerns of agent 
sceptics.
Together with these requirements an agent programming language must also provide 
a range of additional features such as persistence and multitasking. The languages agent 
researchers have used until now to develop agent-oriented systems fall broadly speaking 
into three categories. The first category is object-oriented languages that are widely 
available such as Java [51]. The second category is proprietary languages such as 
Telescript [45, 48]. The third category is script'ing languages which are either widely 
available such as Tel [16] and Python [3], or proprietary such as WAVE [108, 109] and 
Messengers [20]. Nwana and Wooldridge [94] provide a comprehensive overview and 
classification of agent programming languages.
The ai'chitecture-based agent design approach provides a different perspective. 
Language-based agent systems are bound to have limited end-user popularity and 
integration with existing software because : a) they require that the user has a good 
knowledge of the language they are based on; and b) existing software written in other 
languages cannot easily be converted and interoperate with the language-based agents. 
The architecture-based approach attempts to resolve these limitations by separating the 
programming languages (implementation) from the internal structure of both the agent 
and the agent system. In the Genesereth sense the architecture-based approach defines an 
agent as a number of existing software components together with a transducer which 
insulates these components from the agent environment. The agent system is a federated 
system where specialised software entities provide a variety of services in a distributed 
manner. In the late 1990’s the architecture-based design approach was effectively split 
into two further categories: the object-oriented category mainly represented by the 
CORE A standard [98] and the non-object-oriented category represented by FIFA [88]. 
Both COREA and FIPA are currently the only standards in the domain of software 
agents and will be presented in subsequent sections of this chapter. In the next section we 
will attempt to define some basic services that an agent system must offer to the agents. 
In section 2.7 we will elaborate on the points of section 2.6 and define a number of
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important issues that an agent system must support. These issues will form the design
objectives of the agent architecture presented in this thesis.
2.6 Basic modules of agent systems
The infrastructure needed to support agent systems comprises the following five
fundamental components according to [91]:
1. Execution facility. The execution facility is essentially the agent’s runtime 
environment. In other words it is the environment within which an agent ‘lives’. It 
must be taken into account the fact that the agent can be mobile, in which case it 
moves from machine to machine. The execution facility includes the hardware and 
software necessary for an agent to execute tasks. One of the most important 
parameters that affects the execution component is the selection of the agent 
programming language. This factor will be discussed in the following section.
2. Com m unication facility. The communication facility deals with the communication 
between agents or between agents and other entities. It is the procedure that must be 
followed in order for information to be exchanged in a transaction. Exchanging 
messages is the most fundamental means of communication. Messages have content, 
which is the data included in the message, and context, which is what changes the 
content to information. According to [17] the communication facility is implemented 
as a standard set of protocols and it should support both synchronous and 
asynchronous communication methods.
3. T ranspo rt facility. The suppoU facility deals with how the agent communicates. It 
refers to the means by which an agent can move from a network location to another 
in order to perform a task. It also refers to the distribution of static agents to network 
sites. Transport mechanisms explored for possible use as agent transportation means 
include Electronic Mail, the UNIX Remote Shell (rsh) and TCP/IP [72].
4. Packaging facility. The packaging facility provides a standard method of wrapping 
agents along with the information describing their internal state. Regardless of their 
structure, the agents have to store state, authentication, agent capabilities and goal 
information.
5. Security. The security facility should ensure that all the components involved in an 
agent system are protected. There must be a standard method for determining an
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agent’s owner (identification). Resources must also be safe-guarded against 
malicious or ill-programmed agents. Security should be an internal attribute of an 
agent system and not an additional and perhaps auxiliary feature.
2.7 Mobile software agents issues
In this thesis we will attempt to design an agent architecture that addresses the issues 
of mobility, access control, agent discovery, agent collaboration and communication. 
Below we provide a concise analysis of these issues together with a review of relevant 
research work„
M obility. Mobility is one of the primary characteristics of an agent and as such it 
must be among the basic services a mobile ageqt architecture supports. The problem of 
mobility can be decomposed into a set of three sub-problems. Firstly an agent must have 
some means of deciding where to go and what to do (navigation). Secondly the agent 
system must intercept any migration request from an agent and physically move the 
agent (code and data) to the desired location. Thirdly the agent system must be capable of 
tracking all the currently active agents so that regardless of their mobility patterns and 
frequency, the agents are continiously accessible. An agent aichitecture can only be said 
to address the issue of agent mobility if it provides the necessary mechanisms to solve all 
three mobility sub-problems.
Mobility can be classified as strong or weak depending on whether the agent can start 
execution from the instruction immediately following the request for migration (strong 
mobility) or it has to start from the beginning (weak mobility). A typical example of 
systems following the strong mobility model is the Odyssey [46] whereas a typical weak 
mobility system is TACOMA [61]. In strong mobility the navigation and computation 
logic of an agent are integrated into a single monolithic program. This has the advantage 
that complex navigation logic can be produced simply by using the control constructs of 
a programming language. However strong mobility implies some form of homogeneity 
and has a rigid structure which cannot be modified dynamically. Typically this type of 
mobility is followed by language-based systems. Its implementation is done by: a) 
incorporating in the language a migration request such as go, migrate, etc. and b) 
extending the interpreter of the language so that the state of the agent can be saved in an 
intermediate format for transportation over the network.
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In weak mobility navigation is separated from computation. Typically the navigation 
logic is expressed as a data structure in the form of a travel itinerary. The building block 
of an itinerary is a simple hop which is represented as a pair destination and action. It 
specifies where the agent has to go and what action it is supposed to perform upon its 
arrival. Itineraries can be more complex by adding various control constructs, i.e. 
repetition, selection, etc. In this way weak mobility can emulate the expression power of 
strong mobility schemes while bypassing the need for having a special notation 
(language) for navigation. The main advantages of weak mobility are that: a) it assumes 
heterogeneity rather than homogeneity; b) the navigation structure is visible to the 
programmer and it could theoretically be modified dynamically; and c) the computation 
language does not need any extensions or modifications to incorporate mobility 
commands. On the other hand in weak mobility, the agent can only be executed from the 
beginning upon its arrival at the destination. ‘
Com m unication. There are three ways of performing communication between 
mobile agents. The first approach is method invocation. In this case agents are object 
entities which communicate with each other by means of invoking methods from their 
interfaces. Pure procedure calls are essentially the simplest and most primitive form of 
communication. The second approach is blackboard systems. A blackboard is essentially 
a common work area which agents can use to exchange information and knowledge 
(figure 2.8).
Figure 2.8 Blackboard-based agent communication
In this approach an agent initiates a communication action by placing an information 
item on the blackboard. Other agents can access the blackboard and retrieve its current
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contents. Blackboards can be protected and agents may need to obtain authorisation 
before they can access a specific blackboard. In general this communication method is 
suitable for task sharing and result sharing. The third approach is message passing. 
Agents exchange messages and can establish in this way communication and cooperation 
mechanisms using defined protocols. Message passing can be used as a basis for 
implementing various coordination strategies because the contents of the messages are 
not restricted to simple command and response structures. For example KQML defines a 
rich set of speech act primitives that can be used to represent complex communication 
acts and dialogues in a message passing agent system. Another important characteristic 
of message passing systems is that they can support asynchronous exchange of messages. 
In the mobile agent domain asynchrony is essential because this feature can result in a 
high latency tolerant agent system. Blackboard systems naturally support asynchrony as 
well in contrast to the method invocation which is inherently synchronous. Typically 
architecture-based agent systems are based on message passing whereby language-based 
systems and object-oriented architecture-based systems follow the method invocation 
approach. FF-main [79] is the only example of blackboar d based agent system. There are 
also two Java-based systems: MARS [28] and Jada [32] whose communication system is 
based on tuple spaces. Tuple spaces, like the Linda language defines, is essentially a 
blackboard system whose contents are accessed with associative mechanisms.
Cooperation. Franklin [42] attempted to produce a typology of cooperation (figure 
2.9). According to this classification multi agent systems are called independent if their 
member agents are completely independent from each other and pursue their own goals. 
Cooperative systems on the other hand have explicit cooperative mechanisms. 
Cooperation in such systems can either be communicative in which case agents use 
communications protocols and procedures to achieve cooperation, or non-communicative 
in which case the agents cooperate indirectly through theii* environment. In this approach 
agents observe thefr environment, sense changes caused by other agents and in response 
to pertinent changes initiate actions which result in yet more changes in their 
environment. Communicative cooperation agents can either be deliberative if they share 
a common planning mechanism or negotiation-oriented in which case they are also 
competitive with each other. Partial Global Planning (PGP) (Durfee Lesser [39]) is an 
example of deliberative communicative cooperation systems whereby contract nets 
(Albayrac [2]) is an example of negotiation-oriented cooperation systems.
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Multi-agent systems
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Deliberative Negotiating
Figure 2.9 Franklin’s cooperation typology
There are also two other characteristics th§t can be used to distinguish different 
cooperation/coordination models: spatial and temporal coupling. Spatially coupled 
coordination models require the participating entities to share a common namespace. 
Temporally coupled models require synchronisation of the participating entities. [28] 
provides a classification of a number of mobile agent systems according to these 
characteristics.
An important conclusion we can draw is that communication is coupled with 
cooperation. The communication method an agent systems follow determines at a great 
extent the cooperation mechanism as well. For example, FF-main [79] has a blackboard- 
based communication system and as a result its cooperation model is spatially coupled 
and temporally uncoupled. We can also observe that blackboard and tuple space-based 
cooperation systems rely on external entities (environment) to provide the service of 
cooperation.
O rganisation and discovery. In a multi-agent system (society) the issue of efficient 
discovery of suitable agents is very important. There are two possible ways of addressing 
this problem. Firstly we can assume that each agent knows the name and services of 
every agent that it wants to contact and interact with. This approach, although adequate 
for systems where the number of agents is small, becomes impossible as the number of 
member agents of the system increase. The second approach, and indeed the one all 
existing agent systems follow, is to provide some form of organisation of agents 
according their contents/services. There are two variants of this: the matchmakers and the 
brokers.
27
Nick Antonopoulos Chapter 2
A matchmaker (or directory or yellow pages) is an agent with special capabilities that 
has the task of matching incoming requests for services with published services from 
service provider agents. Figure 2.10 shows the interaction between an information 
requesting agent (requester), an information provider agent (server) and a matchmaker in 
KQML primitives. The requester asks the matchmaker for specific services. The 
matchmaker searches its database of published services and attempts to match the 
required services with one or more of the published services. If such a match is found 
then the address and other relevant details are returned to the requester who is then 
responsible to contact the server directly without the intervention of the matchmaker. 
This mechanism shows why matchmaker agents are given various aliases. For example a 
matchmaker can be called yellow pages because humans flip through the real yellow 
pages to find the contact details of individuals offering specific services the same way 
requesting agents search the contents of matchmakers to discover suitable server agents.
ask-w ill X)
Requester ^  i Matchmaker
n.‘p l \ in .im o s )
ask-alltn) replyfxj
advcnisc(UNk-alKx)>
Server
uiiath 'crtisc
fask-all(x)>
Figure 2.10 Matchmaker operation
Brokers have very similar functionality to that of matchmakers (figure 2.11). The 
main difference is that the broker not only finds suitable agents on behalf of the requester 
but also contacts these agents (servers), uses their services and returns to the requester 
the results. In this way the requester does not communicate directly with any server 
agents. The broker is commissioned to find and use any agents it decides to be relevant. 
[25] provides a good analysis and comparison of matchmakers and brokers.
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Figure 2.11 Broker operation
Access control. Access control mechanisms are necessary in a multi-agent system to 
ensure that only authorised agents can access the contents and services of other agents. 
The issue of access control is tightly coupled with the issue of authentication. 
Authentication is the process of verifying the true identity of an agent. Without such a 
process any access control mechanisms fall apart since agents can masquerade and 
impersonate others. For this reason it is imperative that all the agents in the system are 
given upon their creation a unique ID that remains constant for their lifetime and cannot 
be forged or modified. Furthermore the agents usually, by virtue of being the 
representatives of tasks of a certain human user, are also given certain security attributes 
according to their user owner.
In the mobile agent domain there are five approaches for access control. The first 
approach is Access Control Lists (ACL) associated with every agent. In this approach 
there is exactly one ACL assigned to an agent. Whenever another agent attempts to 
access this agent then the ACL is searched by the agent system to decide whether the 
requesting agent has enough authorisation to access this agent. Typically the ACL is a 
two-column table matching agent identities to different operations. In Java, for example, 
there is the notion of a guarded object whereby an object is encapsulated in a guardian 
object that contains an ACL via which access to the protected object is restricted.
The second approach is with the notion of security proxies. In this case agents cannot 
access other agents directly but only through their security proxies. A security proxy is 
essentially an object that decides whether to forward any requests it receives to the real 
target object. Such a decision is taken according to the security policy and data the 
security proxy implements. IBM Aglets [58] follow this approach. D ’Agents [107] use 
security proxies (resource managers) as well to protect the host resources from malicious
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agents. Security proxies can be made dynamic by introducing permits [46, 47]. Agents 
can be allowed to access certain resources for a certain time or for a specified number of 
times by presenting electronic tickets to the relevant security proxies. After the agent’s 
permit has expired the proxy rejects any further access requests.
The third approach is ACLs extended with a few abstractions. In the first approach 
the ACL matches agent Ids with operations these agents are allowed to perform on other 
agents. This approach does not scale well as the number of agents increases. For this 
reason the notions of roles and rights was introduced. According to this scheme agents 
are given different roles, i.e. there is a table associating agent Ids with roles, and specific 
operations on specific agents are organised into rights, i.e. there is a table associating a 
right with a set of operations on a number of agents. The central element of this approach 
is a third table associating roles to rights. Roles group together certain agents where 
rights group together several operations on se verbal agents. In this way the access control 
system is much more manageable (coarse grain) because it associates groups of agents to 
groups of operations.
The fourth approach is capabilities. Capabilities are a derivative of the ACLs. The 
only difference is that rights are not assigned to agents from static tables associated with 
the resources. Instead the agents themselves carry their rights in the form of tokens. The 
CORE A security specification will incorporate capabilities in future revisions.
The fifth approach is a form of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [43]. PKI has 
gathered momentum in the area of distributed processing during the last decade. PKI has 
been incorporated in Web browsers. Java provides a number of facilities to assist the 
programmer to define, store, distribute and use cryptographic keys. PKI can also be 
implemented by using KQML as a basis for defining several PKI-related protocols such 
as key distribution, mutual authentication, etc.
In the next section we will attempt to review critically the early years of the mobile 
agents. Specifically we will examine firstly how distributed computing is done 
traditionally, secondly we will provide an overview of the most prominent mobile agent 
frameworks in the early 1990’s and finally we will conclude by providing a concise 
evaluation of these early systems according to how they address the issues analysed in 
this section.
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2.8 The early years of mobile agents
The traditional approach in doing distributed computing is the Remote Procedure 
Calling (RPC). The RPC was conceived in the 1970’s and since then it has constituted 
the main communication standard. According to this paradigm, the communication 
between two computers A and B is the enabling of computer A to call procedures 
(programs) that reside in computer B and vice versa. If only one of them requests 
services from the other then this model of communication is called client-server. This 
name stems from the fact that the computer which is sending requests can be called client 
and the computer servicing these requests can be called server.
More specifically, in the RPC paradigm one computer requests the execution of a 
specific procedure which is resident in another computer by sending, via the underlying 
network, the requested procedure’s actual arguments [81]. This greatly resembles the 
call-by-value execution of functions and/or procedures in all imperative programming 
languages [105]. The procedure execution request includes essentially the name or 
Identification Number of the appropriate procedure and the values that substitute the 
procedure’s formal parameters in the procedure call. The computer which is the host of 
the called sub routine, after the reception of the request, executes that procedure with the 
arguments provided and then sends back to the requesting computer the results. This 
procedure is illustrated in the following diagram (figure 2.12):
Cirant
Figure 2.12 RPC based distributed computing
One of the most important objectives of the RPC is the transparency [81]. This 
means that the process of calling a procedure should look the same to the user regardless 
of whether the procedure called is local or remote. Naturally though, the fact that the 
network is used to transport the client requests to the server imposes restrictions and 
limitations to the whole process. Thus, in real life, because of network inefficiencies and
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bottlenecks as well as server shutdowns, the calling of a remote procedure is not really 
transparent.
As it can be observed, there are two main disadvantages with the RPC approach: 
firstly, the client computer can only request services or procedures that are implemented 
in the server computer. This greatly reduces the flexibility of the system since it 
constraints the number of possible procedures that can be called by the client. Secondly 
in order for a remote procedure to be called, the request must first be sent by the client 
and then the acknowledgement (including the results) must be returned from the server to 
the client. This means that continuing interaction between two computers relies 
completely on continuing communication [48]. For this reason, unreliable 
communication can have a fatal effect on the RPC.
The Remote Evaluation paradigm [115] basically states that instead of the client 
computer requesting the execution of remote procedures by supplying the necessary 
arguments, the client can supply the procedure itself to be executed at a remote computer. 
In this case the client computer sends over the network the procedure and the necessary 
data in order for that procedure to be executed (figure 2.13).
Client
S«rv«r
Figure 2.13 Remote programming
The Remote Programming paradigm has two important advantages compared to the 
RPC. Firstly, the performance of the system is improved because the network is required 
to carry less messages, hence the usage of the network, which is the bottleneck in all 
kinds of computer communication, is reduced. Secondly, and more important, the 
Remote Evaluation paradigm allows the customisation of the services a server provides 
to the user-client. This is possible since this paradigm, by allowing the user-client to send 
over to the server its own program (procedure), enables the extension of functionality of 
the server procedures.
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2.8.1 Telescript
The Remote Evaluation paradigm can be further enhanced by allowing the 
transported procedure to begin execution in the client computer and at a certain stage its 
execution stopped, following which it is sent to the server computer and its execution 
resumed there from the point it was stopped. The data that accompanies such a procedure 
when it is transported to a remote computer is essentially its current state [48].
Telescript was the first commercial mobile agent software based on the 
aforementioned extention of the Remote Evaluation paradigm. The basic building block 
of the Telescript system is the autonomous process. An autonomous process is 
essentially a program whose execution is asynchronous and independent to the execution 
of all other programs. There are two types of autonomous processes: the Agents and the 
Places [48]. Agents are mobile processes whioh can travel in the Telescript network 
gathering information. Places on the other hand are stationary processes which provide 
services to visiting agents. An agent, because of its mobility can be in different places at 
different times. Furthermore, a place can be the host of one or more agents. There aie 
three ways by which an agent can communicate with a place or other agents:
1. Travel. An agent can travel from one place to another. In order to do that it must 
present a ticket which shows the destination of the trip and the means by which this 
trip will be accomplished. The travel o f an agent is implemented by the go instruction 
in the Telescript language. After the agent has reached the destination place, it can use 
the services provided by that place. Moreover, it can establish communication with 
any agent that it is also there.
2. M eeting. A necessary condition for a meeting between two agents to occur is that 
both of them occupy (reside) the same place. If this is the case then any one of them 
can call the procedures of the other. They can also exchange information if they are 
involved in similar tasks. This agent-to-agent communication method is implemented 
by the meet instruction of the Telescript language. This instruction also allows one 
agent to refuse a meeting if the terms it has set, such as the start time o f the meeting, 
are not satisfied. If two agents which occupy different places want to communicate 
then they can either arrange to meet at a certain place (this usually implies that both 
agents will have to travel) or establish a
3. Connection. This communication method allows two agents to interact if they are at 
different places, no matter how remote. It is the traditional approach according to
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which the two agents communicate by exchanging messages. It is implemented by the 
connect instruction of the Telescript language. This instruction requires the 
identification of the target agent, the place it occupies and other terms and conditions. 
Similarly to the meeting procedure, a connection can be refused if certain criteria are 
not met.
The Telescript Language (TL) is the language used to encode the procedures o f the 
Telescript agents and places. Its syntax and its set of instructions closely resembles that 
of the C programming language. Although the TL is complete in the sense that entire 
applications can be written with it, parts of the application such as the interface to 
databases can be written in C. Its purpose is to allow developers to implement the 
communicating parts of an application.
The TL is object-oriented, since it is based upon a hierarchy o f predefined classes of 
objects. Each object has attributes and operations. An attribute represents one of the 
object’s characteristics. An operation on the other hand is a task the object can perform. 
Both attributes and operations can be private or public. If an attribute or operation is 
public then it is visible and can be called from another object.
Apart from being object-oriented, the TL is also communication-centric since the 
instructions which implement the communication methods among agents are central in 
its design. Furthermore, it exhibits persistency since the current state of every place and 
agent are stored in non-volatile memory. Finally it must be noted that one o f the most 
important characteristics of the TL is its focus on safety and security. These features will 
be discussed in a later section.
The Telescript network consists of interconnected Telescript Engines. A Telescript 
Engine (TE) is a software program which supports the Telescript language and the 
execution of the places which reside in that engine as well as the agents that visit those 
places. A TE can support more than one place and more than one agent. The number of 
places residing in an engine varies greatly and depends on the host computer in which the 
engine is implemented. Generally though, it can be said that a TE needs to support a 
multi-user, multi-process environment.
The Telescript Engine accesses the resources of its host computer through three 
Application Program Interfaces (APIs) as it can be observed from the following diagram 
(figure 2.14):
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Figure 2.14 Telescript system
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The Storage API allows the engine to access the non-volatile memory o f the host 
computer to safely store its places and agents so that they can be restored in case of a 
computer failure. The Transport API allows the engine to package and transport an agent 
to another engine via the underlying communication media. Finally the External 
Applications API enables the part of an application encoded in Telescript to 
communicate with other parts of the same application which are encoded in another 
script language such as C.
The purpose of the safety features of a language is to ensure that a program will do 
what it is intended to do and if it fails, it fails gracefully. Graceful failure means that 
persistent objects such as places and agents are safe and can be restored.
On the other hand, security features aim to protect the integrity of the system against 
malicious users. These features allow the Telescript processes to protect themselves 
against untrusted places or agents by refusing a travel, meeting or connection.
The most important safety and security features are the following [45]:
• In terpre tation . The Telescript language is an interpreted language. This implies that 
every process written in Telescript is executed via the Telescript engine. Since the 
Telescript engine acts as a mediator in the execution of agents and places, it is clear 
that the engine can check the code of every executable process and refuse executing 
any part of it which violates any security parameters.
• A uthorities. The authority of a place or agent is the user or organisation it represents. 
Places which have the same authority can be grouped into a region. Authority is a 
central security feature in Telescript. An engine refuses to accept and execute an agent 
which has failed to pass the authorisation procedure, which may demand
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cryptographic forms of proof. An agent can refuse a connection or meeting request 
from another agent if that agent either cannot show a valid authority or its authority is 
not in a list of acceptable authorities. Places can act in exactly the same way, thus 
refusing to be visited by agents which carry unacceptable authority. One important 
feature of the authority system in Telescript is that it does not allow anonymity, thus 
blocking in this way any virus attempting to deceive the system.
® Perm its. A permit in the Telescript paradigm is data that grants capabilities to agents. 
There are two type of permits: the first gives the right to execute a specific instruction 
and the second allows an agent to use a specific resource at a certain amount, for 
example it can impose a limit on the number of computations an agent can perform or 
give that agent a maximum lifetime. The permits an agent has are negotiable in the 
sense that when that agent enters a place, its permits can be restricted. No place has 
the right to increase the capabilities of a visiting agent. When it exits that place these 
restrictions are lifted but new ones can be imposed if it enters another place. Thus, 
generally, the permits provide a method of protecting the Telescript system by 
limiting the effects of malicious or ill-programmed agents and places. These 
restrictions are absolutely necessary in an environment where processes execute 
without any human intervention or control.
In the late 1990’s Telescript was re-implemented in Java and was renamed Odyssey 
[46]. The Telescript’s concepts and mechanisms have been maintained completely.
2.8.2 Logic Flow
Logic Flow is a model of distributed computation in which the program (logic) flows 
through a distributed knowledge network. Peter Sapaty [108] defined a model named as 
WAVE that follows the principles of logic flow. Navigation in WAVE is implemented 
by means of spatial matching of strings, written in WAVE language, with the network 
topology. As the WAVE program moves through the network of data nodes, it carries 
with it operations and intermediate results. When it reaches a network node, arbitrary 
processing can be performed locally and data may be left at that node to be used by other 
WAVE programs. Such an arbitrary processing can result in the dynamic splitting of the 
WAVE program into segments, each of which moves thereafter as an independent
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WAVE program in the network space. Thus there is no synchronisation and centralised 
control of the segments into which a WAVE program has been split.
The network space in the WAVE model consists of d a ta  nodes and links which 
interconnect the nodes. The data nodes are actually active in the sense they can perform 
local processing and communication with other nodes. This is possible because each 
node holds a copy of the WAVE language Interpreter (WI) which enables it to parse and 
execute any WAVE string which arrives at it.
Each node is assigned a unique address via which it can be accessed from another 
node located anywhere in the network space. Furthermore, all nodes have contents which 
is an arbitrary string that can indicate that node’s name, purpose etc.
Similarly to the nodes, the links also have contents (a string usually indicating their 
name). The links in the WAVE model are the only means of representing a relation. This 
means that if between two nodes A and B there exists the relation R then this is 
represented by creating a bi-directional (unoriented in the WAVE framework) link 
between these two nodes and give as contents to the link the name R.
Apart from the contents, a link can also have an orientation (+ or -). The node which 
is at the positive side of a link is the active part of it and the other is the passive. 
Moreover, the links can be classified in the following three categories:
1. Surface links. These links are used to interconnect adjacent nodes. They can be 
oriented or unoriented, but must be labelled (non-empty contents).
2. Tunnel links. These links are oriented and unlabelled. Their purpose is to connect 
non-adjacent nodes temporarily. These links are automatically discarded (destroyed 
after the end of the communication).
3. Loop links. These links are abstract and represent local processing in the same node. 
Finally, for every WAVE program there are two special nodes in the network space:
• The E n try  node. This is the node that receives the WAVE program when first 
injected into the network. This node has an address of 0, carries no contents, has no 
surface links to other nodes but has a copy of the WI. For this reason, all the WAVE 
programs are first executed in their entry nodes and then start propagating through the 
network if this is necessary. When the WAVE program terminates the results are sent 
back to the entry node of that program.
• The T erm inal node. The terminal node is the node that accumulates the results from 
all other nodes in the network. It has no copy of the WI and, similarly to the entry
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node, has no contents. It is accessed via a special variable through temporary 
unlabelled (tunnel) links.
A WAVE program consists of a sequences of constructs called moves. Each move is 
separated from its neighbour moves by either a period or a comma delimiter. A  period 
delimiter indicates sequential execution whereas a comma delimiter denotes concurrent 
execution.
When a WAVE program is injected in the WAVE network space via an entry node, 
its first move, which is called head, is always executed in the entry node. All the 
following moves known as tails can be executed in any node, including the entry node. 
After the execution of the head, the head itself is discai'ded and the first move o f the tail 
becomes the new head.
The basic principle of the navigation system of WAVE is that the execution of the 
current head determines the propagation of the tail [96]. So if the head specifies a hop 
from the current node to a new one then the tail will be executed in this new node. If the 
hop is multicasting or broadcasting then the set of destination nodes specified are called 
Goal Set (OS) nodes. Each of the OS nodes receives a copy of the tail, of which the first 
move will become the head and will be executed first in that node. Hence, if the resulting 
OS includes more than one node, the WAVE string splits itself in as many instances, 
called branches, as the OS nodes demand. On the other hand, if the GS is empty then no 
propagation occurs and the branch dies.
The WAVE language [109] is a language which is used to encode all the programs 
navigating the WAVE network space. Unlike any other programming language, its only 
internal information unit is a non-nested sequence of elements (scalars) called vector. A 
vector behaves much the same way as a list in declarative language or an array in an 
imperative one. A vector’s elements can be accessed by their indices or contents.
The language cannot be considered as typed since there is only one data type, that of 
a string. A scalar in fact is any combination of letters, digits and special symbols 
enclosed in a pair of quotation marks. It can be considered to be a vector of one element, 
since more elements can be appended to it. The empty value ” does not constitute an 
element in a string, hence whenever encountered it is skipped.
The WAVE language defines three classes of variables:
1. Nodal Variables. These variables are prefixed with N and are local to the nodes of 
the network space. They can be used to store intermediate computation results or code 
to be injected. They exist as long as the node to which they belong exists.
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2. F ron ta l variables. Frontal variables are prefixed with F  and are particular to a
WAVE program. They move with it in the network, thus allowing the program to
carry intermediate results with it. They are destroyed when the WAVE program to 
which they belong terminates.
3. Environm ental variables. These variables are prefixed by E and enable a WAVE 
program to read and/or modify local information in a distributed network. Some of the 
environmental variables are read-only whereas others permit their alteration. More 
specifically these variables are the following:
• Node Content C: Stores the content of the current node.
• Node Address A \ Stores the address of the current node (read-only).
• Predecessor Node Address P : Stores the address of the node previously visited by the 
current WAVE program (read-only).
• Content o f Link L: Stores the content of the Mink, the WAVE program followed, in 
order to reach the current node (read-only).
• Sign of Link S: Stores the orientation of the link, the WAVE program followed, in 
order to reach the current node (read-only).
• Terminal T: Enables the access of a special input/output terminal, which is used as a 
common communication point for all WAVE programs in the network space.
1. Apart from the classification of variables into three categories, another central point in 
the WAVE language is the definition of rules which enclose any arbitrary WAVE 
strings and determine its control and coordination. There are nine rules altogether 
which permit, among others, the sequential or parallel execution of branches, the 
repetition of a set of commands (loop), the creation of an arbitrary network topology 
and the synchronisation of WAVE branches whenever required.
The WAVE paradigm, as it was mentioned in the beginning of this section, is a typical 
representative of a family of language-based agent systems whose main functionality is 
the provision of a proprietary notation to facilitate autonomous navigational behaviour of 
programs in a virtual semantic network of passive data nodes. Bic and Fucuda [20] 
developed a similar system called Messengers which belongs in this category and 
exhibits very similar behaviour to Sapaty’s WAVE.
Echo algorithms, BPEM and Intelligent Email are three systems developed during the 
1980’s that can be considered relevant to this category.
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Echo algorithms [31] was one of the first approaches to distributed computing by 
means of propagating self-contained intelligent messages through a network of simple 
interpretive nodes. The basic idea behind this paradigm is to initiate a wave o f messages 
from some initial nodes into neighbouring nodes until all the nodes of the network are 
visited. These messages are called explorers and essentially create a forward spanning 
tree. When a message reaches a node that has been visited by another message then it 
stops and starts retracing its path to its origin. This results in a second wave o f back- 
propagating messages called echo which collect information about the graph they are 
traversing which in turn is combined to produce a global solution. Echo algorithms are 
very useful because they employ asynchronous message passing to explore the properties 
of arbitrary networks without any a priori knowledge of the network topology.
BPEM (Binary Predicate Execution Model) [19] developed at the University of 
California, Irvine, is a model designed to support the paiallel processing of knowledge in 
the form of ditributed semantic networks. In BPEM the process of answering a query is 
translated into the process for finding a topological match for a given template in the 
underlying knowledge net such that each free variable appealing in the query is bound to 
a node label of the knowledge net.
Intelligent Email [44] is essentially a family of systems whose objective is to to 
transform electronic mail messages into active or intelligent messages. Typically when 
such a message reaches its destination it is executed and gathers information from the 
local host or transports itself to another host. The Intelligent Email paradigm is restrictive 
because it is confined only within the electronic mail domain. However it is relatively 
flexible because it does not require each participating host to run a special interpreter like 
WAVE or Messengers.
Lubomir Bic, in an influential paper [20], provides a classification of all these 
systems according to the degree of navigational autonomy and dynamic composition 
each one exhibits.
2.8.3 Agent Tel
The Agent Tel is a transpoitable-agent system which is under development at 
Dartmouth College, USA. The main goals of this system are to provide multiple 
languages and transport mechanisms for the agents. Furthermore it must ensure
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transparency of communication for the end-user as well as security and fault-tolerance of 
the whole system [52]. Its name stems from the fact that its first implementation (alpha 
release) only supported the Tel programming language. Similar to Telescript, the Agent- 
Tcl system was re-written in Java in the late 1990’s and was renamed D ’Agents [107].
The architecture of Agent Tel [52] is depicted in the following figure (figure 2.15):
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Figure 2.15 Agent-Tcl architecture
As it can be seen, the Agent-Tcl system consists of four levels. The lowest level 
comprises an API for each supported transport mechanism such as TCP/IP, Email etc. 
The second level is the server that runs at each network node. Among the tasks a server 
performs are:
• Keeping track of the agents executing at that site and of the available interpreters.
• Accepting incoming agents and authenticating their identity.
• Allowing the agents to exchange messages
• Providing the transportation means by which an agent can migrate to another machine.
• Providing access to the nonvolatile memory and restoring the state of the agents in the 
event of a node failure.
The server is implemented as two cooperating processes. The first process is the 
socket watcher which is listening to a UNIX socket for incoming agents, messages and 
requests. The second process is the agent tabler whose purpose is to keep track of the 
executing agents and buffer messages between agents until the destination agent receives 
them.
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The third level of the architecture consists of an interpreter for each supported
language. The interpreter itself comprises four modules:
• An Interpreter module for a language.
• A Security module that ensures that the agent will not violate any access restrictions.
• A State Capture module, that captures and stores the state of the executing agent.
» A Server API module which interacts with the server to provide agent-migration and 
inter-agent communication.
Finally the fourth level of the Agent Tel contains the actual agents.
The Agent Tel is essentially the Tel language as developed by John Ousterhout with
the following modifications:
• The Tel core was modified in order to provide facilities for capturing the internal state 
of an executing agent.
• New commands that allow the agent-migration and communication were added. The 
most important of them are:
a) Agent_send and Agent_receive which are used to send and receive messages between 
agents.
b) Agent_meet and Agent_accept which are used to establish a direct communication 
channel between two agents.
c) Agent_submit which is used to create a child agent and then move it for execution to 
another network node.
d) Agent Jum p  which is used to capture the state of an agent, transport it to another 
machine and then resume execution at the statement immediately after the 
agentjum p.
e) Agentjbegin  which is used to obtain a unique name in the network space in order to 
be able to be identified and perhaps contacted by other agents.
The security features of Agent Tel have the following four objectives [53]:
i) Enable the server to authenticate every incoming agent, to impose on it access 
restrictions (authorisation) and ensure that these restrictions are not violated 
(enforcement).
ii) Ensure that execution of an agent does not interfere in any way with the executing 
environment of another.
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iii) Protect each agent against malicious actions from the server in which it resides. 
This means that each server must not be capable of pulling sensitive information 
out of an agent without the agent’s cooperation.
iv) Ensure that an agent does not consume excessive resources in the network even if it 
consumes only a few at each machine.
The current implementation of the Agent Tel achieves the first two of the previous 
objectives. More specifically, authentication is based on the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
system. The file to be encrypted, which can be either an agent that will travel to another 
machine or a message or a request, is sent to the PGP, which runs as a separate process. 
The PGP process encrypts the file which is then sent to the destination machine where it 
is decrypted. For example, when an agent issues an agen tjum p command then the agent 
is digitally signed by the current server’s private key and encrypted with the destination 
server’s public key. Regarding the issue of authorisation, the resources are divided into 
two categories: indirect resources which can be accessed through other agents, and built- 
in resources which can be accessed through the language commands. For the indirect 
resources, the agent which controls the resource is responsible for the access control of 
that resource. The server attaches to every message from another agent a 5-tuple which 
contains information about the identity of that agent and the trust it can be given. Then, 
based on this information, the agent controlling the resource responds appropriately to 
that message.
For the built-in resources the Agent Tel system uses Safe Tel in combination with 
resource manager agents [53]. In this way, agents are initially executed in the unsafe 
interpreter of the Safe Tel from which all ‘dangerous’ commands are removed. If  the 
agent wishes to use a resource it has to either explicitly ask permission from the relevant 
resource agent, by using the require command, or implicitly by issuing a command that 
uses the resource.
2.8.4 Tacoma
The TACOMA is a joint project between University of Troms0 and Cornell 
University [61] whose aim is to provide operating system support for agent-based 
distributed computation. It is focused on providing flexible yet simple mechanisms that 
allow the distribution of computations over a network and their remote execution.
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The computational unit in TACOMA, as in Agent Tel and Telescript, is the agent. 
The agent is essentially defined as being a set o f sequentially executed instructions with 
some initial state. This resembles the definition of a process in UNIX with the difference 
that not all o f the instructions have to be executed at the same place.
The state of the agents in TACOMA is organised into units of data called folders 
[61]. Each folder has an ASCII name and an agent can have one or more folders. For 
instance, a CODE folder can contain the source code of an agent, a HOST folder can 
contain the names of the servers that agent must visit etc. Folders can be grouped 
together into logical sets called briefcases. Hence, an entire agent can be represented by a 
briefcase. Consequently, moving the agent to another place in the network means 
transferring its briefcase to the destination machine. The main characteristic of the 
briefcase is that it can be moved. But, stationary folders are also required to be used as a 
permanent data repository. A stationary collectibn of folders is called a file  cabinet in 
TACOMA.
The basic abstraction found in TACOMA is the m eet operation which allows two 
agents to meet and hence the following general syntax:
meet agent briefcase
where agent is the agent to be met and briefcase the briefcase representing the current 
agent. It must be noted that the host at which the destination agent resides must be 
specified by the folder HOST in briefcase.
For example, if an agent was written in C, was represented by the briefcase TEST 
and wanted to be compiled then, assuming that the name of the agent which can compile 
a C program was Compiler, the required command would be:
meet Compiler TEST
At each network site there are two types of stationary specialised agents: th& firewall 
agent and one or more instances of the exec agent. The firewall agent provides a single 
entry point for guest agents at that site. Hence this agent implements authentication, 
access control and accounting of the arriving agents. It is the only gateway of that 
particular site to the rest of the network. The firewall agent, after completing the security 
check, stores the briefcase of the visiting agent in the nonvolatile memory o f the server 
and notifies one instance of the exec agent that there is a briefcase that just arrived. From 
that point onwards the firewall agent is free to accept new incoming agents.
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The exec agent, which as said before can have two or more replicas active, sets up the 
executing environment for the guest agent. In this way it can impose more restrictions by 
limiting the access the guest can have to resources.
The TACOMA API includes folder, briefcase, and file cabinet abstractions as well as 
abstractions for meeting and executing agents. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
main abstraction is the meet operation which has the syntax:
meet agent briefcase
whose result is to activate the agent with the briefcase as argument. Apart from this 
abstraction, there are abstractions that enable the manipulation of data. These provide:
•  Creation and deletion of briefcases by using bc_create and bc_discard.
•  Manipulation of folders within briefcases, for instance: folder_store be fo lder data, 
which stores data in i\i& folder which is itself in the briefcase be, folder_fetch be fo lder  
which fetches the, folder  from the be briefcase etc.
•  Manipulation of a folder’s contents if these are a list of elements, for instance: 
folder_pop be folder which fetches the first element of folder in be, folderjpush be 
folder data, which adds an element to the start of the folder etc,
•  Manipulation of file cabinets by using abstractions similar to those manipulating on 
briefcases, such as cabinetjcreate name, cabinet_fetch cabinet folder, cabinetjstore 
cabinet folder data etc.
2.8.5 HTTP-based agents (FF-main)
The HTTP-based Infrastructure for Mobile Agent (Lingnau et al. [79]) is a project at 
the Goethe University in Germany. It is designed to provide a low-level infrastracture to 
support agent mobility and communication through HTTP. The main architectural 
component of FF-main is an agent server which runs at every host and its task is to 
provide a supervised execution environment for the agents that visit the specific host. 
The agent server supports some essential agent operations such as : create an agent, 
supervise an agent, terminate an agent, etc. Furthermore it is responsible for transporting 
agents to other hosts and manages the interaction between agents and their users.
Each agent is assigned a unique URL upon its creation. The agent server where an 
agent was born is called the home server for that agent and it is responsible for keeping
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track of the agent’s location. Agents are transported to other hosts as MEVIE documents 
by POSTing them to the URL of the destination agent server. Upon its arrival, the agent 
is parsed by the agent server and if the agent is accepted then the agent server starts the 
execution of the agent and assigns to it a visitor URL. Furthermore it forwards to the 
agent’s home server the new URL of the agent.
Agents in FF-main cannot communicate directly. Instead each agent server 
contains an information space which is accessible by the agents via the CGI methods of 
GET and POST. Each entry in the information space is assigned an access header. The 
agent server mediates every access request that the local agents generate in order to 
ensure that the requesting agent’s credentials satisfy the access criteria of the specific 
entry.
2.8.6 Evaluation of early agent systems
The presented early agent systems have predominantly followed the language-based 
design approach. WAVE, Messengers and the rest of the agent systems of the same 
family are based on proprietaiy specialised scripting notations. Telescript is an example 
of a general purpose proprietary language-based agent system. Agent-Tcl is an example 
of a widely available language-based agent system whereas TACOMA is the only system 
that attempts to follow the architecture-based (language-neutral) approach. The main 
benefits o f these systems is that firstly they support code mobility in various ways and 
secondly they also support the asynchronous execution and propagation of the agents.
In general, however, the early language-based agent systems relied on proprietary, 
complex notations that have complicated semantics and awkward syntax [30]. The result 
of this approach is that these systems cannot exhibit any interoperability, portability or 
integration characteristics. Furthermore several o f these systems were oriented towards 
specific applications, for example WAVE and Messengers suited well distributed graph- 
related problems such as discovery o f the topology of an arbitraiy network and discovery 
of the shortest path between two nodes. These characteristics seriously reduced their 
overall significance and acceptance level by Internet end users.
A second negative point of these systems, with the exception of Telescript, is that 
they viewed the agent environment as a set o f passive data nodes that do not exhibit any 
autonomous activity. Instead, as Telescript proved, most generic distributed computing
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scenarios can be best modelled if these stationary nodes are active and offer certain 
services to the mobile agents.
Below we will attempt to critically review these systems in more detail according to 
the navigation, mobility management, communication, organisation, collaboration and 
access control mechanisms they support:
• Navigation. The navigation logic is fully embedded within the computational logic 
with the exception of TACOMA. Clearly there was the consensus that strong 
mobility is more powerful than weak mobility supported only by TACOMA. This 
approach however, because it relies on a certain degree of homogeneity, nowadays 
comes in diiect conflict with the nature of distributed computing environments such 
as the Internet which are highly heterogeneous.
• Mobility management. No mobility management services were offered by these 
systems with the exception of ff-main. Mobility management, or else the support for 
the dynamic tracking of the locations of the mobile agents, is necessary to ensure that 
agents are continuously accessible regardless of their mobility. If  such a service is not 
provided then the functionality and capabilities of the agents are seriously degraded. 
FF-main provided a mechanism based on the idea of Mobile IP in the domain of 
mobile hosts. However this mechanism only assisted the discovery of the location of 
the agents by their users and not by other agents. No automatic machanism was 
provided for the latter case. Furthermore in FF-main each server has to be aware of 
its neighbours to enable mobile agents to decide where to go next.
• Communication. Communication was either performed via message passing 
(Telescript) or data sharing (WAVE, FF-main). In the former case agents can 
exchange messages synchronously whereas in the latter case agents communicate by 
leaving data in data nodes that other agents can access and utilise. The data sharing 
approach imposes the problem of protecting these data and ensuring only specific 
agents can access specific entries. WAVE and Messengers did not provide any 
mechanisms for secure data access in the nodes. Ff-main appends a primitive form  of 
Access Control List (ACL) into each entry in the information space. In general these 
systems also did not use any higher level protocol for the communication of agents. 
Furthermore no message-passing related services such as bufering and filtering was 
provided.
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• Organisation. The early systems had mainly focused on providing support for 
mobility. No agent organisation structures were provided and, as a result, agents were 
not capable of discovering pertinent peer agents and interact on a service basis. Each 
agent had to know in advance the names and addresses of the agents it had to 
communicate with. This approach is very restricting because it assumes that the 
agents have upon their creation some form of global knowledge of their environment 
based on which they interact with other agents. Agent-Tcl and Telescript provided 
some form of local “yellow pages” that agents could use to find relevant local agents. 
These local structures though were isolated from each other and were, not 
interconnected to provide a comprehensive distributed agent discovery structure.
• Collaboration. In eaiiy systems collaboration was implemented either as an exchange 
of messages (Telescript) or as dedicated entities (nodes) that can store shared data 
(Messengers, FF-main) acting effectively^ as passive shared blackboards. No 
protocols or mechanisms for higher-level collaboration was provided.
• Access control. The issue of access control is completely omitted in Messengers and 
the other related systems. In TACOMA although a firewall agent was provided which 
was responsible for maintaining the security of a network site, there was no 
presentation or analysis of specific security features. Agent-Tcl initially had no 
security features, although these were later added in an ad-hoc fashion. Still though 
Agent-Tcl has failed to provide a mechanism for flexible, customisable inter-agent 
access control, having focused on mainly protecting agents from malicious machines 
and vice versa. Telescript had by far the most comprehensive security system. 
However the agents were assigned static ACLs that could only be modified by their 
owners. No security policies sharing mechanisms were provided. The Telescript 
security system was focused primarily on providing access control mechanisms for 
the resources through the Telescript interpreter and the concept of Telescript permits. 
Finally FF-main completely lacked any access control features with the exception of 
the access header in the entries of the information space which were static and 
predetermined.
In the next section we will attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of
contemporary mobile software agents systems.
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2.9 Modern mobile agent systems
The design and development of modern agent systems has been greatly influenced by 
the emergence of two standards: Java and CORE A. Java has been used extensively as the 
platform for the development of language-based agent systems, whereas CORE A [98] 
offers a comprehensive platform for developing object-oriented, architecture-based agent 
systems. FIPA [88], the relatively new standard for agent systems is also very relevant 
but until now has had very little impact on the development of agent systems. In this 
section these three standards will be outlined. Moreover an overview of a selection of the 
most prominent agent systems will be presented. Finally we will attempt to evaluate 
these modern agent systems based on the issues identified in section 2.7.
2.9.1 An overview of Java
The Java programming language [51] developed by SUN Microsystems has two 
important characteristics that make it suitable for the development of generic client- 
server applications: it offers a network-based programming environment and platform 
independence. Various network programming facilities are incorporated into the Java 
specification for example interfaces to access Berkeley sockets in the Unix operating 
system, etc. The Java compiler does not translate the Java source code into binary format 
directly. Instead it transforms the source code into a platform-independent intermediate 
form called Java byte code. The Java byte code can then be ported and executed directly 
on all platforms that support Java. The so-called Java virtual machine is used to execute 
Java byte code on the target platform.
Java is a fully object-oriented language whose syntax is based on the C++ 
programming language. There are several differences between C++ and Java. The most 
important ones are that Java provides no pointers structures, no operator overloading, no 
direct access to memory and no multiple inheritance. On the other hand Java offers 
automatic garbage collection, multithreading and exception handling.
The Java language and run-time environment (Java virtual machine) provide a 
number of principles and mechanisms that can facilitate the development and
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management of software agents. Specifically the Java services pertinent to software 
agents are the following :
• The Java security model.
• Support for distributed computing through the mechanism o f Remote Method
Invocation (RMI) and Java Applets.
e Object mobility through object serialisation.
Java by virtue of being network-based has to provide a far more comprehensive 
security model than those provided by traditional programming languages. For example 
the notion of automatic downloading and execution of Java programs Jfrom the network 
(Java Applets) makes it possible to execute a program of unknown origin and contents in 
the local machine. This clearly could be disastrous since the downloaded program could 
be malicious and for instance attempt to erase the contents of the local file system. 
Indeed Java Applets if unrestricted would provide an excellent platform for the 
development and deployment of computer viruses at a massive scale.
The Java security model consists of several layers, some of which are embedded
within the language itself whereas others are part of the Java mn-time environment. The 
Java class loader forms the first security layer and it is responsible for receiving applets 
and Java classes from the network. The class loader is a component of the Java virtual 
machine and its main functionality is to define a name space for each received applet. 
This name space determines the functions of the Java virtual machine the applet is 
allowed to access and invoke. The class loader itself is not accessible by any applet 
whereas the other components of the Java virtual machine can be visible to applets that 
satisfy certain security requirements, for example, they come ftom  a specific origin, etc. 
The restricted execution environment assigned to an applet is effectively an 
implementation of a sandbox as analysed in (Müller [87]). By default an applet’s 
sandbox is very restrictive and prohibits the applet from accessing the network, the local 
file system or other concurrently executing applets.
After an applet is successfully downloaded from the network and its name space is 
set the next security component activated is the verifier. The verifier checks the applet’s 
byte code to ensure that : a) the Java language specifications are met and b) the language 
rules are not violated. Typical programming errors in memory management, illegal data 
type assignments, etc.' are identified by the verifier. In this way it is ensured that an 
applet’s code when executed will not harm the local system.
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An applet that successfully passes the stages of the class loader and verifier is 
allowed to be executed. At this stage a third security component takes over and monitors 
the execution of the applet, the security manager. Its task is to ensure that the applet can 
not access any service/functionality of the Java virtual machine which is outside the 
applet’s sandbox. The security manager acts as a mediator and it is consulted by the Java 
virtual machine whenever the applet attempts to perform an action that could directly 
affect the local system. Broadly speaking the security manager is a repository of various 
access control policies. In a typical scenario these policies permit or prohibit an action 
depending on whether the requesting Java program is a Java applet or application.
In addition to the above security components the Java language offers a number of 
further security-related services that enable the Java programmer to : a) authenticate and 
digitally sign applets and other classes, b) use various encryption techniques, c) define 
cryptographic keys distribution and management policies, etc.
A second important agent-related Java mechanism is the RMI (Remote Method 
Invocation). The RMI mechanism allows a Java object to invoke methods from other 
remote (physically distributed) objects (figure 2.16).
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Figure 2.16 Java RMI architecture
Briefly the first step in implementing the RMI mechanism is for a Java object to 
publish its interface in the local RMIregistry facility of the local Java virtual machine. By 
doing so the Java object registers its willingness to accept invocations of its methods by 
remote objects. The result of the first step is the generation of skeleton code which is 
stored in the local RMIregistry. The second step is for a remote object to request the
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invocation of a method of the previous object via its local RMIregistry. This registry is 
then responsible for locating and communicating with the RMIregistry of the target 
object. The result of this inter-RMIregistry communication is that a copy o f the target 
object’s interface is downloaded to the local virtual machine of the requesting object. 
This copy is called client stub. The final step is for the RMIregistry to pass a reference of 
this stub to the requesting object which can subsequently use it and invoke any o f its 
methods directly. The source and target Java virtual machines are responsible in 
communicating the actual invocation requests and results of the requests. From the view 
point of the requesting object the procedure is transpar ent which means that it can invoke 
a method from the remote object the same way it invokes methods from local objects.
Object serialisation extends the input/output capabilities of Java and supports the 
transmission of a Java object (class and state) through the network. This mechanism is 
concerned with the packaging of a Java object’s? definition and state into a serial, byte- 
based stream, the transfer of the byte stream to the target machine and finally the 
unpacking of the byte stream and reconstitution of the original object at the target 
machine. Object serialisation provides a ready-made facility that Java-based software 
agents can use to physically migrate from one machine to another (agent mobility). In 
fact the Java object serialisation can be used to implement strong mobility for agents 
because an object (agent) can be interrupted at any time during its execution, transformed 
into a byte sequence, transmitted over the network, reconstituted at the destination 
machine and execution resumed at the next program instruction after its interrupt (request 
for migration).
2.9.2 An overview of CORBA
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) created by the Object 
Management Group (OMG) [95] represents one of the two most important efforts in 
standardising distributed object computing. The second standard in this area is the 
Distributed Common Object Model (DCOM) from Microsoft [97]. DCOM in contrast to 
CORBA is a standard proprietary to Microsoft whereas OMG is a grouping of currently 
more than 700 companies and organisations. The main aim of the OMG members is to 
provide a reference architecture and a set of specifications that maximise the portability, 
reusability and interoperability of software. Effectively the OMG provides an open
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discussion forum for the advances in object-oriented technologies. Because of the nature, 
organisation, members and aims of the OMG, its main output, CORBA, automatically 
becomes a highly important standard.
The central component of the CORBA system is the Object Request Broker (ORB) 
(figure 2.17). The ORB’s main functionality is to act as a trusted mediator in every 
interaction between two or more local/remote user objects. The ORB architecture offers a 
number of important services to the user objects such as communication, security, yellow 
and white pages, etc. The name Broker stems from the fact that when a user object wants 
to communicate with another object then the ORB intercepts the request, forwards it to 
the specified destination, performs the operations and return the results to the requesting 
object. In other words in CORBA objects do not communicate directly with each other 
but only with the ORB.
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Figure 2.17 CORBA architecture
The Interface Definition Language (IDL) is another important component of the 
CORBA system. IDL is a declarative notation that objects can use to publicise their 
interfaces in a standardised representation. The IDL specification does not therefore 
define any programming constructs but provides the necessary notational structures to 
describe object interfaces. The CORBA specification makes a clear separation between 
the definition (description) of an interface and its implementation. In fact the interface 
descriptions and implementations are stored in different CORBA components (interface 
repository and implementation repository respectively). This separation gives CORBA
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one of its main strategic advantages because in this way the user-defined objects o f the 
CORBA system could be written in different languages, executed in different hardware 
or operating system platforms but still be able to communicate and interact with each 
other (via the ORB). Such interoperability can be supported because all the objects 
regardless of their implementation have standardised, IDL-based interfaces via which 
any object can find, understand and invoke a method of another object.
Because CORBA is a fully object-oriented architecture, like JAVA, it relies on RMI 
to implement the most basic act of object-oriented distributed processing which is the 
invocation of a method of a remote object. The requesting object produces a request 
message that contains the CORBA ID of the target object. The CORBA ID is a long 
integer number used to uniquely identify every object in the CORBA system. The 
requesting object could find the CORBA ID of the target object either statically or 
dynamically (static and dynamic method invocation). In both cases the ORB locates the 
target object (skeleton server) from which it finds the location of the actual 
implementation of the target object. Upon completion of the execution o f the target 
object implementation the ORB returns the results to the invoking object. Here it must be 
noted that the RMI mechanisms of both Java and CORBA support only synchronous 
communication between objects.
CORBA is part of a further comprehensive architecture, the Object Management 
Architecture (OMA) (figure 2.18).
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The ORB plays the role of a central software bus that interconnects individual 
applications {application interfaces), specific application area services {domain 
interfaces) and general system services {object services and common facilities).
The object services also known as CORBAservices provide general services for all 
CORBA-based applications. These services include naming, persistence, relationships, 
security, query, object discovery, etc. The common facilities, CORBAfacilities, provide 
horizontal facilities required to support different application categories. The main 
difference between object services and common facilities is that the first views each 
individual object on its own whereby the second classifies the objects into groups 
according to the application category they belong to. Essentially the CORBAfacilities are 
a set of IDL-based interfaces that an object must support in order that it can provide a 
specific service. For example in order for an object to provide the service of printing it 
must support and implement a print interface.'The domain interfaces are application 
domain-specific interfaces. In this way specific application domains such as electronic 
commerce, knowledge management, etc. can have their own set of interfaces. These 
interfaces, if implemented, must be available to all objects that belong to this application 
domain. Finally application interfaces are interfaces defined and used within the context 
of a single application. Clearly these interfaces cannot be standar dised and thus the OMG 
does not provide any specification for these. An OMG Object Framework [95] is a 
collection of collaborating individual objects each of which belongs into one of the 
previously mentioned four object categories.
CORBA is capable of providing direct support for the development and deployment 
of software agent architectures. The ADERT system is an example o f CORBA-based 
agent interfaces [94]. The OMG underlined the relationship between CORBA and 
software mobile agents by publishing in 1997 the specification of a Mobile Agent 
System Interoperability Facility (MASIF). This action also highlighted the importance of 
providing interoperability among existing and future mobile agent systems. MASIF 
addresses the interfaces between agent systems in the context of Kinny et al [66]. 
MASIF essentially defines the interfaces at the agent system level rather than at the agent 
level. Specifically MASIF proposes standard interfaces in the following four areas [75]:
• Agent management. This includes standardised operations for creating, executing, 
suspending, resuming as well as terminating agents.
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• Agent transfer. This addresses the issue of how an agent is packed, transported 
and reconstituted at the destination machine.
• Agent and agent system names. The syntax and semantics of agent and agent 
system names is standardised. Through the proposed naming scheme agents and 
agent systems can identify and thus interact with each other.
• Agent system type and location syntax. Agent systems are assigned types and 
agent transfer can only be performed if the destination agent system is of the 
appropriate type to support and execute the transferred agent. Location syntax 
standardisation is also required such that agent systems can locate each other.
2.9.3 Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA)^
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIFA) is a non-profit association 
registered in Geneva, Switzerland. FIFA’s purpose is to promote the success of emerging 
agent-based applications, services and equipment. The FIFA 97 specification is the first 
output of the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents and specifies the interfaces of 
the different components in the environment with which an agent can interact, i.e. 
humans, other agents, non-agent software and the physical world. FIFA produces two 
kinds of specification :
FIFA 97 defines primarily three basic agent technologies : agent management; agent 
communication language; and agent/software integration.
The agent management specification defines agent registration, agent message 
passing, agent lifecycles, and an agent platform (AF). An agent management ontology 
has been defined to facilitate interoperability between agent platforms using FIFA ACL. 
FIFA envisages a variety of different agent platforms from single processes containing 
lightweight agent threads, to fully distributed agent platforms built around proprietary or 
open middleware standards.
The agent reference model provides the framework within which FIFA agents exist 
and operate (figure 2.19). The Directory Facilitator (DF), agent Management System 
(AMS) and Agent Communication Channel (ACC) are specific types of agents which 
support agent management. The AMS and ACC support inter-agent communication. The
' The information in this section has been extracted and compiled from the official FIPA97 documentation 
at http://www.fipa.org
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ACC supports interoperability both within and across different platforms. The Internal 
Platform Message Transport (IPMT) provides a message routing service for agents on a 
particular platform .
Agent Platform
Agent
Software
ACCDirectory
Facilitator
Agent
fVlanagemen
System
Internal Platform Message
Figure 2.19 FEPA agent management reference model
The ACC, AMS, IPMT and DF form what will be termed the agent Platform (AP). 
Each agent has a Globally Unique Identifier (QUID), also known as agent name, which is 
a string global over all FIPA domains which labels the agent so that it may be 
unambiguously distinguished in the agent universe. An agent may be registered at a 
number of addresses at which it can be contacted.
The Directory Facilitator (DF) provides “yellow pages” services to other agents. The 
DF is a mandatory, normative agent which is the trusted, benign custodian of an agent 
directory. Agents may register their services with the DF or query the DF to find out 
what services are offered by which agents. At least one DF must be resident on each AP 
(the default DF). The membership of a DF directory defines an agent domain. A domain 
is a logical space which provides a context within which agents may organise and locate 
each other. One AP can support multiple domains, one domain can span multiple A P’s.
An Agent Management System (AMS) is a mandatory component of the AP. It is an 
agent which exerts supervisory control over access to and use of the ACC. Only one 
AMS will exist in a single AP. The AMS is responsible for managing the activities of an 
AP. These responsibilities include creation of agents, deletion of agents and overseeing 
the migration of agents to and from platforms. The AMS maintains an index of all the 
agents which are currently resident on a platform. The index includes an agents QUID 
and their associated transport address for the AP [18].
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2.9.4 A critical review of contemporary agent systems
The majority of contemporary agent systems is based on Java. There are several 
reasons for this phenomenon: Java is a widely accepted programming language which 
comes with a sophisticated programming environment (Java virtual machine) that offers 
several services such as Java beans, security, serialisation, RMI, etc. Typically an agent 
is represented as a Java object that implements a specific agent class and interface. The 
agent interface offers mobility abstraction by the provision of a method go which, if 
invoked, transfers the agent to another location. The Java serialisation interface is used to 
implement strong mobility. The Java security manager and class loader are configured to 
perform access control and other security related tasks on behalf o f the agents. 
Communication between agents is synchronous and is implemented by using the Java 
RMI.
However there is also a small number of agent systems that have followed the agent 
communication language approach or the object-oriented architecture-based approach. 
The former category typically creates an enviionment in which agents can communicate 
and migrate by using KQML as the communication protocol. The latter category includes 
CORBA-based agent systems and programming environments. A typical representative 
of this category provides a CORBA ORB implementation with the appropriate interface 
to use this ORB through a Java program.
In this section we will review the most prominent contemporary agent systems from 
the point of the collaboration, navigation, organisation, access control, communication 
and mobility management facilities they offer. Specifically the systems we will include 
in our analysis are : Aglets [58], AJANTA [117], ARA [101], Jypsy [76], Jat-Lite [60], 
Java-to-go [78], Knowbot [63], MAP [67, 84], MARS [28], MOLE [116], Concordia [83, 
123] and the CORBA relevant specifications.
The issue of collaboration has in general been neglected. All systems claim that 
adequate collaborative behaviour can be exhibited via the support for method 
invocations. AJANTA and Concordia go a step further and define specialised objects 
called synchronisation objects. These objects can be created and used by the agents to 
support their coordination. Each such object represents a synchronisation expression 
which is evaluated every time new data arrives. When the expression yields true then an 
associated action is taken which typically forwards a specific subset of the accumulated 
data to a specified destination for further processing. MARS is definitely the most
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elaborate system that focuses primarily on providing the service of 
coordination/collaboration to independent, concurrent Java programs. MARS achieves 
this by extending Linda’s notion of tuple spaces to incorporate reactivity. There are two 
levels o f tuple spaces. The first one is Linda like. The second one operates on top of the 
first and adds reactivity to the basic tuple space. The approach for using specialised 
objects effectively belongs in the category o f spatially uncoupled systems whereby the 
second is both spatially and temporally uncoupled. Both approaches however create an 
environment via which the agents can receive the service of collaboration, therefore they 
both belong to the collaborative, non-communicative multi-agent system. This category 
suffers though some important disadvantages : a) the agent’s autonomy is unnecessarily 
reduced since they have to rely on an external environment for the service of 
collaboration, b) access control is also complicated because agents must protect their 
collaboration tuples/synchronisation objects fron*i unauthorised access. By separating an 
agent from its collaboration structure the system is assigned the burden of protecting two 
entities rather than one, c) environment based collaboration is not efficient because there 
is the extra communication between the agent and the collaboration structures for 
delivering/fetching data, d) tuple spaces are not mobile. This means that if an agent 
moves, its collaborative structures, by virtue of being separate from it, do not follow the 
agent in its travel. Consequently the tuple spaces must have a way o f determining the 
current location of the agent so that any necessary data can be appropriately forwarded. 
Furthermore the whole collaboration becomes more inefficient as the target agent moves 
because agents that produce data for the collaboration point might need to send this data 
to the location of the collaboration point itself rather than the agent. As a result data 
might travel to the location of the collaboration which if activated will send the data to 
the corresponding agent located at the same host as the producers of the data. For these 
reasons in chapter three of this thesis we describe and analyse simple yet powerful 
collaborative facilities which are part of the agents themselves.
Most of the aforementioned systems follow the strong mobility model and implement 
it using the Java serialisation facility. As it will be described in chapter three, strong 
mobility is less suitable for agent-based computing over the Internet which is inherently a 
heterogeneous environment. AJANTA and IBM Aglets attempt to emulate weak mobility 
in Java by equipping their agents with itineraries. These itineraiies however are 
expressed in the form of rigid object hierarchies that can support only minimum dynamic 
extensibility. Furthermore the navigation logic of each agent is proprietai y to that agent.
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Other agents cannot copy relevant parts of the navigation logic of a specific agent and 
use them as off-the-shelf components to plug in and use for their own navigation. Such a 
feature can be very useful because it views the navigation logic of an agent as a 
knowledge unit that other agents can utilise as re-usable software components. Another 
disadvantage of the IBM Aglets and AJANTA is that the interconnection among itinerary 
items is static and predefined, thus the execution of the action associated with one of 
these items cannot modify the contents of the other items. Such a feature is also 
important because it makes the agent’s itinerary fully dynamic and adaptive to the 
agent’s environment. Java-to-go uses the TACOMA concepts of folders and enables the 
agent to decide what items to take with it prior to a specific migration. This style of 
navigation, whereby an agent decides which data will be transported with it during a 
migration act is beneficial because agents can reduce their size prior to their travel by 
taking only the essential data items with thbm. In this way the overall utilised 
communication bandwidth can be substantially reduced. Chapter three of this thesis 
provides a flexible, dynamic and re-usable architecture to support the navigation of 
agents based on the weak mobility model.
Agent discovery is another issue neglected in most of the above systems. MOLE uses 
an X-500 directory structure for agents. JAT-Lite, Jypsy, AJANTA and D ’Agents 
provide simple yellow pages agents in every host via which an agent can discover 
relevant local agents by name. Telescript, and the later version Odyssey, provides simple 
directory structures per Telescript place. CORBA, via its traders specification, provides 
an extended model whereby trader objects act as matchmakers that receive queries ftom 
objects, match these queries against their database of registered services and either return 
the contact details of relevant objects to the requesting object or propagate the request to 
other traders for further processing. Thus in CORBA traders can be connected in a 
hierarchy that a query might travel either because the owner of the query specified a 
specific trader path to be followed or from the trader’s own volition and policies. 
Connecting matchmakers together in a hierarchy has been around for several years. In the 
information retrieval area there is a number of systems that follow this approach [22, 23, 
33, 111, 112]. In chapter four of this thesis we will revisit the issue o f agent discovery 
and we will show that there are some significant benefits of adopting a more active 
organisation structure which participates in several aspects of the computation itself.
Access control in these systems is either provided by customising the security 
mechanisms of the Java virtual machine or by providing an abstraction layer on top of
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the JVM. IBM aglets and AJANTA implement a proxy-based access control mechanism 
in which agents do not communicate directly with each other but only through security 
proxies that implement certain access control policies. There is one proxy per agent. 
Telescript follows the capabilities approach via its notion of permits. D ’Agents employs 
the method of indirection to protect resources from malicious agents via its resource 
managers. The CORBA security specification is by far the most comprehensive. CORBA 
defines the interfaces for managing and using security domains, access control policies, 
user credentials, rights and roles. The access control model of CORBA is centralised and 
basically is an example of the third category identified in section 2.7. The specification 
does not define how security domains and security related objects are created, how 
objects are assigned to domains, etc. Other systems for example JAT-Lite and Java-to-go 
do not provide any access control mechanisms. In general none of the aforementioned 
systems offers a distributed, customisable on a [)er-agent basis, reusable framework for 
access control. Such a framework is necessary to ensure that the agents are tmly 
autonomous even for access control puiposes, agents can define and manage directly and 
efficiently their access control policies which can be shared among a group of agents to 
provide for group access control mechanisms. Chapter five of this thesis presents and 
analyses the design of such a framework.
The communication method adopted by most Java-based agent systems and the 
CORBA specification is the synchronous remote method invocation. Java-to-go uses the 
notion of channels for connection-oriented asynchronous communication. JAT-Lite 
supports message passing asynchronous communication through Agent Message Routers 
(AMR). These entities act as high level routers of messages expressed in KQML. 
Arguably the message passing paradigm offers a flexible basis over which complex 
communication protocols can be established among agents. Furthermore message passing 
is inherently asynchronous, a characteristic which is vital for agent-based systems 
because it can hide significant communication latency. The OMG and Sun Microsystems 
have announced the integration of message passing facilities in CORBA and Java 
respectively. In chapter four of this thesis we present an agent communication 
architecture which is message oriented and can also support message passing related 
services such as message filtering and buffering. Recently we have observed the 
development of a number of commercial message oriented software such as MQSeries 
from IBM [57], PIPES from PeerLogic [100], etc. This shows clearly the shift of the 
research and commercial community towards Message Oriented Middleware (MOM).
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Finally mobility management has largely stayed in the background of the agenl 
research community. Software mobility management has several fundamental differences 
compared to hosts management and as a result mechanisms and algorithms utilised in 
today’s mobile telephony cannot be applied to agent mobility. The OM G’s agent 
specification MASIF simply defines the interfaces for mobility management without 
offering or attempting to standardise any concrete solution to the problem. AJANTA like 
MASIF specifies that each agent as it moves could leave forwaiding pointers to its new 
location. These pointers are stored in a local registry which is used by agents to find the 
locations o f other agents. Ff-main uses the concept of a home system for each agent 
which is responsible in maintaining the most up-to-date location of the agent. Ff-main 
however does not provide any automatic mechanisms that would help the agents locate 
each other since the aforementioned method is used only to assist the human operators o f 
the system to locate their agents. FIPA spécifiés that agents should be responsible in 
notifying their home system of their whereabouts and that they could also leave 
forwarding pointers in other systems. In chapter six of this thesis we present and analyse 
an integrated message passing and mobility management architecture that guarantees 
continuous access to agents regardless of their mobility frequency and patterns.
2.10 Conclusions
In this chapter we attempted to provide a comprehensive critical analysis o f the 
domain of mobile software agents. We observed that the mobile agent paradigm 
possesses several important benefits over traditional approaches for distributed 
computing. The early years of the mobile agents were dominated by systems which w ere 
based on proprietary languages with frequently awkward semantics. Moreover these 
agent systems were rather primitive as they concentrated only on supporting code 
mobility while neglecting a number of important issues such as security, agent discovery, 
collaboration, etc. Contemporary agent systems are definitely more complete than their 
ancestors and provide a range of useful services to the agents themselves. However 
today’s agent software is still based on specific programming languages and as a result 
agent technology is still hidden and has not reached the typical Internet end user. As the 
volume of agent systems increases significantly over the years, the issue o f 
interoperability becomes more important and unfortunately with the exception of a few
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standardisation efforts this issue has remained largely in the background o f agent 
research. Finally a number of technical criticisms was presented regarding the 
mechanisms modern agent systems offer to support agent communication, collaboration, 
discovery, access control, navigation and mobility management. These points o f criticism 
form the set of requirements for the design of the agent architecture in this thesis. An 
additional requirement of the work in this thesis is to decouple the agent architecture 
from the idiosyncracies of a specific language in an attempt to bring agent technology 
closer to the typical Internet end users. This would maximise the agents’ beneficial 
impact on society and ensure that agents are not just a hype but a useful concrete 
software artifact that can enhance significantly the efficiency in general-purpose, 
distributed computing systems.
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Chapter 3
The MASIC Agent Architecture
3.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we identified two sets of requirements that a generic 
agent framework must satisfy. The first set specifies the general issues that determine the 
adoption level of the agent framework by the industry and individual users. In summary, 
like any other software, the agent framework must be integrated with the existing 
technology and distributed applications, and must be designed in such a way that it can 
interoperate with other agent frameworks. Portability is necessary because of the 
Internet’s heterogeneous nature. The framework must also be generic so that it can be 
applied to a range of problem areas {applicability) in each of which it should exhibit 
clear gains in programming efficiency in contrast to other approaches. Finally the 
framework should possess a consistent, simple interface via which the user can monitor, 
program and control the framework’s state and execution {programmability and 
usability).
The second set of requirements defines the minimal set of issues and services that an 
agent framework has to address and offer, respectively, in order to support multi-agent 
societies. These requirements stem either directly from the definition of the autonomous 
mobile agents or can be inferred from the analogy between human and agent societies. 
This analogy is natural from the inception of intelligent agents in the early 70 ’s as a way 
of modelling and replicating the human behaviour and intelligence in computer software. 
In this chapter we will attempt to design a novel framework that addresses these issues 
efficiently.
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Specifically section 2 presents the overall conceptual design o f the novel framework 
(agent facilitator and agent system architecture). Section 3 evaluates an early abstract 
model o f the agent facilitator that was produced to satisfy the aforementioned 
requirements. Finally section 4 discusses the final model of the agent facilitator and its 
components. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis analyse the concrete design o f the agent 
system architecture according to the conceptual analysis of section 2 of this chapter.
3.2 Conceptual Design of the Framework
As was analysed in the previous two chapters, a typical agent framework consists of 
two components: the agent facilitator and the agent system architecture. The agent 
facilitator acts as an interface between the agent and the agent system. Its purpose is to 
provide services and functionality on a per-agent basis. The agent system as a whole 
provides services and functionality on a per group or society of agents level.
The first decision we were faced with was which design approach to follow in 
defining the framework. In chapter 2 it was shown that an architecture-based approach 
often provides better integration, interoperability and portability compared to a language- 
based approach. However the latter offers better programmability and can still show a 
good degree of integration if the language the framework is based on is already widely 
adopted and used. In order to make this decision we took into consideration two 
important characteristics of the Internet and the existing software landscape. Firstly the 
main chaiacteristic of the Internet is its heterogeneity and versatility. Secondly there are 
already a large number of legacy software and multi-agent systems fully developed and 
deployed on the Internet. Because of these two facts, the issues of integration, portability 
and interoperability automatically become more significant than programmability. 
Moreover, an architecture-based agent framework can balance out the loss of 
programmability by providing a robust, consistent graphical interface via which the users 
can visually program, monitor and control the framework without requiring to learn a 
new programming language. The coupling of learning/mastering a programming 
language with the use/management of agents in a language-based agent framework limits 
the potential number of Internet users to those who have had extensive programming 
experience. Because of these reasons it was decided to adopt the architecture-based 
approach in designing our agent framework.
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The next step is to identify the conceptual layers of both the agent facilitator and the 
agent system. The framework in total has to comply with the second set of requirements 
identified in chapter 2. The main challenge of this design step is to decide which 
component of the framework (agent facilitator or agent system or both) should offer 
which services. The only guidelines followed for these decisions are that: a) the agent 
facilitator offers services on a per-agent basis whereas the agent system offers services on 
a per-group basis and b) that an agent society’s structure and functionality, as defined in 
the current literature, follows closely the model of the human nature.
The first requirement is that of information processing and storage. Like any human, 
an agent needs the ability to process and store information. An agent is to either 
remember and carry out user-defined plans or possess skills, (i.e. code) and information 
to offer to other agents on demand. In the first case the agents exhibit active behaviour 
while performing their user-defined duties whereby in the second case they are passive 
and only respond to satisfy service requests from other agents. Such requests can be 
made by both active agents or passive agents answering a service request from yet 
another agent. The aforementioned activities the agents to process and store proprietary 
information. These proprietary information and skills define the state of the agent and 
partly determine its individuality. Therefore the agent facilitator is the component of the 
framework that must be assigned the task of offering information processing and storage 
facilities on a per-agent basis. Figure 3.1 shows the agent framework after this decision :
Agent facilitator
User defined tasks, skills 
and information
Agent system
Figure 3.1. Framework after step 1
The second requirement is communication. A solitary agent needs to communicate 
with its environment in order to get some input or return results of its processing to its 
user. In a multi-agent society agents must be able to communicate with each other in 
order to exchange information and requests for service. Communication can only be
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realised if the agents have agreed on a common communication protocol via which they 
can interact. By definition, this means that communication is a service that needs to be 
uniform across the multi-agent society. The communication service supports a set of 
global, unchangeable protocols which do not differ on a per-agent basis. Therefore this 
service forms the first layer of the agent system. In order for the communication service 
to be accessible by all agents, each agent needs to be equipped with an interface that 
encapsulates the services the communication layer of the agent system offers. Figure 3.2 
shows the framework design after this decision:
Communication interface
Communication layer
User defined tasks, skills 
and information
Agent facilitator
Agent system
Figure 3.2. Framework after step 2
The third requirement for our framework is the provision of mobility. Mobility is the 
most important characteristic of software agents and it is the one that gives the agent 
technology a strategic advantage over other approaches such as distributed objects. 
Agents can move physically from machine to machine thus bringing the computation 
closer to the data in order to reduce the communication traffic. Therefore the provision of 
a mobility service is absolutely essential in agent framework.
The fact that agents are mobile gives rise to the problem of mobility management. 
Since agents are mobile their mobility may adversely affect their accessibility. The 
solution is mobility management: a service to be offered to agents on an agent-society 
scale. It forms the second conceptual layer of the agent system. This layer has to be 
above the communication layer since the process of maintaining the current location of 
an agent requires specialised communicating components. Clearly this layer would not be 
required if we assumed that the agents were static rather than mobile entities.
Mobility is not just the ability to utilise some form of transport provided by the agent 
system. It includes the capability to determine the route and conditions of travel, which is
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termed navigation in agent literature. While on the move, the agent will expect the agent 
system to ensure its continuous accessibility.
Similar to the communication layer, the mobility management layer must hide its 
implementation details from the agents, thus the agent facilitator is also equipped with a 
mobility interface. Figure 3.3 shows the framework after this design decision:
Corns & mobility interface
Communication layer
Mobility Management layer
Navigation logic and 
information
User denned 
tasks, skills and 
information Agent facilitator
Agent system
Figure 3.3. Framework after step 3
The fourth requirement is the agent organisation and discovery. Like a human 
society, an agent society has to have some form of organisation via which agents form 
groups according to their needs and services. In order for the agent organisation to have 
any utility there has to be a query layer above it via which the agents can use the agent 
organisation in order to discover and access other agents which offer pertinent services. 
By definition the agent organisation and discovery service imposes some logical 
grouping to the flat set of peer agent facilitators. This grouping is then used by individual 
agents to discover/access other agents efficiently according to certain search criteria and 
preferences. Therefore this service should be represented as a layer in the agent system 
above the communication and mobility management layer. However because agents 
should be allowed to access other agents directly provided that they know their addresses 
and possess enough authorisation, this layer should not completely encapsulate the 
existing layers of the agent system. Figure 3.4 shows the framework after this design 
decision:
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Agent facilitator
Agent system
Corns & mobility interface
Communication layer
Navigation 
logic and 
information
Mobility Management layer
Agent
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User defined 
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Figure 3.4. Framevyork after step 4
The fifth requirement for our framework is collaboration. As was explained in 
chapter 2, there are two possible ways of providing this service. Firstly by adding it as a 
layer into the agent system. The argument for this decision is that collaboration is another 
service similar to agent organisation and discovery. In frameworks following this 
approach the agent system is given the task of supporting collaboration among agents by 
providing them with whiteboards, tuple spaces or other information sharing facilities.
Collaboration is a form of agent organisation whereby more than one agent is 
involved in performing a task. While it requires various forms of group communication 
such as broadcast, multicast, poll, etc. these are not significantly different from the 
communication capabilities required for other forms of activities in agent communities. 
Therefore it is our position that the agents themselves should be encouraged to 
collaborate by utilising their communications capabilities. Another argument supporting 
our position is that the basic act of collaboration is rather simple and easy to represent in 
any programming language. A collaboration point can be modelled as a tuple < 
producers, synchronisation, action, consumers > There is a set o f producers acting 
concurrently, each of which produces a set of data. Whenever a producer finishes its task 
it submits it to the collaboration point. The synchronisation condition of the point is
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evaluated and if it yields false then the newly arrived data are stored temporarily to await 
the arrival of further data. When enough data has arrived then the synchronisation yields 
true in which case the stored data is passed to the action for processing. The results are 
then sent to each member of the consumers set. The definition shows that the act of 
collaboration involves communication of data, synchronisation of these data and then 
execution of an action and routing of the results. A collaboration point uses the 
communication interface to receive data and route the results. Because the collaboration 
point also contains an action it is important to verify that all the arriving data is 
authorised to participate in this collaboration point and therefore causes the execution of 
the action. Therefore it is natural to place the collaboration layer immediately above any 
security layers of the agent facilitator.
In a typical collaboration point, its action field specifies the invocation of a service of 
an agent. If the collaboration service is realised in the agent system then this means that 
there are specialised agent system components that offer this service to the agents.
Therefore the collaboration point is not necessarily co-located with the agent whose 
service is to be invoked when the action field is executed. Thus separating the 
collaboration points from the agents means that the entities that gather the collaborative 
data are separate and perhaps physically remote from the agents that perform the 
processing of the data. So not only would placing the collaboration service in the agent 
system require the existence of specialised entities performing the data gathering, but it 
would also increase the communication traffic, since these entities need to pass the 
gathered, synchronised data to the appropriate action agents. In contrast the approach of 
appending the collaboration service as another layer of the agent facilitator means that 
every agent can act as both data gatherer and processor since the data are gathered and 
synchronised at the place of their processing. |
The last but not least requirement for our framework is the access control. Access j
control occurs at agent and group levels. Individual agents should be able to act |
autonomously regarding security matters and be allowed to specify and customise their j
own access control requirements. At the same time it is imperative that a central !
authority should be capable of specifying and enforcing a common set of ground access I
control rules to the agents. Without such rules the managing and enforcement of security |
policies to groups of agents becomes very difficult. For these reasons, our framework I
1represents the service of access control both within the agent facilitator and the agent j
system itself. The access control layer of the agent system is placed above the existing i
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layers so that it acts as an umbrella for all the services offered by the agent system. This 
makes our framework secure because : a) all the layers of the agent system can use the 
access control layer to set-up and enforce theii* proprietary security policies and b) each 
agent can define and manage its own security policy on top of any ground policy 
specified by the agent system. Figure 3.5 shows the final conceptual architecture of the 
framework after the design decisions for the collaboration and access control services :
Agent facilitator
Agent system
Security policies layer
Mobility Management layer
Communication layer
Navigation logic and 
information
Agentorganisation
and
discovery
User defined tasks, skills 
and 
information
Coms & mobility interface'
Access control layer
Collaboration layer
ik
Figure 3.5. The final conceptual model of tbe agent framework
3.3 The Initial Abstract Computational Model
A cell [4, 5] in the context of our system is a novel representation of a resource or a 
group of resources. For example, it can represent users, groups of users, a file or a group 
of files, devices, processes, relationships between users etc. Thus, cells can be used to 
represent a system at an appropriate level of granularity.
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Each cell is uniquely identified by a name, which is assigned to it the moment the cell 
is created. The body of a cell consists of two parts: the data and the function. The data 
part is a private memory area which contains the data necessary to support the 
functionality of the cell, for example local vaiiables, intermediate results, etc. These 
items constitute the state of the cell. The data field of a cell is only accessible by the 
function of that cell which is executed every time that cell is activated. Hence the 
function part of a cell, among other tasks it performs, serves as an interface between the 
cell’s data (and state) and the other cells (figure 3.1).
Each cell has an interface (i.e. the set of commands it can accept and perform), which 
comprises a standard part and a user-defined part. The standard cell interface supports 
instructions common to all cells, e.g. self-destruct, rename, etc. The user-defined part 
depends on the functionality being provided. For example if a cell represents a file, then 
these instructions may be supported: read, read„all, append, overwrite, change_title, etc.
Cells can communicate with each other by means of exchanging tokens. A token is a 
structured message conveying information that consists of a header, a data field  and a 
security field. The purpose of the header is dual: first it provides the information to 
uniquely identify that token and its context, such as its owner and the computation thread 
it belongs to, and, second, specifies the token’s destination which, naturally, is just 
another cell. The Identification part of the header is necessary for the authentication of 
the token, hence this information is assigned to each token by internal secure 
mechanisms of the proposed system.
The data field of the token contains the information that the token conveys. This 
information includes the method identifier of the method to be executed at the destination 
cell, the arguments or part of the arguments for that method, etc. The data is structured 
within the field by means of a data definition language such as the ASN. 1 notation. This 
is necessary in order for the recipient cell to be able to perform type checking on the data 
it received before this data is fed as arguments to the requested method.
The security field of the token is reserved for use by the security mechanism o f the 
system. It can contain security information, in encrypted form, that is required by the 
system in order for the token to be authorised.
The activation rule of this model is a simple string matching rule: a cell is activated 
when the destination name of a token matches the name of that cell. When a cell is 
activated, it consumes the information provided by the received token, uses and/or 
updates the contents of its data field and then produces a new token or tokens. Thus the
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functionality of a cell can be described as a token transformation. As can be observed, 
this matching rule is the same as the activation rule in the static Dataflow paradigm [11, 
12, 36, 37, 99].
The cell is the only persistent entity of the system. Figure 3.6 shows its simplified 
internal structure. As can be observed, each cell contains two input token queues: the 
activation and the authorisation queue. The activation queue receives tokens that are 
requesting the invocation of a method within that cell. The authorisation queue receives 
tokens that contain security information. Based on this information it will be decided 
whether each of the tokens arriving at the activation queue is authorised to invoke the 
action they require.
The authorisation tokens are the results of the activation of an authorisation graph. If 
the criteria for a token are matched, then this token is forwarded to the 
authorised_token_queue to be fetched and processed by the match process. Otherwise, a 
token is generated and forwarded to the output queue of the cell in order to be sent to the 
sender of the unauthorised token informing it of this event.
I Activation 
I queue
Authorisation
queue
Auth
I Authorised token queue
Token
store
Method
prototypes
I Method activation queue I
Exec
Output
queue
Figure 3.6 A simplified view of a ceil
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When a token successfully passes the authorisation stage, it is then forwarded to the 
authorised token queue (ATQ). This queue acts as a regulator between the auth process 
and the match process thus enabling these two processes to operate concurrently until the 
queue becomes empty. The match process consumes tokens from the ATQ, matches 
them with the tokens held in the Token Store (TS) and, based on its method prototypes 
table, it determines whether all the data necessary for the activation of the method are 
present or not. If the token being processed completes the data required for the activation 
of a method then this token together with the appropriate tokens from the TS are 
forwarded to the method activation queue (MAQ). Otherwise, the token is placed in the 
TS to wait for a match.
After the matching stage, the next phase of the cell processing is the exec process. 
The exec process consumes sequentially the activation requests from the MAQ and 
activates the requested method. Each method is expressed as an arbitrary graph by means 
of a meta language. This meta language should enable the programmer to connect into a 
data dependency graph independent modules implemented in any programming 
language. The interaction between the cell’s methods and data is done via a storage API 
which can be referenced by any of the cell’s methods.
Finally, upon termination, the method sends any results produced back to the exec 
process. The exec then packages the results into token(s) and places them in the output 
queue in order to be collected by the server and forwarded to the appropriate cell.
3.3.1 Program representation
From the previous section it is clear that the main abstraction of the model is the 
notion of cell. The cell’s methods are functions, through which the user can access and 
observe/modify the program’s script and state. Thus these functions define an interface 
for the user program interaction. By default typical methods that are included in each 
program cell upon creation are:
• Functions that manipulate the program’s script. For example: insert code, append 
code, remove code.
• View status.
• Execute.
® Terminate.
• Input. Acts as input when program is executing.
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® Output. Acts as output. These two I/O functions can be called by the program itself 
during execution. They form its I/O interface, and they hide the implementation 
details from the main program logic.
Cells represent heavyweight, largely static entities. The overhead they impose is 
large for lightweight, frequently travelling programs (agents). For this reason, small 
programs that perform simple repetitive tasks over a number of cells are efficiently 
represented as tokens. Accordingly we shall now extend the concept of tokens with a 
new variety: the program tokens. A  program token (or token agent), in contrast to 
program cells:
a) Cannot exist and execute independently. A token agent is always executed in the 
context of a cell it is visiting. It is similar to the concept of applets in JAVA™. The 
current host cell is the manager of the token and it is responsible for its execution.
b) It generally has smaller size.
c) It migrates frequently.
d) It has no access control of its own, being subject of the access protection mechanisms 
of the host.
The structure of a program token is as follows (figure 3.7):
NP CP
Data Sharing
Figure 3.7 Program token conceptual structure
As can be observed, it consists of three parts:
1) Navigational Program (NP). The NP is responsible for the navigation of the token 
inside the network of cells. Upon arrival at a cell, it is activated and determines the 
next destination(s) of the token, if any.
2) Computational Program (CP). The CP is responsible for performing the required 
computation at every cell the token visits.
3) Data Sharing. This can be implemented as:
a) Shared variables, which are used for exchanging information. The current host cell 
of the token implements a semaphore for each shared data structure. Access or 
modification of any data is done via the appropriate semaphore.
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b) Exchange of virtual tokens. The two programs can communicate by sending 
tokens to each other through the In & Out queue of the host cell.
c) Signals. If NP and CP are different executing processes, then they can exchange 
signals, provided that they possess the appropriate signal handlers.
Based on the complexity of their different parts, TAs can be classified into the 
following categories:
1) Simple Tokens. These are messages with a specific predefined destination and data.
2) Routing Tokens. These tokens contain fixed data but the destination field is a NP 
which is executed at every cell to determine the next hops, if any. In the simplest 
case, the NP can be:
• A list of destinations.
® A routing path of the form: X/Y/Z...
This means that the token will go first to cell X. This cell, according to its routing 
table will perform a transformation of the head of Y/Z producing a new path, for 
instance Yl/Z. Then the token will go to cell Y l, etc.
• Another routing path with variables. Assuming that variables start with a $ then 
the following path:
a/b$x/$x/f$y/$y
is translated as follows. The Token goes to cell a. There the head (b$x) is matched 
and for instance results in instantiating $x with c. Hence the remaining path 
becomes:
c/f$y/$y
The token is forwarded to cell c where pattern f$y is matched yielding for instance 
$y=d. Finally the token will be routed to d which is its final destination. A routing 
path can be further extended with recursion and selection constructs, thus making it 
adequate to express simple navigational logic \
3) RP Tokens. These tokens have a fixed destination, but their data field, instead of 
carrying passive data for a remote method invocation, is a program (CP) that will be 
executed at the destination. This is similar to the remote programming concept.
a) Agent Token (TA). These token are fully fledged agents since they comprise both 
a NP and a CP.
' A n exam ple o f  such sty le is found in W A V E  [108]. W e decided not to research this issu e  further.
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These different types are distinguished by a flag in the token header. This flag allows 
the host cell, upon reception of a token, to identify its type and thus process it 
accordingly.
From the above analysis, it is clear that each of the two program representations has 
advantages and drawbacks. Selecting one is a matter of efficiency and user choice. In 
general a program consists of a set of heavyweight entities (lengthy, complex algorithms) 
together with a set of lightweight entities that perform simple repetitive tasks. Such a 
program in this system is represented as a set of cells and token agents (figure 3.8):
agents
cells
Figure 3.8 Program representation
Existing systems with similar capabilities consider the cells (static objects) as higher 
entities and the tokens (mobile objects) as lower order entities that serve the cells by 
retrieving and filtering information. So the user is forced to organise the program into 
cells and tokens statically, thus not taking into consideration any dynamic conditions 
which might make this organisation inefficient.
By contrast, our model states that both entities are equal. Furthermore, just as a cell 
creates and sends tokens, a token agent can request the creation or one of more cells. 
Effectively a token could create a cell, copy its contents into it and then destroy itself. 
Such a procedure allows a token to be transformed into a cell and vice versa. A possible 
reason for such a decision is, for example, that a token has become large in size and it is 
not efficient any more to remain a token. This capability enables the programmer to use 
the logic that controls dynamically the representation and organisation of the program.
3.3.2 Program cooperation
Programs can co-ordinate their activities by means of synchronisation points. Each 
cell can define and use an arbitrary number of synchronisation points in their token store. 
A synchronisation point (SP) can be defined as the following tuple:
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< ID, A ttributes, Expression, PendingD ata >
where :
ID: An SP is identified by a name. Programs can use a synchronisation point by 
referencing its name.
A ttributes: SPs possess certain characteristics, some of which are:
Lifetime: An SP can be temporary, which means that it will be destroyed when the 
program which has created terminates. SPs can also be permanent, in which case their 
lifetime is independent of the lifetime of their creator. The lifetime of a temporary SP can 
be defined in terms of : the number of invocations, real time, etc.
Scope: An SP can be global or local. A  global SP is visible by the whole network of 
cells. Any cell or token agent residing in a cell, can access such an SP. On the other hand, 
a local SP is only visible by the program that has created it. In a more general scenario, 
one of the attributes is actually an ACL defining a more complicated access control 
policy.
Colour flag: An SP can participate simultaneously in many synchronisations. Each 
synchronisation is independent from the others, hence their data must be distinguished 
and stored separately from the data of other invocations. This is achieved by colouring 
each datum.
Expression: This is the main part of an SP. The expression, in PROLOG terms, is just a 
predicate whose body is of the form : <condition,action>. Both parts are arbitrary 
PROLOG compound goals. The semantics is that if the condition part of the SP 
expression succeeds then the action part is executed.
PendingD ata: This is a temporary storage for the data of the different synchronisations.
3.3.3 Evaluation of the abstract model
The abstract model presented in this section represents the first attempt to define an 
agent facilitator (cell) that follows the specifications defined in section 3.2. The presented 
model has the following characteristics:
• Efficient program representation. The model defines two types of agents, the 
lightweight (tokens) and the heavyweight (cells). The existence of these two 
program representations enables the programmer to define computations as an 
arbitrary mixture of tokens and cells. Therefore, in contrast to existing approaches 
that provide a single program representation, the programmer in this model can
78
Nick Antonopoulos Chapter 3
classify and map efficiently his computation on a set of collaborating cells and 
tokens.
• Mapping to the conceptual model of the agent facilitator. The model follows 
closely the conceptual architecture of the agent facilitator as defined in section 
3.2. The cell has a communication interface (input and output queue) via which it 
can communicate with other cells. A newly arrived token passes first the access 
control layer, then the synchronisation layer (token store and match process) and
finally it performs an action on the cell’s state by means o f invoking the cell’s j
program (method).
• Absence of navigation and mobility logic. The current cell architecture does not 
specify a component to store and manage its navigation logic. Furthermore the 
mobility interface is not defined. Therefore the cell’s architecture has to be 
modified such that its state contains the navigation logic and its functionality uses 
the service of mobility.
• Asymmetric security. The cell only enforces access control for its input. In this 
way it can control which agent can access which services. This facility is not 
adequate. For example the owner of the cell might want to specify a security rule 
which prohibits the cell from using the service of other specific agents because 
either these services are too expensive or the specified agents belong to a 
malicious or not trustworthy user. This rule is by definition an output access 
control rule and cannot be either represented or enforced by the cell’s input access 
control facility. Therefore in contrast to existing approaches the cell’s architecture 
has to be extended to include an output access control facility. The arguments for 
not having output access control are that:
1. output control rules can be represented as input control rules of the destination 
agents. This argument is wrong because it assumes that if user A does not wish to 
communicate with user B then user B does not want to offer any services to user A.
2. the skills (programs) residing within the cell are created by the user owner of the cell 
and therefore he can embed his output control rules within the programs themselves.
However this form of output control is inefficient because these rules have to be 
present in every program the owner inserts in the cell and unmanageable because if 
the output control rules change then all the existing programs within the cell have to 
be updated to reflect these updates.
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• Multithreading. The current architecture of the cell is multithreaded. The cell 
consists of three concurrent threads (authorisation, matching, execution) that 
exchange data (tokens) in a sequential fashion. The cell’s internal queues act as 
token flow throttles to control the flow of tokens from one thread to the other. 
Each stage in this pipeline is responsible for processing each token according to 
its current state which is the lock table for the auth thread and token store for the 
match thread and updating their state if the token carries a command to do so. If 
the token does not carry a command to modify/access the state of the current 
stage then it is forwarded to the next stage. If the token is a token agent then it 
carries a program and hence such a token cannot be inspected by the auth and 
match process as to whether its code requires access to their respective states. 
Such tokens are executed in the exec stage. However because of this fact, there is 
a serious limitation in this multithreaded' design. For example, it is possible that 
an executing program in the exec stage needs to access and modify the state of the 
access controller or the token store. In this case the auth or match thread, 
respectively, must switch to this request. Race conditions can occur because the 
executing program in the exec stage can specify a modification to the access 
controller. It is possible though that before its request gets satisfied, the access 
controller has already authorised and forwarded other tokens from the input 
queue, which would have been rejected if the state of the access controller had 
been updated first by the program in the exec stage. These conditions must not 
occur because they impose security risks. They can be avoided by making the 
design of the cell single-threaded.
Based on the above points of criticism, the final functionality of the cell (agent 
facilitator) can be described as follows: the cell is a single process that processes the 
incoming messages one at a time. Each message passes several stages sequentially until 
its request or program (token agent) is executed. The navigator component provides a 
repository for the user-defined tasks and navigation logic whereby the Information Store 
stores the current skills and information about the agent. In the remainder of this chapter 
the structure and functionality of the cell’s main components (i.e. tokens, token store, IS, 
Navigator) will be presented. For ease of reading the description of the input and output 
access controller will be presented with the design of the security policies layer of the 
agent system in chapter five.
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3.4 The tokens
The tokens are messages exchanged between cells. The types and structure of every 
type of token defines the high level communication protocol among cells. From the 
existing literature on communications protocols, a typical message contains a header and 
a data field. The header contains information about the message, i.e. its ID, its owner 
agent, its type, etc. The data field contains the information the source agent wants to 
convey to the destination agent. As shown in section 3.3 the tokens in our framework are 
extended to incorporate a security field which can contain security information the access 
controller of a cell uses to determine whether this token has enough authorisation or not. 
This security information has to be kept as a separate field because special operations 
might be requhed to be performed on it. For example, the source agent might wish to 
apply some form of encryption to this information because of its confidential and 
sensitive nature. Furthermore, the input access controller of a cell should be the only 
entity in the cell which is allowed to decode and inspect the contents of this field. The 
contents of the security field of a token must not be passed as input to a program of the 
Information Store because they might be copied or altered. At this point it must be 
emphasised that the functionality of a cell is predefined and constant and hence it can be 
trusted, whereas this trust must not be assumed of the programs the owner of the cell 
have incorporated in its Information Store. Because of these issues, the security 
information of a token must be kept and treated as a separate field within the token.
To design the structure of a token, recall that our framework in general must be 
adaptable by a wide range of users. By definition, since the framework is architecture- 
based the tokens in this framework must be defined in a declarative notation. The chosen 
notation must be simple, flexible and widely available. All these constraints are satisfied 
by the XML [80]. It is a simple, yet powerful tag-based notation emerging as the de facto 
standard for data modelling and interchange over the Internet. Using this notation a 
generic token can be represented as a simple XML text file which contains three tags, 
each mapping to one field of the token. Because the aforementioned three fields, header, 
data, security, make up a token the three XML tags representing these fields are 
embedded as sub-elements within a main element called token in the XML file. Figure 
3.9 shows the generic token in XML:
81
Nick Antonopoulos Chapter 3
< ?xml version= ”1.0" ?> 
<token>
<header> 
header_contents 
</header>
<data>
data_contents
</data>
<security>
seciirity_contents
</security>
</token>
Figure 3.9 An XML token
By applying the same technique of mapping sub-fields of the token into sub-elements 
of the XML file we can represent any token in XML. Furthermore by using the XML 
DTD (Document Type Definition) facility the framework can define and use different 
types of tokens each of which have different structure and elements. If there are more 
than one type of token then each token needs to have an attribute to indicate its type so 
that the receiving agent knows how to process it. The use of the Document Object Model 
(DOM) facility gives us the added benefit of type checking. If we assume that each agent 
knows the DOM model of all types of tokens then when it receives a token, it firstly 
identifies its type and then matches its structure against the DOM model for that type. If 
the token does not have the right structure then it can be rejected. This facility gets even 
more important if we assume that there is an interface via which the users can interact 
with the framework, i.e. send/receive tokens to agents, etc. In this scenario when the user 
attempts to send a token to an agent, the interface can have the DOM model o f the 
corresponding type and thus do type checking on the token before the token’s departure. 
This can save communication because an error-containing token will be detected and 
rejected before it travels unnecessarily to the destination agent.
The necessary fields for the header are the following ; a) the type of the token, b) the 
source and destination address of the token. The destination address is necessary so that 
the communication system can route the token to the appropriate destination. The source 
address shows the originator of the token and is important in order for the input access 
controller of the destination agent to determine the authorisation criteria for this token, c) 
its ID via which the source agent can recognise any replies to this token, d) two flags to 
indicate whether this token requires any reply and/or synchronisation (more on this flag
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in section 3.6) and e) any action to be taken if an error condition occurs during its 
processing (i.e. the token is rejected for security reasons by the destination agent). This 
sub-field provides the flexibility to specify alternative destinations for a token in case it 
can be processed in the current agent. The presented set of sub-fields for the header is not 
exhaustive. It serves only to identify the fields that are necessary for the operation of the 
framework in its current form. The type field allows for future extensions of the header 
of the token.
The tokens can be classified into two categories according to the type of information 
they carry in their data field. The token can be a simple invocation token in which case 
its data field has to specify the service it wishes to invoke at the destination agent 
together with the necessary data. The supplied argument values are tagged with the name 
of the coiTesponding argument of the specific service as specified in the service’s 
prototype. Furthermore the token can be a token agent in which case its data field carries 
the actual code of the program to be executed at the destination agent. In this case it also 
needs to specify the language the program is written in so that the receiving agent can 
find out which interpreter to run in order to execute this program.
In the case that the token contains a program then the token’s data field, apart from 
the program text, can contain other data items the program might need during its 
execution. These data items are naturally represented as tagged values. In XML these 
tags are mapped into elements or attributes. This set of data items comprises a state that 
the program wishes to use when it is executed. When a cell receives such a token then its 
responsibility is to execute this program if the whole token is authorised. The main 
process of the cell forks the appropriate interpreter to run the token’s program. During its 
execution the program is given a simple interface via which it can access and use the 
services of the cell. This interface also allows the program to access/modify the contents 
of the data field of the token in which it resides. The cell process remains alive and 
receives requests/send replies from/to the token program process via a simple inter­
process communication mechanism such as pipes. Among the services the program can 
access is the mobility interface of the cell, thus it can request its migration to another cell. 
When the cell receives such a request, then it terminates the execution of the token 
program, sets the destination field of the token to contain the new address, appends its 
own address in the source field of the token and finally places this new token in its output 
queue to be forwarded by the communication system. At the destination cell, the token
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program is restarted from the beginning (weak mobility). It then uses its state (data items 
in the token’s data field) to determine how to proceed.
The services visible to a token agent can vary and hence we can have a number of 
variations from the previous case. For example if the service of mobility is not accessible 
by the token program then this means that the token cannot request its migration to 
another cell. Therefore the token program will be executed only once in a single cell. 
Such tokens can be called Remote Program Execution tokens (RPET) and in fact can be 
used to perform simple remote programming. Such variants can be distinguished by 
appending a separate type attribute for the token’s data field.
3.5 The Information Store
The Information Store (IS) holds the agent’s proprietary information and skills. 
Agents, if they have enough authorisation, can request access to the contents of the IS of 
another agent. The design of the IS must satisfy the general requirements of the 
framework. Specifically there are three issues pertinent to the design of the IS:
a) integration. Because the agent’s facilitator state does not depend on any specific 
language, therefore its state, part of which is the IS, must be able to incorporate skills 
and information represented in different languages.
b) usability. It must be straightforward for the users of the framework to view, manage 
and use the contents of the IS of the agents, and
c) programming efficiency. This issue is not only related with the program 
representation and execution schemes of the framework but also with the information 
representation strategies. Efficiency in the context of information representation 
means that agents should adopt a uniform information representation scheme that 
enables them not only to exchange information but to share information as well. In 
the previous section we showed that an XML-based message passing can be used for 
efficient exchange of information and commands among agents. The key in 
addressing the second issue (information sharing) is the notion of re-usability. One of 
the reasons for the wide adoption of object-oriented systems is that object-orientation 
offers an integrated, elegant mechanism for information sharing between objects, the 
notion of inheritance. In this approach the definition of new objects is based on the 
contents of the existing ones. Therefore the concept of re usability is inherent in
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object-oriented systems and thus readily available for object-oriented, language-based 
agent frameworks. On the other hand the incorporation of re-usability features in an 
architecture-based framework is not straightforward.
The key idea in solving this problem is to view each item in the IS of an agent as an 
independent black box that can be copied from one agent to another, assuming that the 
enforced security policies are satisfied. Each such black box has a name for identification 
purposes, some contents, an interface via which these contents can be used/managed and 
an access control policy that its potential users must satisfy in order to be allowed to 
access it. The notion of an independent black box maintains the principle of 
encapsulation in object-oriented systems since its contents are accessible only via its 
interface. The access control policy is a necessary component of a black box because it is 
a movable entity which is not aware of either the characteristics of its current host cell or 
the characteristics of the agents attempting to access it. The only protection such an 
entity can have is, upon its creation, to be hardwired with an access control policy. It 
should be possible though for some users to be allowed to reprogram a black box’s 
security policy at a later stage.
From the above analysis it is clear that the IS becomes a repository of a number of 
black boxes. The IS must provide an interface via which other agents can access the 
current black boxes, create new ones or request that a specific black box is copied or 
moved to another agent. The command of copying black boxes from one cell to another is 
probably the most important of the whole IS interface since it enables agents to use the 
contents of other agents as the building blocks of their own contents. Thus it is possible 
that a user can create an agent which is initially empty. Gradually though the agent can 
start having some specific state by copying black box components from other agents, 
assuming it is allowed to do so.
According to the contents and functionality, the black boxes can naturally be 
classified into three categories :
• Data. The contents of a data box are a set of passive data items. These contents 
can be expressed in XML for the same reasons as we used with a token’s 
contents. The box’s interface contains a number of interpreted programs which, 
when invoked, are provided with a standard interface from the cell via which they 
can access/modify the contents of the black box. This interface also allows the 
executing method to invoke another method of the same box. For every method 
the black box needs to contain the method’s name, the language the method is
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written in, the actual code and the names of the arguments the method requires as 
input. The executing method is not allowed to invoke the method of another black 
box because this would destroy the independence characteristic of the black 
boxes. If it was allowed then it would be possible for an agent to copy a black box 
only to find out that in order for it to work it required access to another black box 
which was not present,
• Program. A program box is structurally identical to a data box. There are only 
two differences : a) the content of the program box is the code of the actual 
program and b) by default a program box comes with the method execute which if 
invoked, makes the host cell responsible for executing the program of the box. 
The execute method’s arguments are effectively the arguments the program of the 
box requires as input whenever it is invoked. The user that creates a program box 
can also specify more methods which, if invoked, show or modify parts of the 
program’s code.
• Agent/intelligent. An intelligent black box is a natural extension to the notion of a 
program box. The contents of this box are again a program together with a set of 
data items in XML format that comprise its state. The main difference between a 
program box and an intelligent/agent box is that when the program of an 
intelligent box is executed then it is given an interface via which it can access its 
state (XML elements) and can also access other black boxes in the same IS. An 
intelligent black box is thus a box that can utilise the contents of the IS it resides 
in, in order to perform its task. Furthermore the interface provided to an 
intelligent black box allows it to request its migration to another cell. The 
difference between a token agent and an agent black box is that the former is 
executed upon its arrival at the destination cell whereby the latter upon its arrival 
is placed in the IS of the destination cell. A token from an authorised agent is 
required to re-activate the newly arrived intelligent black box by invoking its 
execute method. Because of their interaction with the contents of the IS of the 
current host cell, intelligent black boxes can on the one hand perform their tasks 
perhaps more efficiently than program boxes but on the other hand might not be 
able to complete their task if they are placed in a cell that does not contain the 
necessary black boxes.
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3.6 The Matching Store
As was explained in chapter two, the collaboration service is an important 
characteristic/utility that an agent frame work should support. In section 3.2 it was shown 
that our framework provides an important new abstraction: collaboration points within 
the agents themselves. The Matching Store (MS) component of the cell is responsible in 
maintaining and managing an arbitrary set of collaboration points. The basic structure 
and functionality of a collaboration point was shown in section 3.3. An important 
difference between the proposed framework and other existing systems is that our notion 
of collaboration point is more general and powerful than the collaborative facilities in 
other systems. Firstly most of the existing agent frameworks provide only basic 
synchronisation facilities which enable a number of agents to synchronise their 
execution. The implementation of these synchronisation points is by means o f a 
semaphore which is given an initial value and each of the synchronising agents, after it 
reaches a specific point in its program, decrement this value. When the semaphore 
reaches zero, then the agents are allowed to continue their execution. Such facilities can 
only support synchronisation of programs which does not include any data exchange and 
processing. Secondly Aglets and Concordia do attempt to provide more generic 
collaboration facilities. For this service they define independent specialised agents called 
synchronisation objects which offer the necessary functionality to support the 
collaboration among other agents. The synchronisation objects contain a set of 
synchronisation items each of which has a name, a synchronisation expression and an 
associated action. The collaborating agents must know the address of the synchronisation 
object and the name of the synchronisation item in order to perform the action of 
collaboration. The synchronisation expression of a synchronisation item contains the 
names of all the agents that must send data to this item in order for its associated action 
to be executed. Typically the action part of the synchronisation item just specifies a 
method o f an agent to be executed using the gathered data as input.
Our definition of collaboration points is more generic and can incorporate the 
functionality of the existing approaches as well as support more collaboration patterns. 
Specifically, as it was shown in section 3.3 the collaboration points in this framework 
form a conceptual layer all incoming tokens in a cell have to go through. The new 
collaboration patterns supported by this framework and their importance are discussed 
below:
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» Dataflow-style. The dataflow model of computation provides an elegant way of 
representing programs as asynchronous dataflow graphs [13, 15]. In such a graph the 
nodes represent single, low-level instructions and the arcs indicate the flow o f data 
among these nodes. The functionality of dataflow graphs is based on a simple node 
activation rule that inherently contains the notion of synchronisation [82, 89]. More 
specifically it is defined that a node in the graph is activated and the relevant 
instruction executed if and only if all necessary data for the instruction is available. 
This rule is important because tokens in a dataflow graph are synchronised 
automatically according to their contents and the ID of the program they belong to. 
This matches exactly our framework’s approach to place the collaboration phase 
before the execution phase of a token’s processing in every cell. The dataflow rule 
can be applied at a higher level in our framework for tokens carrying a single service 
request (agent method invocation in object-oriented terms). With this technique 
tokens from different agents can go through an implicit, automatic collaboration act 
that the programmer does not need to define explicitly.
The dataflow-style of collaboration is implemented as follows in our framework: 
when a token arrives at a cell and passes the authorisation phase it is then submitted to 
the Matching Store of the cell. The Matching Store examines the data field of the token 
and identifies the name of the method the token wishes to invoke. If the specified method 
exists then the Matching Store uses its prototype signature to determine the names of the 
arguments that method requires as input. The token then is checked as to whether its data 
field carries all the necessary arguments. If it does then the token is forwarded to the 
execution stage. If it does not then the Matching Store creates automatically a dataflow 
collaboration point. The contents of this collaboration point are as follows: a) its 
synchronisation expression contains the required argument names for that method in an 
AND boolean expression. This represents the fact that in order for this point to be 
executed it has to have received values for all the specified arguments, b) its action field 
contains just the name of the method to be invoked, c) its name contains the ID of the 
program this collaboration point participates in. This ID is part of the header of every 
token, and d) the already arrived token is placed in the collaboration point's storage. 
When a new token belonging to the same program arrives at the cell wishing to invoke 
the same method then the Matching Store checks whether the arguments the new token 
carries in its data field together with the ones already present (from the previous token) 
satisfy the synchronisation expression. If they do the Matching Store passes the
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invocation request to the execution phase. The results of the invocation aie sent to the 
union of the destinations the collaborating tokens have specified. Otherwise, if the 
present aiguments are not sufficient then the new token is stored with the old one to 
await the arrival of more tokens. The presented novel collaboration mechanism is simple 
but suffers from one problem. Since all tokens pass through the collaboration layer, a cell 
cannot distinguish between tokens that carry partial data because they wish to participate 
in a collaboration act from the tokens that carry partial data because of an error. To solve 
this problem we define a synchionisation flag as a necessary sub-field of every token’s 
header. If the flag is set then this indicates the token’s willingness to go through the 
collaboration phase. Otherwise the token indicates that it is independent from every 
other. In the latter case, if the token is found to contain less that the required data for the 
method invocation it specifies, it is discarded and an appropriate error message is sent to 
its originator.
• User defined. The data flow style of collaboration can be applied when the 
programmer wishes to define a single, existing method of a cell to be invoked as a 
result of a collaboration act. There are cases though where the programmer wishes to 
specify more complex actions to be performed as a result of the activation of a 
collaboration point. For this reason we define the user-defined collaboration pattern. 
The structure of such a collaboration point is identical to that of a dataflow 
collaboration point with the difference that the action field of the point now contains 
a user-defined interpreted progiam to be executed. The synchronisation expression 
contains an AND boolean expression of all the arguments required as input by the 
program specified in the action field. As before, when all these necessary arguments 
have been assigned values by incoming tokens then the program is executed. The cell 
provides an interface to this program via which the cell’s IS contents can be 
accessed/used/modified. The name field of such a collaboration point contains a user- 
defined string that uniquely identifies it in the local Matching Store. In order to 
participate in the activation of a user defined collaboration point, a token specifies in 
its data field the name of the point rather than the name of a cell’s method (in the 
dataflow style). The existence of user-defined collaboration points gives the 
collaboration layer two strategic advantages over other models : a) in other 
approaches if the user wanted to define a collaboration point in the context of our 
framework, then he would have to first incorporate the program within the IS of the 
agent and then define a synchronisation point whose action invokes the
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aforementioned program. In our framework, this scenario is implemented in a single 
integrated step, and b) After the activation has occurred the programmer will have to 
explicitly remove both its program from the agent and its synchronisation point from 
the appropriate synchronisation object. In our approach this procedure takes place 
automatically in a single agent where the user-defined collaboration point was 
defined.
In conclusion, the notion of user-defined collaboration points can be used to 
efficiently create, use and discard collaboration points that invoke arbitrary user-defined 
programs. The efficiency stems from the fact that : a) the gathering of data and execution 
of action occur within the agent whose services the program will utilise (minimum 
communication) and b) both the creation and deletion of such a point do not involve any 
change in the IS of the agent which is used for storing more permanent information 
items.
• Agent collaboration points. The aforementioned patterns of collaboration can be used 
by service request tokens. However, as shown in section 3.4 the tokens can also be 
the carriers of lightweight agents (token agents). Token agents cannot use the 
previously described collaboration patterns because they carry a program rather than 
a single invocation request. In this case it is not possible for these programs to define 
in advance which method (service) of the cell they wish to invoke. The decision and 
invocation of appropriate cell services takes place at run-time only. The question that 
naturally arises here is how to specify that a number of arbitrary programs (token 
agents) wish to collaborate and what the possible semantics of such an act are. 
Existing approaches claim that the only semantics that can be given for such 
collaboration is that of simple synchronisation. According to this approach a 
prespecified number of programs access a semaphore entity when they reach a certain 
stage in theft execution. Every participating program accesses the semaphore and 
reduces or increases its value. Then the program checks if the new value of the 
semaphore is equal to the prespecified value. If not then the program remains blocked 
until enough participating programs arrive such that the semaphore’s value reaches 
the threshold. In this case the programs are awakened and can continue their 
concurrent execution. From this description it can be observed that the action 
associated with this synchronisation is that the participating programs can resume 
their concurrent execution.
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The approach followed in this framework is a natural extension o f this. An agent 
collaboration point synchronises the execution of a number of token agents, referenced 
by name in the point’s synchronisation field, and results in their execution according to a 
prespecified sequence in the point’s action field. Our approach is more generic and 
flexible because : a) the synchronisation condition specified can be an arbitrary Boolean 
expression over the names of token agents. Thus the only option the existing systems 
give which is an AND expression of specified agents becomes just a special case in our 
approach, and b) the action specified can define the sequence (or randomness) according 
to which token agents will be executed in the cell after they are synchronised. This 
enables the programmer to define the order with which his token agents will interact and 
thus change the state of the current host cell. In this way the programmer can ensure the 
integrity of the semantics of his program.
Token agents can indicate that they are willing to participate in a collaboration by 
setting their synchronisation flag. It is also necessary that the state of the token agents 
specifies the name of the collaboration point they wish to activate. The token agents are 
responsible for defining the value of this attribute (represented naturally as an XML 
element) prior to their migration to a new cell.
Because of the reasons mentioned in sections 3.4 and 3.5 all forms of collaboration 
points can be efficiently represented in XML. The type of a collaboration point is 
indicated by an XML attribute. Each field of a collaboration point is represented by an 
appropriate XML tag (element). Each of the three forms of collaboration in total is 
represented as an XML file that follows a different XML DTD. The synchronisation 
expression of the collaboration points is a simple string representing the appropriate 
boolean expression. The action part is either a string (if it specifies order of execution of 
the token agents or if it specifies the cell service to be invoked in the case of dataflow- 
style points) or the text representation of the program to be executed in the case of user- 
defined collaboration points.
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3.7 Agent Navigator
One of the primary characteristics of mobile agents is their ability to migrate 
autonomously from host to host [64]. Thus, support for agent mobility is a fundamental 
requirement of every agent infrastructure. Agent mobility has been addressed by various 
systems [46, 52, 58, 101, 117, 123].There are two distinct design approaches for agent 
mobility based on which there is the sepai ation of strong from weak mobility.
Strong mobility is implemented by incorporating within an interpreted programming 
language the most primitive navigational action of migrating to a new single physical 
location. The agent in this case is a single monolithic program whose computational logic 
is fully integrated with the navigational logic. When the interpreter encounters the 
navigational command, the execution of the agent is interrupted, the whole state of the 
agent’s execution thread is captured and subsequently transmitted to the remote 
destination the agent specified [46]. Upon airival the system resumes the execution 
thread thus the agent resumes execution from the point of interrupt.
Strong mobility schemes have two important drawbacks: a) Language dependency. 
They are usually based on a new, proprietary language that the programmer is required to 
learn in order to program agents. [108, 121], and b) Homogeneity. Being based on a 
single, global language for agents, these schemes assume that the language’s execution 
system is distributed and made available in all the hosts of the network. The homogeneity 
assumption though does not hold for the Internet which is inherently a heterogeneous 
environment.
The alternative approach to strong mobility is weak mobility. This approach is based 
on the separation of navigation from computation. The navigation logic of an agent is 
typically encapsulated in an itinerary object which contains a set o f 3-tuples 
<destination, action, next >. Each such tuple defines where the agent must go 
{destination), the method of the agent {action) that must be executed upon its arrival and 
the next tuple to be executed after this current one {next). Tuples of this form can be 
hardwired with each other to form navigational patterns, such as sequential traversal, 
parallel traversal, spawning agent replicas that perform a specific task and return the 
results to the parent agent, etc. These patterns can be embedded within each other thus 
allowing the creation of more complex regular navigational expressions or itineraries. 
Existing systems implement each navigational pattern as an object therefore a regular 
navigational expression is represented as a rigid object hierarchy. As a result an agent
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travel plan is inherently static and predefined by the agent programmer during the agent’s 
creation phase. In a continuously active and changing environment though, like the 
Internet, it is not sufficient to provide agents with static travel plans. The AJANTA 
system has no support for dynamic modification of itineraries whereas IBM ’s Aglets 
argue that they implement dynamic travel plans but in reality they only support the 
addition/removal of a plan item at the bottom/end of the itinerary. Furthermore 
Concordia is based on the assumption that a change of plan takes place only in 
exceptional cases [83, 123].
In this section the agent Navigator is presented and analysed. The agent Navigator is 
an active entity embedded within an agent and it supports the creation and dynamic 
modification of the agent’s itinerary.
3.7.1 Agent Navigator: An overview
Like the computation logic, the navigation plans are equally an important part of an 
agent’s state. Therefore in contrast to the Concordia approach they should be embedded 
within the agent itself. The agent Navigator is an active component of an agent and its 
main functionality is to a) store and manage the agent’s navigational data, and b) 
implement the agent’s navigation plans. The agent Navigator consists of three basic 
elements: the plan items, the Navigator State (NS) and the Application Programming 
Interface(API) as shown in the following figure (figure 3.10).
Navigator
access & 
modify
NS
A P I
Synchronisation
Store OtherAgents
Figure 3.10 The agent Navigator
For the following analysis, it is assumed that the agent consists of two concurrently 
active parts: the agent Navigator which is responsible for implementing the agent’s tasks 
and the communication process which is responsible for receiving messages from other
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agents/users. These messages are either kept in a queue to be processed after the end of 
the currently executing navigation plan if they contain requests from other agents, or sent 
as interrupts to the Navigator if they contain navigation control commands such as pause, 
resume or terminate.
An agent’s Navigator contains one or more interconnected plan items. A plan item is 
an autonomous, pseudo object whose contents are expressed in a declarative notation. It 
carries an identity tag that uniquely identifies it in the local Navigator. The fact that the 
plan item is represented as a named set of declarations supports the cross-referencing of 
plans or components of plans. For instance, in contrast to existing approaches, the 
executing plan item can reference by name other plan items within the local Navigator 
and use/modify their components (run-time modification of travel plans), create new 
plans, delete existing ones (if they are not referenced currently by any other plan items), 
etc.
The functionality of a plan item is similar to that of a simple Jtinerary  in Aglets. 
Each plan item specifies an action to be executed at a specific destination as well as the 
next plan item(s) to be executed after the current one. The action field of a plan item, 
rather than referencing a method of the agent (existing approaches), embodies instead a 
program written in any interpreted language for which a secure interpreter is available. 
The plan item becomes in this way autonomous since it does not depend on the contents 
(methods) of the agent it resides in. This autonomy is useful because it enables the 
copying of plan items among agents without altering their semantics or functionality.
The plan items in this architecture contain more fields. For example the field data stores 
the results produced from the execution of the action. This provides an added benefit 
over the existing systems because the plan items can directly exchange and share results 
simply by referencing each other’s name and field name. Therefore the plan items do not 
rely on the local agent to provide any proprietary storage facilities that could be shared 
by them. Section 3.7.2 discusses the plan item’s structure more extensively.
The Navigator State is a private information store of the Navigator. It contains certain 
permanent information characterising the Navigator itself such as the ID of its owner, its 
version, etc. This information can only be viewed by other agents or executing plan items 
but it cannot be modified. The main data item of this component is the plan stack which 
is used to store a number of regular navigational expressions (as defined in section 1) that 
must be executed in a last in-first out (LIFO) fashion. More details o f the plan stack are 
also presented in section 3.7.2.
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The agent Navigator implements an API through which other active components of 
the agent and in general other agents can access/use the agent’s navigation logic and data. 
The API contains a set of methods that enable the currently active plan item to a) 
access/modify the components of other plan items in the same Navigator; b) define/use 
synchronisation points in the agent’s token store, presented in section 3.6; and c) use the 
communication facility of the agent to interact and use the services of other agents. 
Similarly, this interface enables the agent itself to a) access/modify its navigation plans 
(plan items); and b) control the execution of the Navigator process at run-time if it has 
received one or more navigation control commands from the network. Moreover, the 
interface also offers methods that enable other agents to copy, move or create plan items 
in the local Navigator assuming that such requests are authorised by the access control 
policy the agent enforces.
3.7.2 Plan Items
As already mentioned, a plan item represents the pre-specified action or actions that 
the Navigator will have to execute on a specified location, and then hop to another host 
or terminate the agent’s trip. It comprises the following fields:
i. The name of the plan item, used for cross-reference and reusability purposes as 
described below.
ii. A set of attributes, where the plan item keeps some information for private use
i.e. the plan’s item ID, the owner’s ID of the plan item.
iii. A data field, where the plan item keeps data acquired during its execution.
iv. The location field, which holds the host name, where the agent has to go in 
order to execute the plan item.
V. The action method, that holds the series of actions that the plan item has to 
execute on the specified location.
vi. The next field, which holds a pointer to the next plan item(s) the Navigator 
executes next.
The benefit of individually naming each plan item is that every plan item can access 
individual components of another plan item. This way, if a user wants to reuse a plan 
item in a different Navigator he can cross-reference an already pre-defined one. 
Furthermore, a component of a plan item can be linked to the same component of another 
plan item. Hence, if the user/agent changes one plan item, then automatically all plan
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items referencing this plan item will implicitly be updated. The deletion method of a 
referenced plan item is similar to the UNIX directory deletion operation. A reference 
counter is used and the plan item will not be deleted unless the counter is zero.
Given that plan items are reusable components, once defined, they can act as pseudo- 
objects and be copied or accessed by other plan items or Navigators. Let us assume that 
the user creates a plan item -  called “stores_check” -  to check if a specific product exists 
in a shop’s warehouse. The product ID is defined as a variable and stored in the 
attributes field. Because of this the programmer can define a new plan item that utilises 
the existing computational logic of the first plan item, to look for another product at 
another location.
Another advantage is that the action field can be implemented in different 
programming languages for each different plan item, thus giving a language-neutral 
approach. Consequently, the action field will hold the language’s name the code is 
written in and the actual code that has to be executed upon arrival at the required 
location. It is the programmer’s responsibility to ensure that the required 
compilers/interpreters will be available on the location of execution. Moreover, the plan 
item being a dynamic entity can modify components of itself or of other plan items 
during execution of its action. The programmer can use the API to access and/or change 
other plan items. For example, at the aforementioned example, plan item “stores_check” 
looks for a product at the stores of a shop and the item is not in stock. Let us also assume 
that there is another plan item -  called “supplier_check” -  which checks if a supplier has 
in stock a product. During its execution, the action of the first plan item (“stores_check”) 
can change the value of its next field to point to the second plan item (“supplier_check”), 
since the requested product is not in stock. Therefore the plans in this architecture are 
adaptive and thus more efficient than static plans supported by other systems.
In the simplest case the next field of a plan item points to a single plan item. 
However, it can also represent navigation patterns. The set of patterns that are utilised in 
this model was identified by the AJANTA and Aglets models, and are the following:
• sequence SQ = {plan_item_l, plan_item_2, ..., plan_item_N). The agent has to
execute each plan item in sequence.
• set SET = (plan_item_l, plan_itemJ2, ..., plan_item_N). The agent has to
traverse through all plan items in an undetermined order.
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• split SPLIT = {plan_item_l, plan_item_2, plan_item_N). The agent creates N 
replicas, each of which executes one of the specified plan items. Upon their birth 
the children agents act as autonomous agents and their behaviour is independent 
of their parent’s behaviour. In this navigation pattern the children agents are not 
expected to report any results back to their parent.
•join  JOIN = (plan_item_l, plan_item__2, ..., plan_item_N:SP_ID). The agent 
creates children of the plan item and dispatches them concurrently at the 
specified destinations. It has to provide them with a synchronisation point ID so 
the results can be collected (described in more detail in Section 3.7.3).
Additionally, each next field can include regular expressions in its context. A regular 
expression will be a combination of the aforementioned patterns. For example, let us 
assume that the next field of plan„item_l includes: next = SQ(plan_item_2, 
SET(plan_item_3, plan_item_4)). In this case, the Navigator has to execute first 
plan_item_2 and then the pattern SET(plan_item_3, plan_item„4). In order to do that, it 
copies the whole regular expression to its Navigator State and then executes 
plan_item_2. Therefore, an important difference between the presented architecture and 
the existing approaches is that regular navigation expressions are represented as strings 
which is more efficient and flexible than the object hierarchy representation adopted by 
the IBM Aglets and Concordia.
The problem that arises here is that one or more of the plan items referenced in the 
above expression can, in turn, contain another expression in their next fields. For 
example, if the next field of plan_item_2 has another regular- expression -  
SET(plan_item_5, plan_item_6) -  then the Navigator will have to execute this expression 
without losing the rest of the travel plan. In order to maintain consistency, the Navigator 
keeps a stack of the regular expressions that have to be executed. The Navigator’s State 
before and after the next field of plan_item_2 is depicted in figure 3.11. We can see that 
the next plan item for execution will be either plan_item_5 or plan_item__6, then 
plan_item_6 or plan_item_5 respectively and then SET(3,4).
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Navigator State
Plan Stack:
S Q ( S E T ( 3 , 4 )  )
Navigator State
Plan Stack:
S E T ( 5 , 6 )
S Q ( S E T ( 3 , 4 ) )
(a) Hie NS before next at plan item 2 (b) The NS after next at plan item 2
Figure 3.11 The Plan Stack example 
Since next is language-neutral, we can introduce breakpoints and give the user more 
control over the execution of the travel plan. Specifically we implement “PAUSE” as a 
keyword which if it appears in the next field of the current plan item, the Navigator 
execution is paused. Until a “RESUME” or “TERMEMATE” message has been received, 
the agent has to wait^. Thus, by inserting breakpoints, we can create collaborating agents 
that execute a computation in parallel and co-operate by pausing, exchanging results and 
resuming. For instance, imagine two agents which collaborate. The first one -  after 
executing his action -  has paused and has to wait for some results from the second one. 
When the second finishes with its execution sends the result and a “RESUME” command 
to the first one, and then both continue their execution.
A problem that can appeal" is the asynchrony between the two agents. That is, the 
results and the command “RESUME” from the second agent arrive before the first one 
has paused. This situation can be solved by introducing a stack that keeps “RESUME” or 
“TERMINATE” messages arriving at the input queue of each agent.
An additional advantage of our model is that a plan item can be easily represented 
with XML as shown in figure 3.12. Hence, by representing a plan item with a human
<name, plan_item_name = "value">
<attributes,owner = "owner_userID",
<data, data = "values"> <location, location = "value"> <action, type = "language_type", 
code = "code_text"
>
<next, next = "destination"> </name>
Figure 3.12 XML representation of the plan item
The commands PAUSE, RESUME and TERMINATE belong in the set of standard methods of every cell
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recognisable form in standard notation, applications can be created, where the user can 
directly generate and inspect his own travel plans.
3.7,3 The Split/Join procedure
One of the most important and frequently appearing navigational patterns is the split- 
join procedure. In a typical split-join scenario the agent creates n replicas each o f which 
is assigned a specific task to perform. The replicas behave as normal agents but at the 
end of their task, the results produced have to be reported back to the parent agent. The 
parent agent processes the results and decides what further task to execute next (if any).
From the above it is clear that an important part of the split-join process is the 
synchronisation and processing of the results from the children. In MASIC agents are 
equipped with a Token Store facility which can be used in this context as well. Briefly, a 
Token Store is a collection of Synchronisation Points (SP). An synchronisation point in 
the context of navigation is defined as a tuple <JD, expression, action, store> where:
ID is a string uniquely identifying this synchronisation point in the local token store 
Expression A Boolean algebra expression over the names of children agents. For 
example if an SP’s expression field contains the string “A and B or C” then the action of 
the SP will be executed if either the results from both children A, B are received or only 
the results from child C.
Action The action field of the SP contains a program written in an interpreted language 
which takes as input the results from the children agents and produces as output the 
navigation pattern the agent Navigator has to execute next.
Store Whenever the results from an agent arrive indicating the ID of this SP, then the 
new result’s agent name together with the contents of the store are checked as to whether 
they satisfy the expression. If the expression yields false then the new results are placed 
in the store awaiting more results to arrive.
The proposed agent Navigator supports the split-join pattern, like other related 
systems. In our system this procedure is implemented as follows:
Step 1: The currently executing plan item creates via the API n new plan items with 
names plan_l, plan_2, ...,plan_n.
Step 2: It also creates a synchronisation point with a specific ID.
Step 3: The parent’s next field contains the string JOIN(p/an_7, planJZ,
...,plan_n:SP_ID)wh&v& SP_ID is the ID of the synchronisation point.
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Step 4: The n agents are created. In each of them there is a field in the Navigator State 
indicating where the end results should be submitted. Specifically, it contains a tuple of 
the form <parent_agent_address, SP_ID, results_tag> where the parent_agent_addrest 
is the address of the parent agent, SP_ID is the ID of the synchronisation point to be 
invoked at the token store of the parent agent and resultsjtag is the tag that has to be 
appended to the results and will be used as input to the expression o f the synchronisation 
point.
Step 5: The child agents execute the appropriate plan items.
Step 6: At the end of execution they submit their results to the parent agent invoking tbs 
synchronisation point SPJID and appending the data with the results tag.
Step 7; After the expression of the SPJID yields true the action is executed to produces 
the new navigation pattern the parent agent wishes to execute next.
In conclusion, the advantage of using the external token store (which is still part of 
the agent’s state) is that plan items can define and use generic synchronisation points 
while the Navigator’s structure remains simple without the need to incorporate any extra 
synchronisation facilities. Furthermore, the synchronisation points defined in this way arc 
persistent and can be used repeatedly by different plan items.
3.7.4 Conclusions
The support for agent mobility is one of the primary services that an agerË 
architecture has to offer. Existing systems offering weak mobility support only tfttc 
definition of static, precompiled travel plans that cannot be modified dynamically. In thiis 
section a novel agent Navigator facility was presented. Its main components, the plain 
items, are autonomous, named lists of declarations that a) can cross -reference each othej 
thus allowing for efficient itinerary representation and b) can be used as re-usabftc 
components that can be copied to other agents (navigation knowledge sharing). The plaa 
items are offered an API via which they can access and modify the contents of other locail 
plan items at run-time. Furthermore it was shown that breakpoints are introduced to 
enable the user to control the execution of his agent dynamically. In conclusion ths 
presented agent Navigator can be used to efficiently represent re-usable, dynamic travel 
plans which can be created and inspected by the user directly through the use of an XML 
viewer.
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3.8 Discussion
In this chapter two main objectives were achieved. Firstly the overall conceptual 
model of a novel language-neutral agent framework was designed. Secondly the internal 
architecture of the agent facilitator (cell) was presented and analysed. The main 
requirements for both designs were set in chapter two and will form the basis for the 
evaluation of the designs.
Two important requirements of the proposed framework as a whole were integration 
and interoperability. These requirements have been taken into account in several parts of 
our design:
« Firstly the framework itself does not depend on any proprietary programming 
language or environment.
* Secondly the declarative parts of the variou^ components of the agent facilitator are 
represented in the standard notation of XML.
* Thirdly the active parts (programs) of the agent facilitator were assumed to be 
represented in any interpreted language for which there is a safe interpreter. This does 
not pose any serious restriction since there is a number of such interpreters widely 
available such as Tel, Java, etc.
» Fourthly the framework as a whole supports language-independent weak mobility 
rather than language-dependent strong mobility.
The usability/programmability of the framework is also robust because of the 
presented agent facilitator architecture. Specifically because there is no underlying 
restriction for the interpreted programming languages used to create and insert items in 
the IS of a cell and also because of the XML representation of the cell’s declarative parts, 
it is straightforward to create a GUI via which end-users can interact with the framework. 
The process of creating a cell should be a matter of simply filling an online form. The 
process of updating the state of a cell should be a matter of selecting already existing 
programs from libraries and incorporating them in the IS of the cell. Tokens can also be 
created by online forms. Furthermore since a cell is represented in XML it should be 
possible for the user to view directly the contents of the cell and perhaps invoke a 
specific service by utilising the GUI. The GUI can also include a graphical copy paste 
method that enables the user to select a component of a cell’s state and paste it to another 
agent, assuming that the source and destination access control policies are enforced.
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Another important metric for our framework was re-usability. Distributed object 
systems achieve re-usability through inheritance. Architecture-based frameworks, being 
language-neutral, do not immediately support any inheritance or indeed any other re­
usability mechanism. Our proposed framework solves this problem by viewing the 
contents of agents as independent, copiable components. New agents can utilise and copy 
(if they are permitted) the components of existing agents.
Hierarchical structuring is also important for program representation and execution. 
Our framework provides a range of structuring facilities through the agent facilitator. 
Firstly, in contrast with existing frameworks, the agent facilitator incorporates a 
hierarchy of characteristics. Cells are rather heavyweight agents, tokens can be the 
carriers of lightweight agents (token agents) and intelligent black boxes contain programs 
that interact with the local host cell and can jump at their will to another cell. The 
programmer can use any mixture of this rich repertoire of agents to represent his program 
efficiently. Cells can represent persistent agents that do not migrate frequently, token 
agents can represent temporary highly-mobile sub-programs that visit a number of hosts 
and perform simple, perhaps repetitive, tasks and intelligent black boxes can be used to 
represent persistent services that utilise the contents of their host cell. Secondly, each 
agent facilitator has onboard collaborative facilities that the programmer can use to 
efficiently co-ordinate the activities of his multi-agent program. These collaboration 
points reveal the co-ordinated structure of the invocation of simple cell services. 
Collaboration points can also be structured into a distributed dataflow-style graph which 
can act as the control mechanism of a set of multiple-type agents representing a single 
user program.
The presented novel agent facilitator also provides some additional benefits to our 
framework in comparison to other systems regarding access control. Firstly in our cell 
there is support for both coarse-grain access control via the access controller of the cell 
and fine-grain access control because of the fact that the components of the IS can have 
their own access control policies. The access control in total is symmetric and enables the 
user to define both input and output control policies. Furthermore the cell itself has a 
trusted, predefined functionality and acts as a trusted mediator in the interaction between 
incoming tokens and internal active or passive components.
However the aforementioned benefits do come at a price. Our proposed framework 
suffers from two main disadvantages: firstly the lack of static type checking. Being an 
architecture-based framework, it offers no embedded mechanism for type checking of the
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arguments passed as input for the invocation of a cell’s service (method). Because each 
cell is expressed in XML, the framework can still implement a primitive type system by 
assigning to every argument of a method a type label in the form of an XML tag. These 
labels could then be checked against the labels of the argument values that the incoming 
tokens contain. However this constitutes dynamic type checking with all its known 
disadvantages.
The second disadvantage is related to the procedure of executing active components 
within a cell, for example a method. As was presented earlier, in this case the executing 
program is given an interface via which it can access the contents of the data box it 
resides in. Every access request is received by the main process of the cell which 
consequently retrieves the requested data item and returns it to the executing method via 
an interprocess communication mechanism such as pipes. This procedure is necessary so 
that the main process of the cell ensures that every requested access is allowed according 
to the access control policies in place. But it is slower than the access to data by an 
executing method within an object in object-oriented languages. Although 
communicating across pipes is less fast, the advantage is that different procedures do not 
have to share the same address space and hence certain security risks are avoided.
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Chapter 4
Mobility management and agent discovery
4.1 Introduction
In a distributed mobile agent envhonment, the issue of locating and tracking of 
mobile agents and thus ensuring continuous access is of paramount importance. The first 
part of this chapter outlines the conceptual (high level) architecture of a novel, integrated 
addressing and routing system ( Mobile Agents Routing Services Architecture MARS A) 
which provides a structured decentralised solution based on the notion of lightweight 
software routing/addressing nodes, the arbitrers [1, 5]. The system supports the creation 
of overlapping physical and logical hierarchies which define multiple access paths for each 
agent. Each such path is coupled with a distributed access control mechanism and can be 
customised on a per agent basis. Furthermore, specialised management agents (MARSA 
Management Agents) support the dynamic updating of the system’s naming hierarchies.
Apart from mobility management, a multi-agent system must also enable the agents to 
discover efficiently other agents based on the services they offer or their characteristics 
(agent discovery). In the second part of this chapter it is argued that the agent discovery 
can be coupled with several aspects of the computation such as access control and 
customisation resulting in a better sharing, use and management of the information held by 
the agent discovery system. A novel architecture is presented in which discovery messages 
and discovery paths are mutable, active entities, which interact with each other as peers 
making the organisation system dynamic in nature. Queries traversing the system can be 
reformulated while at the same time the system itself can change depending on the nature 
and volume of the query traffic. Furthermore it is shown that the organisation nodes of
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the proposed architecture can serve as re-usable components for building more complex, 
composite nodes from existing ones.
4.2 Mobility management background
Since the notion of software mobility is relatively new, a plethora of naming and 
addressing schemes available that could be used to resolve the issue of mobile agent 
tracking become inadequate because the concept of mobility is not taken into account in 
their design. Typical examples of such systems are : the Internet’s Domain Name System 
(DNS) [85] and the X.500 Directory Service [103].
Furthermore this issue, strangely enough, has not been given enough attention by the 
various state-of-the-art mobile agent systems or frameworks. Typical examples of such 
systems are; Odyssey [46], Aglet [58], ARA [101], Agent-Tcl [52], TACOMA [61]. Most 
of these systems either completely neglect the problem or provide an oversimplified 
inadequate scheme. Flat schemes do not scale well and strictly hierarchical ones suffer 
from serious inefficiencies. Furthermore, several models for locating mobile hosts such as 
[14, 73] can not be applied in the tracking of mobile agents [120].
Nevertheless, there is a number of proposals that attempt to resolve the problem in a 
structured manner. These systems are : the Globe location service [119, 120], Emerald 
[62] and the Location Independent Invocation (LII) [21]. Emerald is based on building 
chains of forwarding pointers, a concept which does not scale well to global networks, 
whereby the LII assumes that the update-to-lookup ratio is small, an assumption that 
clearly should not be the basis of a naming system in a mobile agent world. Globe on the 
other hand, is based on a simple physical hierarchy of dedicated servers which can not be 
agent-customised or tackle any agent privacy or security issues. Furthermore, it offers 
little extensibility and can only accept very few optimisations.
Agents in the context of the system proposed in this chapter are user or system entities 
representing data or programs that can communicate with each other by means of 
exchanging structured messages (tokens) [4]. Each agent is assigned an input and output 
queue. The agent reads its input queue for incoming messages and places in the output 
queue any outgoing messages. The system is assigned with the task of removing the 
pending tokens from the output queues of the agents and placing them at input queue of
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the appropriate target agents. Each agent is given upon its birth exactly one Global 
Unique Identification (GUID) which depends on the location of its creation and remains 
constant throughout the lifetime of the agent. Each agent has a home system agent which 
is assigned to store the current address of the agent. The purpose of the GUID is to 
identify the home entity of an agent, which in turn guarantees to maintain the current 
location of the that agent. Thus the GUID provides the primary way of locating a mobile 
agent.
4.2.1 Overview of the proposed system
In this section, an overview of the novel architecture of the system is given. A more 
detailed analysis can be found in [5].
The system is realised as a network of servers. Each server comprises a set o f system 
level entities, the arbitrers, and a MARSA Management Agent (MMA) agent. The 
functionality of a server is partitioned into a number of arbitrers. Each arbitrer represents a 
virtual place in Odyssey terms [46]. In this context every arbitrer enforces its own security 
policies and provides a set of proprietary services to the agents visiting its virtual place 
(local agents). The main functionality of an arbitrer is to act as a message-passing node 
that receives all the outgoing messages from the agents that visit its place and route them 
to the appropriate destination. Similarly the arbitrer receives all incoming messages and 
delivers them to the appropriate local agent(s). The purpose of the MMA is to manage the 
set of arbitrers in the local physical machine (server), improve the efficiency and speed of 
the GUID resolution system by registering all foreign agents currently visiting the local 
machine and support the dynamic reconfiguration of the servers hierarchy.
The servers considered in our system are not dedicated into merely implementing the 
naming system. Each server, however, operates in “dual” mode, acting as both a GUID 
resolution node and as a venue for visiting and creating agents. Agents can be created in 
any of the servers of the system, thus each server is the home machine for a number of 
agents. Upon its creation, an agent is given an input and output queue and is assigned an 
arbitrer, called its “Home” arbitrer”. Home arbitrers are responsible to keep a minimum 
state information for each agent they serve as also to keep track the location of the agents 
they serve. Similarly, when an agent moves and resides in some foreign system, it is again 
provided with an input and output queue and assigned to one of the local arbitrers of the
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foreign system, the “Foreign” arbitrer. The Foreign arbitrer is responsible for the 
forwarding of messages to and from the visiting agent and to inform the Home arbitrer of 
the agent about its current whereabouts. This is done by letting the visiting agent reveal 
its GUID and probably other details to the Foreign arbitrer through a registration 
procedure.
The GUID assigned to an agent is a structured string which can resemble an IP 
address. The servers in our system are organised into a hierarchy that represents their 
physical organisation. A message whose destination field is the GUID of an agent, travels 
through the hierarchy of servers until the current location of the target agent is retrieved.
Aibilrer I
Addr3
OBJ I 
ID I
Addf 4
OBJ 2 
ID 2
Figure 4.1 An addressing example
As a result, in contrast with existing hierarchical naming systems, the GUID of 
different agents can vary in length, depending on which level in the server hierarchy, the 
home servers of the agents are located. For example, if we assume the tree topology of 
Figure 4.1, an agent created in server 2, has the GUID 1.2.arbl.idl whereby the agent in 
server 4 has the GUID 1.3.4.arb2.id2
The immediate consequence of this organisation is that resolution of shorter GUIDs 
can be done in less steps than the resolution of longer ones. This property does not pose 
any serious problem because this difference is only experienced at most once when one 
agent tries to locate another. Thereafter, the source agent can use one of the provided 
shortcuts, which are discussed later, for any subsequent attempts to locate the same agent, 
thus bypassing the physical hierarchical resolution of the GUID.
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4.2.2 Functional Specification of arbitrers
The conceptual architecture of an arbitrer (see Figure 4.2) comprises the following 
layers:
I Services Layer | 
I Logical Layer |
Mobility Management 
Layer
Naming Sub- Arbitration
Layer Sub- Layer
Figure 4.2 Layered Architecture of arb itrer
1. Nam ing and  arb itra tion  layer. The functionalities provided by this layer allow him 
to: a) remove pending messages from the output queues of the agents it serves, 
according to some arbitration policy, and route them towards their specified 
destinations, b) receive incoming messages destined for the agents it serves and 
distribute them accordingly and c) participate in the structured resolution of GUID 
addresses. In the most typical case, the arbitration policy can be a priority based 
scheme whereby agents with higher priority are served first and more frequently.
2. M obility m anagem ent layer. This layer gives the arbitrer the functionality to act as 
home router for agents. It implements algorithms for maintaining the most up-to-date 
location of its agents, possibly perform analysis on their travel patterns that can be used 
for possible probabilistic tracking of Mobile Agent etc.
3. Logical layer. This layer gives the ability to arbitrers to be connected into an arbitrary 
logical network. Each arbitrer can be assigned to represent a concept or relation. When 
an agent is created, it submits a profile of its contents or services that it can provide. 
This profile is injected into the logical network and it can be registered in a number of 
logically relevant physically distributed arbitrers [111]. Each of the arbitrers that 
accepts the agent profile becomes a logical home router for that agent and maintains a
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pointer to the agent’s physical home router. The logical home routers of an agent act 
as aliases of the agent’s GUID, thus allowing the agent to be located and accessed by 
agents which are not aware of its GUID. The logical layer enables the arbitrer to route 
messages whose destination is a logical address rather than physical address (GUID). 
The structure of the logical address can be thought of as a list of strings separated with 
a delimiter, like for example a URL address in the WWW.
4. Services layer. This layer consists of the services the arbitrer offers to agents which 
are assigned to it. One important service can be message filtering. Each of the agents 
being served by this arbitrer can customise this filtering. For example an agent can 
specify that it doesn’t wish to accept any messages from a specific agent or with 
specific content. The provision of a services layer to an arbitrer can transform it from a 
routing/naming node to an information centre for its assigned agents. Thus the arbitrers 
apart from partitioning the naming and routing service can also be the means of 
partitioning and distributing to groups of agents the general services the physical server 
offers to the agents currently visiting it.
The arbitrer interface comprises three parts. The fiist part is the set of commands that 
the local MMA can use to manage and enquire the arbitrer. The second part is the user 
interface which is used by the agents in order to invoke/customise the various MARSA 
user services. These services include the setup and customisation of filters, buffers for 
connection-oriented communication, mobility-related requests, etc. Finally the third part is 
the set of commands that other peer arbitrers can invoke in order to support the migration 
of agents as well as the resolution of the GUIDs.
4.2.3 Access paths
In general, each arbitrer is identified by a GUID. After all, an arbitrer is just a system 
owned agent. Furthermore, an arbitrer is also registered and identified with an ID in the 
MMA agent of the server it resides in.
The problem of locating a mobile agent in this system is transformed into the problem 
of locating the physical Home arbitrer of that agent. There are four ways of performing 
this:
I.Via the full GUID, hence following the normal hierarchical GUID resolution method 
{indirect physical addressing).
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2.By giving an address of the form:
serverlP. arbitrerlD
With the second method, the message is sent directly to the server whose IP address is 
serverlP. That target server’s MMA agent matches the given arbitrerlD  with the list of 
local arbitrer Ids and forwards the message to the appropriate aibitrer. In a similar manner 
an agent can be accessed by using an address of the form:
serverlP. arbitrerlD. agentID 
where : agentID is the ID with which the agent is known locally to the arbitrer that serves 
it. It has to be unique only within the specific arbitrer {direct physical addressing).
In this way, a message can be delivered to an agent with only two pattern matching 
actions: Firstly to find the appropriate arbitrer within the specified server (matching 
performed by the server’s MMA agent) and secondly to find the specific agent among the 
set of agents served by the specified arbitrer. This method bypasses the arbitrer physical 
hierarchy and views the system as a simple flat set of distributed arbitrers.
3.By using one of the logical addresses of the agent, {logical addressing).
4.By using a hybrid address. This scheme is a combination of indirect and direct 
addressing. Such an address has the following format:
DirectPart. IndirectPart 
The first part is of the form presented in method 2 whereby the second part is of the 
form of method 1 or 3. With this scheme any node of the logical or physical hieraichy o f 
arbitrers can be used as a starting point in resolving a hybrid address (multiple entry 
points). Parts of the hierarchical resolution of GUIDs or logical addresses can be bypassed 
while others can be maintained.
Access paths do not only provide shortcuts which can improve the efficiency and 
speed of locating a mobile agent but also provide a way of tightly coupling the addressing 
and tracking mechanism with privacy and general security requirements. M ore 
specifically, each agent can specify what security requirements a message has to satisfy 
depending on the originator of the message and the path it follows in order to reach the 
agent’s home router. Each path can be given different security requirements.
The agent can distribute the security requirements for a path as lightweight Access 
Control Lists (ACL) into the arbitrers that comprise that path. In this way, a message 
destined for that specific agent and following the specific path is scrutinised by each 
intermediate arbitrer to ensure that it satisfies the specified conditions before it is routed
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to the next arbitrer. The union of the security constraints of each arbitrer participating in 
an access path for an agent constitute the security policy that agent implements on that 
path. Hence the system supports secure access paths on a per agent basis. A typical 
application of this security system is to protect the privacy of the mobile agents. A mobile 
agent could decide not to be contacted by certain other agents when it is not currently in 
its home machine. Thus, for example, access requests for a specific agent can be denied, if 
the requests have passed through specific paths.
4.2.4 The MARSA Management Agents
The Marsa Management Agent (MMA) plays three important roles in this system : 
Firstly the MMA participates in the resolution of the GUIDs and keeps track of the 
current visitor agents in the local physical machine. MMAs that reside in different 
machines can communicate with each other in order to perform the address resolution. 
Each MMA listens to a specific, well-known port in the local server and can access 
directly the network independently of the arbitrers.
It also acts as a central logical node that can be contacted by user agents to update 
dynamically the configuration of the local MARSA system. For instance the MMA agent 
can create new local arbitrers that implement different policies and offer different services. 
Moreover the network of MMAs makes the whole hierarchy of the GUIDs dynamic in 
nature since they can support the run-time addition of arbitrers and physical machines. An 
existing arbitrer can also be removed provided that there are no registered agents for 
which this is theii" home arbitrer. This is a reasonable restriction which is present in all 
major file management systems such as UNIX, MS-DOS, etc.
The third task for each MMA is to store and manage various policies and services that 
are common to all the arbitrers of the local machine. If a user agents, assuming that it 
possesses the necesary authorisation, modifies these policies/services, then the MMA is 
responsible in communicating these updates to all the local arbitrers. The arbitrers 
themselves have a predefined, trusted functionality which guarantees that they will enforce 
the common policies and provide the common services to their registered agents. An 
immediate application of supporting common policies among arbitrers is access control 
For example the administrator of the local MARSA system might deem necessary to 
forbid any agents of a specific user from entering the local machine. The MMA provides a
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simple interface via which the administrator agent can set and enforce this policy in all the 
local arbitrers without the need for contacting each one of them individually.
The MMA interface commands can be grouped into four categories: a) create/remove 
arbitrers/machines, b) maintain a record of the visiting agents in the local machine, c) 
perform name (GUID) resolution, d) manage the common policies/services. The first 
group of commands is used by authorised agents to request the creation/deletion of 
arbitrers. It is also used by the MMAs of unregistered remote machines that wish to 
register and join the MARSA system. Such MMAs must first contact a registered MMA 
in order to be authenticated and be given a GUID. After this process these new MMAs 
can create theii' own, local, customised arbitrers. The second category is used by the local 
arbitrers to report the arrival/departure of a visiting agent. This information is important 
and must be stored by the local MMA as this is related to the GUID resolution 
functionality of the MMA. For example if a local agent wishes to send a message to a 
remote agent then the arbitrer responsible in forwarding this message contacts its local 
MMA to discover the home network address of the destination agent. It is possible 
though that this agent currently is visiting the same machine where the originator agent is. 
Since the MMA is aware of the current visitor agents then it is guaranteed that the mesage 
will be sent to the destination agent without contacting the home arbitrer of that agent 
This is efficient because the act of communication was completed without any network 
communication. Clearly the MMA is the most suitable entity of the MARSA system to 
store this kind of information because such scenaria can occur with any of the local 
arbitrers. The third category of commands is used by remote MMAs to request the 
resolution of GUIDs. For every such message the MMA uses its knowledge of the 
network addresses of its children machines and forwards the message to the appropriate 
MMA. If the requested GUID belongs to one of the local arbitrers then the MMA places 
this message to the input queue of the appropriate arbitrer. This category is also used by 
the local arbitrers to request the resolution of GUIDs their agents wish to communicate 
with. Finally the fourth category is used by authorised agents that wish to view/update the 
active common policies/services of the local machine.
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4.2.5 Evaluation
In this section, we presented a new infrastructure that enables the location tracking 
and transparent routing of Mobile Agents (MARSA). The mechanisms presented can be 
integrated with security and privacy protection mechanisms and enhanced with the 
provision of logical hierarchies to support dynamic discovery of agents based on the 
services they can provide to other agents. Our proposed scheme has theoretically the 
following properties:
» Guaranteed continuous access to the mobile agents.
® Realisation of logical addresses for each agent to support its dynamic discovery.
9 Tight integration of the addressing mechanism with a general-purpose security 
mechanism which can be customised on a per agent basis.
» Provision of multiple entry points in the logioal and physical hierarchies which can be 
used as a mechanism to bypass parts of the naming hierarchy.
« Integration of the addressing scheme with a decentralised routing mechanism based on 
the concept of Arbitrers and distributed caching.
» Ai'bitrers can be agent customised and offer higher level services to the agents they 
serve such as filtering of messages.
• The arbitrers have a layered structure which is open to future extensions.
However, the MARS A system is still in its infancy. There is no prototype 
implementation or simulation results to demonstrate its performance. This section 
presented only the initial conceptual (high level) architecture of the system. Therefore 
various important communication-related issues such as buffer management, 
communication deadlock and starvation, etc. have not been addressed. Clearly more 
research is required to transform this initial design into a feasible, efficient, general- 
puipose communication system for mobile agents.
4.3 Introduction to agent organisation & discovery
An agent community or society can be thought of as a group of specialised agents 
collaborating with each other in order to perform multiple, user-defined tasks. Similarly to 
the human society organisation, each agent offers specialised services that other members 
of the community can invoke and utilise. In such a system it is important for the agents to
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be equipped with a discovery facility that enables them to publish their services and 
discover other agents whose services are pertinent to their tasks. Therefore the agent 
discovery issue falls into the broader category of information retrieval and resource 
discovery.
Existing multi-agent or distributed objects systems such as Odyssey [46], Agent-Tcl 
[52], Aglets [58], ARA [101], WAVE [108], Mole [116], CORBA [98] either ignore the 
need for agent discovery completely or use a distributed database which acts as a 
centralised agent directory. The agents can register a profile of the services they offer to 
the database. Each such profile contains the address of an agent and a description of the 
services it offers, the latter using some fixed notation. The database is simply a large 
collection of profiles which agents can query to discover whether there are any agents 
offering specific services.
From the aforementioned systems, CORBA is the only one to provide a 
comprehensive fiamework for agent discovery. The CORBA framework is based on the 
notion of specialised discovery objects called traders, which can be created by objects that 
carry administrative privileges. User objects can access the traders to register the services 
they offer to other user objects. Trader objects can be connected with each other by links. 
An inter-trader link defines a unidirectional path between two traders. It is used and 
managed by the source trader as the target trader is not made aware of the existence of 
the link. Each trader can receive queries directly by user objects and according to certain 
policies specified either in the trader or the query can utilise one or more of its existing 
links in order to forward the query for further processing. When the query’s search criteria 
are satisfied then a message is sent to the query originator object. The message contains 
the CORBA name and the interface of the object that has been found. Policies specified in 
the query can determine the number of objects returned as answers to the query as well as 
their ranking according to certain criteria.
The literature on information retrieval and resource discovery [23, 33, 85, 112, 22, 54, 
55, 110] describes solutions similar to those introduced with CORBA. Typically there is a 
group of organisation nodes that form a hierarchy and are distributed over a number of 
physical servers [23, 55, 71]. Resources, usually documents, register a summary of their 
contents (in the form of an SQL query or a Small Prolog database) with the back end of 
the organisation system [77]. The profile indicates what queries the specific resource (i.e., 
document) will satisfy. In the front end, the system accepts user queries in the same
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notation that the profiles are expressed in and attempts to match the query against the 
current contents of the profile database [68]. Some of the systems require the user to 
guide them during the query-processing phase [23]. Others introduce automation in either 
the gathering and distribution of profiles or the processing of the queries [112]. In the first 
case the system deploys a number of profile gathering agents which visit the resources and 
create their profiles [68]. These profiles are then submitted to the leaves of the hierarchy 
of organisation nodes. Each node processes the profile and possibly forwards the profile in 
full or abbreviated form to the nodes one layer up the hierarchy. In this way, the nodes of 
layer n can utilise the profiles of the nodes in layer n+1, process them and then forward 
aggregated profiles to the nodes of layer n-1 [111]. In the second case the queries are 
automatically forwarded down the hierarchy until they reach the server where the resulting 
document is physically located [111].
In general the hierarchy of profiles/organisation information is typically 
managed/updated manually by an administrator. The administrator can perform its tasks 
by dispatching specialised agents that traverse the set of documents/resources pertinent to 
a specific knowledge domain and report back any changes that need to be reflected to the 
central organisation hierarchy [68]. Although this approach introduces a degree of 
automation in the process of information gathering, it suffers from the disadvantage that 
the agents need to have an a-priori, complete knowledge about their domain.
In general, the discovery of agents or resources follows the following simplified model 
(figure 4.3) :
Organisation
system
User
agent
Resource
agent
Figure 4.3 Current approach to agent discovery
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According to this model, resource agents first register themselves with the 
organisation system (step 1). In step 2 a user agent contacts the organisation system in 
order to discover whether there is any agent offering certain services. The organisation 
system processes the query and sends the reply to the query originator (step 3). Finally, in 
step 4 the user agent that originated the query uses the results returned by the 
organisation system to directly contact the resource agent that has been found. In this 
simplified model of interaction, it is cleai* that the process of agent discovery (steps 1 to 3) 
is separated from the computation process (step 4). The main disadvantage of this 
approach is that an important component of the computation, namely access control takes 
place only in step 4. The organisation system is based on the assumption that all thic 
information it holds is public, hence it offers no access control services for its registered 
resource agents. This means that the user agent can acquire information about a resource 
agent which it has no sufficient authority to access. As a result, processing time amd 
communication bandwidth is wasted for both agents.
The agent discovery process and access control process should therefore be properllj 
integrated. Another advantage of integration would be the ability to use the inffastructuirc 
of the organisation system to organise, distribute and manage access control information! 
The organisation system would then be an active mediator between user and resource 
agents, with the process of agent discovery being concurrent with the access contrcd 
process. The organisation system should ensure that a query does not proceed to the nexd 
phase of processing unless the owner(s) and the characteristics of the query satisfy certafa 
authorisation criteria and constraints, respectively. At first glance, this approach seems tio 
introduce additional latency as the interaction between any given user and resource agenta 
has to be mediated by the organisation system. However, the impact of the extra latency es 
unlikely to be significant since the indirect interaction only takes place when a user agen! 
attempts to discover and access a resource agent for the first time. At this stage (see stesp 
4 in figure 4.3), the resource agent would additionally return the part of the interface thM 
this user agent has the authority to access. No further assistance of the organisation 
system should be required from this point on. To summarise, in the existing approaches 
the search criteria of a query determine the interfaces the query can retrieve and use:
Inteifaces -  fiquery)
The new approach described in this chapter is based on the following novel equation :
Interfaces = fiquery, securityjpolicies)
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4.4 Agent organisation as name management
In general, an organisation/agent discovery system is essentially a name management 
system. In this section we will attempt to substantiate this claim by defining a generic 
abstract model of a name management system and observing any similarities between its 
structure and functionality and those of a generic organisation/agent discovery system.
Names are symbolic representations of abstract concepts or real objects. A namespace 
provides a context within which a name has a specific meaning (semantics). A name 
management system is a group of namespaces, possibly connected with each other and 
distributed over an arbitrary number of physical servers. Each namespace can be 
represented as a function /  which takes a name into the value (meaning) of that name 
within the current context :
value = / (  name )
A name can be given different semantics in different contexts. This means that in 
general if/  and g represent two different contexts then :
/ (  name g {  name )
A context can be thought of as a pair :
< namespace_name, { < name, value > } > 
where namespace_name is the name uniquely identifying the specific context within the 
group of contexts of a particular name management system and { < name, value > } is a 
group of names each of which is assigned specific semantic value. Following the same 
notation the name management system itself can be represented as a pair :
< namesystem_name, { < namespace_name,namespace_address > } > 
where namesystem_name is the name uniquely identifying the specific name system within 
a group of name management systems and { < namespace_name,namespace_address > } 
is a group of namespace names each of which is assigned specific namespace_addresse5. 
Therefore a name management system is essentially a mapping function from the group of 
names to the group of semantic values. The group of values represents the group of 
objects that have a physical manifestation, such as a data file, a program, a device, a user, 
etc., and operations that can be performed on them. Up to this point, the names' in 
different contexts and the contexts themselves have been treated as disjoint, independent 
entities. Only two operations can be defined in such name management systems :
a) definition of a name within an existing context;
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b) definition of a new context within the name management system.
However a generic name management system should be able to address at least two 
more phenomena :
a) the relationship between two categories of names and
b) the relationship between the semantics of two names in two different contexts.
The first case is important because naturally one category of names might be a sub­
category of another category. For this reason a context should be allowed to register itself 
with a name in another context.
The second case is equally important because it incorporates the notion of re-usability. 
The semantics of a name in a context can be defined to be equivalent with the semantics 
of another name in a different context. Expressing equivalence relations among semantics 
of names results in a more centralised and thus more efficient management of a group of 
names. For instance if the semantics of n names are associated with the semantics of a 
specific name then the updating of the semantics of this name will result in the automatic 
implicit updating of the semantics of all the n names that “point” to it. There are numerous 
real world applications that have demonstrated the usefulness of such a scheme. For 
example in the World Wide Web, a company might create a simple Web page via which it 
offers various services to its customers. It can then register links to this central Web page 
in other pertinent pages or search engines. If the company decides to modify its services 
then it needs to modify only its central page.
So far the structure of the semantic space has remained somewhat abstract. The 
semantic space has to consist of two separate entities:
a) The external namespace. All the names defined in this namespace have externally 
defined semantics. This means that evaluation of such a name results in an action 
to be executed by the underlying operating system. Essentially the operating 
system acts as a local external namespace for the segment of the name 
management system which is installed in this physical machine. For example if the 
operating system is UNIX then the name mkdir my_dir in the context of this OS 
will create a new directory called my_dir. Clearly the external namespace forms 
the interface of the local segment of the name management system to the. real 
world. Because the physical machines which the name management system is 
distributed over are assumed to run different operating systems it can be 
concluded that the external namespaces are local and variable. For example the
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name Is in the UNIX external namespace makes sense and it will result in a valid 
action, but in the context of MSDOS it would yield an error,
b) The constant namespace. Because the external namespace depends on the physical 
location of the name management system, we can not use this notion to create 
mappings between names and semantics that remain constant throughout the 
system. For instance, the value of name 2+3 may be obtained arithmetically, giving 
the result of 5, which is unchangeable and location-independent. The name 
management system has to ensure that such information remains constant within 
the system and does not depend on the physical location or will o f possible 
malicious users. Figure 4.4 shows a diagrammatic view of the novel name 
management model.
Constant
Namespace
Name 
Management 
System 1
Name 
Management 
System N
V V
External External
Figure 4.4 The abstract name management model
The main functionality of this model is to be able to find the semantics of a name, 
submitted as a query by a user. Because the contexts can be interconnected and because 
the semantics of the name in a context can be linked to the semantics of other names in 
other contexts, the process of finding the semantics of a name consists of several stages. 
At each stage the system finds the semantics of a name. If these semantics depend on the 
semantics of another name in another context then the system continues the evaluation 
process with the new name. Otherwise if the semantics of the current name are fully 
determined then :
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a) if these semantics are an action (external namespace) then this action is performed 
and the evaluation process terminates, otherwise
b) if the semantics are a global constant then this constant is returned as an answer to 
the query. The names whose semantics in a specific context are defined either in 
the external namespace or the constant namespace are called atom names in that 
context because they constitute the points at which the name evaluation process 
terminates.
The existing organisation and agent discovery systems [23, 85, 98, 111] follow this 
model closely. They treat an external namespace as the group of resources the system 
manages, the contexts are represented as organisation nodes within which resources can 
link up, the organisation nodes are interlinked, typically forming a hierarchy. Because of 
this interlinking, the process of evaluating a name passes through several stages as well 
until the process reaches a context that is a leaf of the hierarchy.
However, the model presented in this chapter offers two benefits over the existing 
models:
a) centralised control of name semantics. This facility is useful when there are names 
which have to be assigned a global, permanent semantics. For such names the 
provision of a centralised registry to store global mappings is necessary. Existing 
systems do not offer such a facility. There are two possible reasons for this : a) as 
suggested by section 4.3 of this chapter the current mobile agent systems are primarily 
focused on providing code mobility and have neglected the issue of agent discovery 
altogether or have provided the simple and easily implementable passive '"yellow 
pages”, b) the names of resources is of the form of a hierarchical path that is 
quaranteed to be unique for every resource. In this way such systems claim implicitly 
that one or more resources can have the same name provided that they have registered 
this name in different name contexts. Clearly though this approach leaves open the 
possibility for the unauthorised and possibly malicious exploitation of registered names 
(including trademarks) of business services and products.
b) Evaluation of names is linked to actions. Existing systems are passive and assign 
passive information as semantics to names. In contrast the presented abstract mpdel 
extends the notion of semantics of a name to include actions. Hence in this model, 
evaluation of a name can yield an action which will affect the external environment. 
The repeated evaluation of the same name could yield different results subject to the
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constraints and rules of the external environment. For example all operating systems 
forbid the creation of a file with a specific name if another file already exists with the 
same name in the same directory. Therefore if the evaluation of a name in the 
proposed organisation system results in the creation of a file then repeated evaluation 
of the same name will yield an error message from the underlying operating system.
4.5 Requirements of a concrete agent discovery system
The abstract model presented in the previous section extends the generic model that 
many current systems are based on. However there are a number of more concrete 
requirements that a generic organisation/agent discovery system has to satisfy. In this 
section we will attempt to produce these requirements and match them against the current 
organisation systems in an attempt to prove that the existing approaches suffer from some 
further important disadvantages.
A daptivity. In existing systems the organisation of resources remains constant over time. 
Typically the resources are organised into a hierarchy which is designed to be as generic 
as possible. The hierarchy is rigid in that it can not accept major structural modifications. 
In CORBA, for instance, user objects can not create their own traders or trader 
hierarchies. On the other hand, the organisation and service-discovery structure of an 
agent society must be adaptive. It should be able to change to reflect the current 
availability of services and service requirements of the society’s members. Individual 
agents should be allowed to create their own organisational structures to reflect their own 
contents and services. These individual organisational structures could then form group 
organisational structures, etc.
A necessary condition for creating an adaptive organisation system is that there is no 
ontological connection between the agents and the organisation nodes. Agents should be 
allowed to register/unregister themselves from organisation nodes at will. The 
organisation nodes should be kept separate from the resource agents. In this way, any 
changes in the organisation structure will not have any side effects on the state of the 
resource agents themselves.
Interaction. In all existing systems the queries and organisation links are passive entities. 
A query defines a group of requirements. A link offers a group of services. The
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organisation node where the link resides matches the query’s requirements against the 
link’s services and then the service interface is returned to the query originator. In this 
chapter we argue that links and queries should be active peer entities that interact with 
each other. This interaction offers certain advantages:
(i) A queiy can modify the state of a link and leave a message. This may be
useful for other queries of the same or different program thread that attempt to 
travel through that link. For example a query could inform other related
queries that it has passed down that link so that the others can avoid following
the same route (avoid duplicate queries),
(ii) The link can modify the state o f the query and make the query itself more
specific. Certain attributes of the query might change, for example a certain 
number of credits can be removed from the query’s wallet (in the case of 
electronic billing). The link could in general incorporate new information into 
the state of the query which might be useful for the further links that the query 
will follow. Note that this query-link interaction could be mediated by the 
organisation node for security purposes and in order to make the links o f the 
organisation system sensitive to the nature and volume of the query traffic.
Reusability. In existing systems the links, which are the basic building blocks of the 
system, are not autonomous entities. Furthermore, the organisation nodes themselves can 
not be used as building blocks to create new, composite organisation nodes. The 
reusability, and hence the efficiency, of the system can be improved by considering links as 
pseudo-objects. Apart from the benefit o f encapsulation, the links will then become 
reusable components which can be copied from one node to another. Additionally, the 
existing organisation nodes can be used as re-usable components at a coarse-grain level to 
create new aggregated organisation nodes. Applying the concept of reusability to the 
organisation system can significantly reduce the complexity and speed up structural 
alteration of the system.
In tegration  of agent discovery and access control. The benefits of such integration 
have been analysed in section 4.3.
O rganisation nodes as high-level service providers to agents. The organisation nodes 
of the system could offer high-level services to their agents: e.g., access to legacy systems, 
a group mailbox for the members, etc. In this way an organisation node could be
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transformed from a mere service publisher to a central management node of a community 
of agents sharing the same interests.
Specialisation. An efficient organisation system usually requires specialised nodes. Each 
organisation node should represent a concept or characteristic that its members (resource 
agents) should possess. This is important because user agents can be made aware of these 
specialised nodes so that they may direct any queries to pertinent nodes rather than 
flooding the system with broadcast queries or searching through a number of nodes 
sequentially. To enforce specialisation, each organisation node should implement a 
registration protocol that resource agents have to follow before they are allowed to 
publish their services at that node. The registration protocol should ensure that the 
services a candidate resource agent wishes to publish satisfy the topic or characteristics of 
the particular organisation node. Existing systems in the area of resource discovery followithis principle but CORBA does not ensure that each trader is a repository of specialised 
interfaces (services).
4.6 Overview of the proposed architecture
In sections 4.3 and 4.4 we presented our view that organisation and agent discovery 
models are essentially name management systems. An abstract name management system 
was suggested and shown to have certain benefits over existing models. Furthermore, 
some requirements for an efficient, dynamic organisation system were delineated, which 
are not fuUy met by the existing systems. In this section, a concrete architecture for agent 
organisation/discovery is introduced. We shall discuss its compliance to the abstract 
model of section 4.4 and the extent to which it addresses the requirements laid out in 
section 4.5.
The novel features of the proposed architecture are as follows:
• Agents are organised into groups. Each group is represented as an agent called group 
manager (GM), thus both members of a group and the group itself are on the same 
level of representation. A group manager, described later in this section, acts as a proxy 
node performing aliasing of the names of the agents it includes.
® Groups can be organised into further groups by gathering their group manager agents. 
In this way, the agents’ organisation can be of arbitrary depth and complexity.
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• There is no ontological connection between the agent members of a group and the 
group itself, meaning that groups can be created and deleted to organise arbitrary 
groups of agents without destroying the existing members and bringing any new ones 
into being.
• The name of the group manager agent defines the group it manages as a set expression 
on groups. Other groups can be referenced in a regular expression by using the name of 
their group managers. For example, if A, B, C, D are GM names, then a GM with a 
name of:
( A n R ) u ( C n Z ) )
represents the union of intersections. Thus new groups of agents can be created from 
existing ones.
In terms of implementation, a newly created agent is assigned a unique identifier (tag). 
A message whose destination field is equal to the tag of an agent, directly matches it and 
activates the agent (after the message is authorised). In traditional systems, such as UNIX, 
the tag of an object is the only means by which it can be represented. For instance, a 
UNIX file would have as name a path starting from the root of the tree hierarchy 
(absolute path) which uniquely identifies the file within the UNIX file system. In other 
words, this path defines a unique access path to the object. Although further access paths 
can be added by creating symbolic links to the object, those links are separate objects, 
while the access path should be part of the original object state.
In the architecture described in this chapter, agents can belong to more than one group 
and hence can have more than one access path. An access path acts as an alias o f the 
agent’s unique ID (address), which identifies an additional route, as a list of other agent 
IDs that can be aliases as well, via which that agent is accessible. For each access path, an 
agent can have a different lock expression locking it [7, 10]. Furthermore, the agent itself 
can control which users can access it through which paths. Any agent can customise the 
security requirements for a specific path based on whether this path is trusted or not. 
Existing systems neglect the importance of the route a message follows in order to reach 
its destination and thus their access control policies take into consideration only the 
originator of the message [98]. By contrast, in this architecture, an agent can define who 
can perform which operation via which access path. In this way, for example, an agent
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could loosen its security requirements for messages that have reached it via an access path 
that the agent knows is trusted and thus secure.
To clearly demonstrate this integration of access control and discovery, a simplified 
description of the structure and functionality of a group manager is given below.
The primary function of a group manager is to maintain and update a list of aliases. 
There is one or more aliases for every agent that belongs to this group. Each row of the 
alias table consists of five elements :
1. Alias. This is the pseudonym by which an agent, registered with this group manager, is 
known. It is set by the agent upon registration with this group manager.
2. Address pattern . Any message whose destination matches the alias field of a row of 
the alias table will have its destination field appended with the corresponding address 
pattern. This pattern can be the true identifier of the agent or a new alias, thus allowing 
for multiple indirection. In the most general case, the address pattern can be a general 
procedure (an executable program) that it is invoked to determine the new destination 
of the matched message. This program takes as input the characteristics of the query 
and generates as output the address pattern for the query.
3. The security field contains the identifiers of the lock agents that need to be contacted 
to check whether the message possesses enough authorisation to proceed to the next 
destination. The lock agents are engaged only if both the owner of the message and the 
access path it has followed to reach this group manager match the corresponding 
ownership pa th  and access path  fields, respectively. The lock agents specified in the 
security field are generally the input nodes of a complex authorisation graph. The 
results produced by this graph will be sent to the message’s next destination agent, 
whose lock table will determine whether the message is authorised to activate that 
agent or not [7].
The structure of the alias table, as described above, leads us to the following important 
observations:
a) Every time a group manager redkects a message to a new destination, it concurrently 
activates the authorisation graph associated with that destination. Thus messages that 
are generated during the execution of a program proceed in parallel with the messages 
that are produced by authorisation graphs.
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b) As part of an agent’s registration procedure, the group manager is given the 
authorisation graph to be evaluated for every message addressed to the agent. This 
authorisation graph can depend on the ownership path of the message and the access 
path it has followed [10]. This means that an agent, upon its inclusion in a group, can 
define the security requirements for all categories of incoming messages that are 
received via the group. Group managers thus integrate security with routing. Both 
addressing and access validation are cascaded through a chain of group managers en 
route, which allows the address and security information to be translated incrementally. 
Accordingly, the destination address is structured into a slash-separated (by 
convention) list of patterns with the head of the list being processed at every group 
manager along the message route.
4.7 The links
From the previous section it is clear that the group managers form a network of 
control nodes of this massively-aliasing system. The primary function of a group manager 
is to maintain and update a list of links, which contain the security and routing 
information. In the process of registering itself with a group manager, an agent creates a 
link per each pseudonym it wishes itself to be known by.
NAME
DESTINATION CONSTRAINTS
INFORMATION BASE
ACCESS CONTROL LIST
INTERFACE
Figure 4.5 The structure of a link 
A novel view of a link is that of a lightweight object which can only exist as a part of a 
group manager environment. Representing the link as an object-like entity offers the
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advantages of data encapsulation and security that can be applied to each individual link.
Furthermore, requirement three (re-usability) of section 4.5 is satisfied because links can
be used as components that can be "copied and pasted” from one group manager to
another. The composition of the link is shown in figure 4.5.
1. Name is a pseudonym of the agent that has created this link. The name can either be a 
single lexical unit or a sequence of units. In this way the resource agents can use more 
than one keywords to describe their published services.
2. Destination. Any message whose destination field matches the name part of a link will 
have this field replaced by the corresponding address pattern which is stored in the 
destination field of the link (see the structure of the alias table above). For each 
destination specified there is a corresponding security field, too.
3. C onstraints. Each link can contain a constraint base which contains a set of 
constraints that each message (agent) must satisfy in order to be permitted to travel via 
this link. These may, depending on the application, have the meaning of size 
restrictions, minimum payment credits, etc. The constraints can be passive and 
expressed in a declarative notation such as XML. In this case the group manager is 
responsible for reading and matching them against the characteristics of the query. A 
constraint can also be represented by an executable program, which is triggered by 
message arrival. The group manager executes the "constraint program” and gives it an 
interface via which it can read and/or modify the contents of the information base of 
both the link and the message. Details of this interface will be presented in the next 
section. The constraint program and indeed any other active part of the link can be 
written in an interpreted language for which the group manager has a safe interpreter. 
Examples of such languages are Java, safe-Tcl, etc. As was mentioned earlier, the 
group manager mediates this interaction to ensure that any vital, constant 
characteristics of both the link and the query are not altered accidentally or maliciously.
4. Inform ation base. This component of the link acts as a general purpose information 
repository. Some items of this repository can be made public whilst others can be 
accessible only by specific agents. More specifically the information base of a link is 
defined as a set of information items. Each information item is defined as a tuple : < 
name, value, type, access_key > where name is a string uniquely identifying this item 
in the information base, value is the content that this item has, type defines whether this
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item is read only and accessjcey is a string used for access purposes. If the accessjzey 
is present then if a query wishes to access this item, it should also provide the required 
key. The provision of access key is a simple method of controlling access in the 
information base at a fine grain level. It is necessary as a basic protection against a 
malicious query destroying information intended for another query. Because links are 
copyable objects, it is important to represent their properties in a machine-independent 
language, such as XML, which is a de facto  standard for data interchange in the 
WWW.
Each link possesses a standard interface comprising operations that incoming 
messages can perform on the link. One of the most important commands of this interface 
is the copy command. If an agent invokes this command then the link as a whole can be 
copied to another group manager. For integrity and security reasons the owner of the link 
should be able to specify which parts of the interface are visible to which agents. To 
achieve this an Access Control List (ACL) is incorporated as part of the state of the link. 
This is a simple table that defines which operations are visible to which agents.
The links according to their destination field can be classified into two categories : a) 
static, in which case the destination field contains a fixed, static destination pattern and b) 
dynamic, in which case the destination field contains an executable program.
Figure 4.6 shows a typical link in XML form :
<?xml version=’T.O”?>
<link name=”te sf’>
<destination type=”dynamic” language=”perf 
code=”/usr/bin/my_link”>
</destination>
<constraints type=”static”> 
query_owner=nick 
query_topic=research 
</constraints>
<information_base>
Iink_o wner,css lna,r,null# 
msg_100,hello,w,null# 
msg_210,queryl00passed,w,abcd# 
</information_base>
<ACL>
null
</ACL>
</iink>
Figure 4.6 An XML link
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4.8 Query and its interface
The structure of a query is a simplified version of the link structure (figure 4.7). Each 
link has an ID assigned to it by the query-originator agent. The query specifies a 
destination which is the name of a link or a list of links to be followed. Similar to a link, a 
query also possesses constraints and an information base that have the same semantics as 
the corresponding components of a link. Finally a query can specify an action to be 
performed when it reaches its final destination (target resource agent).
ID
DESTINATION . CONSTRAINTS
ACTION
INFORMATION BASE
Figure 4.7 The structure of a query 
The action field of a query can either specify the invocation of a function of the 
resource agent for specific arguments, or a program it should execute. Figure 4.8 shows 
the XML representation of a typical query.
<?xml versions” 1.0”?>
<query ID=”my_query_1234”>
<destination>
traveljink
</destination>
<constraints type=”static”> 
link_owner=css ina 
link_topic=asian_traveI 
</constraints>
<information_base> 
query_owner,css2as,r,nuIl# 
query_history, surrey_travei_link,r,null# 
</information_base>
<action type=”static”>
f.
x=10,
y=20
</action>
</query>
Figure 4.8 An XML query
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The constraint fields of both queries and links can contain executable programs. Such 
programs are executed by the group manager which gives them access to the information 
base fields of both the query and the link. To this end, the program is provided with two 
primitives:
a) get(info_base, item_name, access_key). The first argument determines which of
the two information bases the program requires access to, the second argument
specifies the information item to be accessed and the third argument provides the 
access key required to access this item.
b) set(info_base, item_name, value, access_key). This command allows the program 
to set the value of the information item item_name in the information base 
info_base using the access_key.
A program execution has the nature of a transaction in that if the program fails, the set)requests are rolled back. The following novel algorithm is used to process arriving queries:
1. Fetch the query destination.
2. If the destination is a list o f links, use the head of the list.
3. Match the content against the names o f the current links.
4. For every match do:
a. Start a transaction
b. Execute the constraints of the query.
c. Execute the constraints of the link.
d. Commit the transaction
e. Execute the destination field of the link to determine the query’s next 
destination.
f. Append the result as the head o f the query’s destination field.
g. Route the query to the next hop.
5. Proceed to the next element o f the destination list (if any).
This method nicely follows one of the main concepts of the proposed architecture : the 
peer interaction between a query and a link. Furthermore, by using transaction discipline, 
it ensures that the state of the query and the link does not change if their matching fails. 
The modifications the query and the link perform on each other’s information bases persist 
only if their interaction succeeds.
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As shown above, a query is allowed to match, and travel through, more than one link 
in any given group manager (i.e., to multicast). The information base of the query can 
include an item to indicate the policy the agent-creator of the query wishes to follow. For 
instance it could specify unicasting of the query or a maximum number of links to be 
followed in every group manager. In a similar fashion, the group manager could 
implement its own policy on this issue. If the two policies conflict then the more 
restrictive one is obeyed. The proposed architecture follows the CORBA specification of 
traders at this point.
4.9 Access paths coupled with customised security
The links as presented in the previous section are re-usable components. The proposed 
architecture also supports interlocking links . This is an important characteristic of the 
abstract model presented in section 4.4 and as a result it becomes one of the design 
requirements of the concrete architecture.
The interlocking links enable the resource agents to create automatic access paths. An 
access path is a chain of links of arbitrary length, i.e. a link set where members point at 
one another in a specific order. A query traveling along this path only needs to activate the 
first link. After that, the query is forwarded automatically from one link to another. The 
links of a path can belong to physically-distributed group managers.
Note that in this architecture every group manager is an independent specialised agent. 
Therefore, it has an address that queries can use to access it directly. Consequently an 
access path does not have to be traversed from the start. A query with sufficient authority 
can travel along a path by using any link of it as a starting point. Path segments can thus 
be utilised as re-usable components, too.
As a simple example, let us assume that there is a group manager A which contains a 
link X  that points to a resource agent Agi. The Agi is the creator and owner of the link x. 
Now let us assume that the security requirements that a query must satisfy in order to 
travel through the link x are S Furthermore let us assume that there is another group 
manager B in which the agent Agi wishes to create a link y that points to the link x » To 
do this the agent Agi sends a request to group manager A invoking the function
131
Nick Antonopoulos Chapter 4
connect_link. This function is included in every group-manager interface and has the 
following parameters:
Connect_link{new_link, current_link, group, state, securityjrequired) 
where new_link is the name of the new link to be created in the group manager group 
whose contents are defined in the parameter state, its destination field is defined to point 
to the existing link currentjiink and the security requirements that a query has to satisfy in 
order to be forwarded from the new_link to the currentjiink are specified in the 
parameter security_required.
On receiving this request, the group manager, according to the policies it implements, 
might modify the contents of the security_required parameter in order to incorporate its 
own authorisation requirements. The next and final step is to forward this request to the 
group manager B where the new link will be created. In order for this to succeed the 
owner of the existing link must have authorisation to create new links at the destination 
group manager B.
Here it must be noted that the group manager is only allowed to incorporate more 
security requirements to the existing ones and not reduce them. This is achieved by 
ensuring that any implementation of a group manager has certain, predefined, fixed 
functionality. This is achieved by having a dedicated, specialised agent in our architecture, 
called creator, which is the only authorised entity in the architecture to create new group 
managers. The creator is publically available and can be contacted by any user agent to 
create simple or composite group managers. In the latter case the creator receives as input 
from the user agent the set theoretic expression the new composite group manager must 
satisfy. It is then responsible in getting the contents of the relevant group managers and 
combining them appropriately to produce the requested new composite group manager. 
Fake group managers created by malicious user agents can be detected because each valid 
group manager could use in its communications a secret key that can be shared among a 
group of valid group managers. An alternative is that the creator agent acts as repository 
of the addresses of valid group managers in the local system. Every group manager that 
attempts to contact another group manager for the first time should contact the registry to 
ensure that the destination group manager is valid and vice versa.
If we represent the contents of the security_required variable as S y.x and the security 
requirements the group manager B has added as S then it can be said that the security
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requirements for the path y->x->Agl are Sa u  Sy.x u  Sy.^ z u  Sx-agi where Sa are the 
authorisation requirements a query has to satisfy in order to access the group manager A. 
The above equation can be generalised as :
Spath = S agent u  Sgroups 
where Spath are the total authorisation requiiements for an arbitrary path, Sagent are the 
security the requirements that the end-of-path resource agent sets and Sgroups are the 
security requirements added by the participating group managers. This equation is very 
important because it allows : a) the resource agents to create and customise the access 
control requirements for access paths to themselves and b) the group managers can 
impose a set of minimum security requirements that a query has to satisfy. The first 
characteristic is innovative because it couples agent discovery with access control and the 
second point is important because it makes the model symmetric.
4.10 Operations on group managers
As was discussed above, group managers form a conceptual network where resource 
agents may be associated with more than one node simultaneously. When a resource agent 
is registered with more than one group manager, this corresponds to a resource that falls 
under more than one category. Discovering multiply-registered agents in the existing 
systems usually involves a poll of all potential categories and a merge of the information 
found there. In the distributed case, those may result in massive communication. To 
remedy this, we propose aggregate organisation nodes that contain collated information 
obtained from several group managers. Since those are little more than sets of links, set 
algebra can be utilised to define the aggregated nodes, as follows:
a) Union. A link will become a member of the union group manager if and only if it 
appears in at least one of the participating n group managers..
b) Intersection. A link will become a member of the intersection group manager if 
and only if it appears in all the participating group managers.
A natural question that might arise at this point is why the set complement operator, 
being one of the primitive operators in set algebra, is not represented and used by the 
proposed system. The set complement can not be defined in this system because this 
would require the knowledge of the universe of discource of each group manager. If it
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was known in advance that the universe of discource of a group manager is a set of n 
specific links, then assuming that the group manager contains m, where m <n, links, the 
complement of this group manager could be defined as a new group manager containing 
the remaining n-m links. In the proposed system though group managers do not have a 
universe of discourse and thus the result of taking the complement of a group manager is 
undefined. Moreover it is neither practical nor efficient to assume that the universe of 
discource of a group manager is the union of all the links in all the group managers. In 
such case the complement group manager would have to be notified by any content 
changes in all existing group managers thus making the process of updating the 
complement group managers unscalable.
In order to maintain the semantics of the union and intersection operations it is 
necessary to ensure that no resource agent can register directly with a composite group 
manager. By using these primitive operations composite group managers can be built to 
represent set expressions among a number of simple group managers to support two 
fundamental data-organisation primitives: generalisation and specialisation.
In order to create composite groups there must be a set of rules which determine 
whether a link is equal to another link. This is necessary for intersections, but also for 
unions, where a link must occur no more than once.
First of all, not all components of a link are important for determining the link 
identity. The information base refers more to the link state than function. Also, two links 
differing only in the access-control and constraint components should be considered 
identical for the same reason. On the other hand, the link name and destination are part of 
its identity and have to be matched exactly. Since, nevertheless, all of the link parts need 
to be represented in the aggregate-node link, those non-identity-related items have to be 
combined in some manner. The access-control information and the constraint base allow 
simple combining, which could be either conservative (i.e. the more restrictive item wins) 
or liberal (i.e., the less restrictive one does). This however, does not have to work the 
same for constraints and access control in that the link with more security can have 
weaker constraints, making it impossible to choose both items consistently. Indeed, the 
weaker constraints could be weak because there is a tough security limitation added to 
them on the same link. In this circumstance, the aggregate link can only refer to both 
source links.
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Another issue is data consistency. As aggregate nodes totally depend on the group 
managers they are intended to represent, any link update in the latter should cause the 
corresponding update in the former. To minimise additional data traffic between simple 
and composite nodes, which could be significant, we limit the aggregate node to reside on 
the same physical machine as the nodes they represent.
Finally, remember that links can be interlocked. In order to enable the decision-making 
process at the starting point of an interlocked chain, the eventual interface of the resource 
agent the chain is leading to is propagated back up the chain. Whenever an aggregate link 
is created, its attributes refelect the respective interfaces of all the destination agents 
associated with the source chain-links. To analyse this further the following facts and 
definitions must be taken into account.
The links in the proposed architecture can be classified into three categories according 
to the type of their destination field. The first category are the fixed links whose
destination field is a string representing the new address the queries will have to be
forwarded to if they match this link. The second category are the multi-links whose
destination field is a table containing a set of possible destination addresses. In this
category, if a query matches the link then the query is forwarded undeterministically to 
one of the destinations specified. Our architecture requires the existence of such links 
because they provide an efficient representation of groups of agents registering themselves 
with a single link to a group manager and thus enjoy common access paths and therefore 
common common constraints, information and access control information. These agents 
could either offer the same services in which case the multi-link represents replicated 
services or offer diferent services. In the latter case the multi-link acts as a registered 
agent company. In general the existense of multi-links offers a way to form groups of 
agents sharing the same interests/services as well as the same access paths and policies. 
The third category are the dynamic links whose destination field is an executable 
program that determines at run time the new destination for the query that matches this 
link. The dynamic links are the logical extension to the multi-links. Multi-links are 
essentially static and explicit. But there can be situations in which the new destination 
where a query has to be forwarded depends on a number of factors such as the query 
itself, real-time availability information, etc. In these cases it is much more efficient to 
have a program that determines dynamically the new destination of the query rather than 
having a large multi-link enumerating pairs of conditions and destinations.
135
Nick Antonopoulos Chapter 4
The links in the proposed architecture can either point directly to a resource agent or 
point to yet another link. The first type are called terminal links (in accordance with the 
abstract model presented in section 4.4) and the second type are called indirect links. 
Because of the existence of indirect links it is possible that even if two links point to 
different destinations, their final destination is the same resource agent. This phenomenon 
can happen because two links can participate in two different access paths which converge 
at a certain point and thus are connected to the same end resource agent.
Because access paths are lists of links and because links can be of different types, it 
can be said that in general an access path is a list o f links of different types. The main 
characteristic of an access path from the point of view of the user agents (these can be 
called the clients of the path) is the resource agent the path is leading to together with the 
set of services the resource agent offers to queries incoming from this path. We can define 
a parameter for every path called path_services which is equal to the paii* <Resource, 
Interface>. The path_services parameter is an important piece of information that must be 
made available to all links participating in a path as read-only items in their information 
base. This parameter can be used by queries to avoid travelling through a long path to 
perform a specific action only to discover that the end resource agent does not offer the 
required function or that the invocation of the function requires different syntax. An 
access path has to be associated with a deterministic value of the path._services parameter 
in order to have significance and provide real assistance to the queries. For this reason the 
last link of an access path must always be a terminal link. This is also important in order to 
ensure that an access path does not contain any loops. Access paths with loops should not 
be present in this architecture because they could create livelock situations for queries 
thus seriously degrading the performance of the system. In the simplest case an access 
path consists of n fixed, indirect links and its final link is terminal. Depending on the type 
of its terminal link we have the following scenaria: 1) The terminal link is a fixed link. In 
this case the path_services parameter is equal to the address of the end resource agent 
coupled with the interface this agent offers to queries travelling through this path. 2) The 
terminal link is a multi-link. In this case the path_services parameter is equal to the union 
of path_services parameters defined for each destination the multi-link specifies. 3) The 
terminal link is a dynamic link. In this case the possible destinations are not specified and 
thus the path_services parameter of such path are set to the address of the group manager 
this link appears in coupled with the name of the link. This pair forms the only alternative
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deterministic information that could be associated with such path. A dynamic link is 
always considered terminal because it defines the point beyond which the access path 
becomes undeterministic. Therefore it can be said that an access path either terminates on 
a proper terminal link (fixed or multi-link) or at the fust undeterministic point (dynamic 
link). By using the aforementioned simple scenaria, the path_services parameter can be 
evaluated for more complex paths whose links are not not fixed but they also contain 
multi-links. For example let us assume that figure 4.9 shows a path where the circles 
indicate indirect multi-links, the dots fixed indirect links and the squares fixed terminal 
links. The question is what is the value of path_services parameter of multi-link X.
Figure 4.9 An example of complex paths
At the terminal links the value of path_services is A, B, C and D respectively. Link Y 
is a multi-link and thus its parameter is equal to the union of the parameters of all its 
“branches” which is A,B. Therefore the value of the link X is the union of the parameters 
of all its branches which is A,B,C,D.
In conclusion the proposed architecture creates two layers of indirection above the 
actual resource agents: the simple and the composite group managers. From the previous 
discussion it should be clear that the query traffic is going downwards (composite groups 
-> simple groups > resource agents) whereby the update traffic is directed upwards 
(resource agents > simple groups > composite groups). Therefore it is possible that a 
query might pass through a composite group manager before this manager receives an 
existing update from its component simple groups. This is a period during which the 
system can be in inconsistent state. But because the update traffic a) moves opposite the
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query traffic, b) is minimised (only certain updates are required to be broadcast) and c) is 
localised, the system is quaranteed to reach the consistent state quickly after the 
occurrence of an update.
4.11 Top level view of a group manager
The top-level architecture of a group manager is depicted in figure 4.10. The following 
components are included:
1. Agent links. The agent-link layer is the minimum functionality a group manager has to 
provide. This layer includes the group of links the member agents have created. This 
repository of links acts as a routing table that redirects incoming queries towards the 
appropriate destinations.
Agent
support
Service
links
Synch
linksSTATE
Agent
links
Figure 4.10 Structure of a group manager.
2. Service links. The service links are a group of links not created by the member agents. 
When followed, they provide different services that the group manager offers to its 
members. These links can be created during the creation phase of the group manager. 
For example, these could be: email, access to specific WWW sites etc. The provision 
of the services can be hierarchical. For instance, only certain member agents could be 
allowed to access the WWW whereas the email service could be available to all the 
members. The provision of service links makes a group manager act as an information 
service centre for its members, rather than a mere query router.
3. Synchronisation links. Member agents of the group manager can define and use 
synchronisation links (SL). The purpose of these links is to act as independent
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synchronisation points among possibly different computation threads in the form of 
queries traversing the network of agents. The synchronisation and agent links are 
structurally identical with only one difference: An SL additionally possesses 
temporary storage for queries. An SL is defined as a tuple:
< Name, Attributes, Condition, Action, matching-store > 
where,
Name: This is the name uniquely identifying this SL in the current group manager. 
Attributes: An SL can be temporary or permanent, visible by all computation threads or 
only by a specific one, etc.
Condition: When a query’s destination field matches the name of an SL in a group 
manager, then it is checked whether the new query together with stored companions 
satisfy the condition. If it does then the Action is performed. The action typically is the 
passing of the existing queries to one or more agent links for processing and 
forwarding. Otherwise, the new query is stored temporarily in the matching-store 
awaiting the arrival of further queries. The synchronisation links can be used to 
efficiently synchronise the traversal of the organisation structure by a number of agents 
(queries). For example a synchronisation link can be used to ensure that two queries 
can continue their travel if both arrive at the same group manager. The concept of 
synchronisation points, their structure and functionality is discussed in more detail in 
[20].
4. Agent suppoi't. Since the constraint field of the queries can contain a program that is 
executed in every group manager the query goes thiough, it can be said that a query in 
the presented architecture can be a mobile agent. The current implementation of the 
group managers supports only the sequential processing of queries. The group 
manager structure can be extended to support the concurrent execution of queries. In 
this case, a group manager can act as a mobile agent venue in which agents execute 
and communicate with other locally resident agents. Such group managers must 
implement the agent support layer which comprises: a) a registration and local agent 
discovery facility, b) local inter-agent communication facility and c) the appropriate 
interpreter for each agent, assuming that agents are coded in interpreted script 
languages. Agents visiting a group manager can make use of its two lower functional 
layers.
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5. State. The state of the group manager is a repository of the group manager attributes, 
policies and interdependencies with composite group managers. Each group manager 
maintains some attributes which remain constant throughout its lifetime such as its 
address, owner, topic, etc. It also maintains and implements a number of policies 
regarding, for instance, the maximum number of links a query is allowed to follow, its 
own access control list, etc. Furthermore each group manager has to know the 
addresses of either a) the composite group managers it participates in, if it is a simple 
group manager or b) the simple group managers it depends on, if it is a composite 
group manager. In the latter case it must also know the set-theoretic expression its 
contents must satisfy. This information is needed so that the group manager may a) 
notify any composite group managers of any changes in its contents, b) accept 
notifications of updates in the contents of relevant simple group managers, c) ensure 
that after it receives an update, it recalculates its contents to reflect that change while 
maintaining the validity of the set-theoretic expression it implements. It must be noted 
that the update messages can also inform the group manager of the removal of one of 
its components and vice versa. The state of the group manager being essentially a set 
of declarative statements, it can be efficiently represented in XML similarly to the 
individual links and queries.
4.12 The name registry
The final component of the agent organisation/discovery architecture presented in this 
chapter is the name registry. The name registry is a specialised agent which implements 
the notion of constant namespace described in the abstract model of section 4.4. There is 
one name registry in every physical server implementing the proposed architecture. This 
distributed set of name registers implements, and ensures the integrity of, the constant 
namespace. Since names are used to identify links in every group manager, providing 
global control for names means that the name registry effectively controls the naming of 
the links in the group managers. Each name registry agent provides a local portal to the 
complete name registry. The main data structure each name registry agent maintains is a 
database which consists of tuples of the following form :
< name, owner, {< context, constraints, semantics >} >
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Each tuple defines the global characteristics of a registered name. Name is the string 
representation of a name. In the name registry every name is associated with a set of 
global characteristics. Each tuple of this set defines the semantics the name must have if 
used in the group manager context and the prospective user of the name satisfies the 
associated constraints. The owner field shows which agent is the registered owner of the 
name.
The context field can either indicate the address of a specific group manager, or the 
topic (category), or a set of group managers/topics for each of which the corresponding 
semantics should be given to the name if it is registered in any of the specified group 
managers/topics.
The constraints field contains a set of declarative statements that the characteristics of 
the prospective user of the registered name must satisfy in order to be allowed to use this 
name. These constraints can include the type and characteristics of services the user 
wishes to associate with a name in the group manager, the characteristics of the user itself, 
etc.
The semantics field includes any base semantics that must be given to the specific 
name when used in specific contexts. For example the name microsoft_corporation can be 
registered and defined so that whenever this name is used to represent a link in any group 
manager then the destination field of the link should include the address of the Microsoft 
corporation. This means that any query that matches this link will be forwarded to the 
address of the Microsoft corporation representative agent. The semantics associated with 
a name can be fixed  in which case no user of the name can add any extra semantics to the 
name whenever it uses it. Alternatively, the semantics are called base semantics and any 
user of the name can add his own semantics to them.
Each name registry agent implements an interface via which user agents can register 
and access name declarations. There are two main operations that each name registry 
agent performs:
1. register_name. A  user agent can invoke this function in order to register a specific 
name. The request must contain the set of tuples (of the above form) that the user 
wishes to associate with this name. The name registry agent, upon receiving such a 
request, contacts other name registries in order to ensure that the name is not 
already registered. If the operation is successful then the new name’s declaration is 
inserted into the database.
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2. Search_name. Group managers must ensure that no agent can register a link with 
them using illegally names from the name registry. Group managers use this 
operation whenever a resource agent attempts to register a link with them. 
Because of the importance of the name registry, each name registry agent must 
have a local well-known address so that the local group managers can access it.
4.13 Evaluation
The described architecture [6, 9] is based on the abstract model developed in section 
4.4. Thus the requirements of the abstract model are satisfied. Specifically, the semantics 
of a link can depend on the semantics of another link in another group manager (notion of 
indirect links and multi-links); group managers can register themselves with other group 
managers (in other words, group managers can behave as resource agents towards other 
group managers); the external namespace is implemented with the notion of dynamic links 
whose destination field can contain a program that accesses and modifies the external file 
system; the constant namespace is implemented with the notion of name registry agents 
distributed in different physical machines.
Furthermore, the architecture satisfies the requirements of section 4.5. Agents can 
create their own organisational structure by accessing the group manager creator agent, 
there is no ontological connection between resource and group manager agents therefore 
links can be created/deleted without affecting the existence of the resource agents, access 
paths can be created and modified at run time via the interface of the individual links 
(adaptivity).
Queries and links are considered as peers entities that interact with each other via the 
group manager entity. The information base of a query can be used to show the history 
and any intermediate results. The information base of a link can change based on the 
number and nature of the queries that have travelled through this link. As a result both 
access paths and queries can be mutated because of this interaction. The group manager 
ensures that certain vital characteristics of both are maintained intact for integrity and 
security purposes, {interaction).
The access paths are coupled with access control. The destination field of a link not 
only points to a new destination but also incorporates the authorisation criteria the query
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has to possess or acquire in order to be accepted by the agent the link points to. As it was 
shown, the access control requirements of a path also depends on the access control 
policies of the participating group managers. Thus the model integrates access control 
with discovery and treats the organisation nodes (group managers) and resource agents as 
peer entities, (security)
The concept of re-usability is present in four levels: a) individual links are re-usable 
components that can be copied among group managers, b) resource agents can form small 
groups and register themselves at a single point in the group manager structure, thus 
enjoying common access paths and hence common discovery and access control policies,
c) existing access paths can be used to build new access paths thus re-using the 
characteristics (constraints, information and access control policies) of the existing paths,
d) existing simple group managers can be used to create new aggregated organisation 
nodes (composite group managers).
The concept of service links as described in section 4,11 enables the group managers 
to offer a set of high level services to their members. Each group manager can “come” 
hardwired with various services from its creation. In this way the group manager can 
become an information-services centre for the resource agents registering with him. In fact 
the group manager can become a virtual market place which uses its onboard facilities 
(service links) to attract customers (resource agents) to register with it and buy (access ) 
his services. To achieve that the group manager can register with other group managers 
for marketing purposes. Thus there is the architectural flexibility to transform the group 
managers from simple query routers to electronic business centers (high level services fo r  
agents).
Finally every group manager represents a category which is specified upon its creation 
and remains intact throughout its lifetime as one of its permanent attributes in the state 
component. Each group manager implements a registration protocol that determines 
whether a particular resource agent can register a specific set of services according to the 
relevance of the services to the category or topic the group manager represents. The 
presented architecture does not give any specification for this protocol because this 
depends on the topic of the group manager and the strictness its owner wishes to enforce. 
Instead this architecture supplies the group manager with the prototype of a method 
whose implementation depends entirely on the owner of the group manager. 
(specialisation).
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The access control mechanism being coupled with access paths offers several further 
benefits : a) from the point of view of the resource agents there is now one more attribute 
in this system to assist them to do fine/coarse grain access control policies. Specifically the 
resource agents can now can now attach specific capabilities to pairs of user agents and 
access paths. The access path itself becomes a factor that determines the security 
requirements a user agent has to satisfy in order for his request to be authorised by the 
target resource agent. Furthermore the unauthorised requests can be blocked before they 
reach the target agent therefore the problem of denial of service attacks at an agent level 
can be avoided assuming that the resource agent has not made its address public thus 
enabling other agents to contact it directly, b) because the access control requirements for 
a path are distributed to its component links this means that the access control information 
of a path can be shared between a number of paths (security knowledge sharing), c) user 
agent queries need not acquire all their credentials from the beginning of then travel. Each 
hop within an access path specifies the credentials the query needs to have in order to go 
just to the next destination. Therefore the problem of determining all the needed 
credentials before the trip starts (in a CORE A fashion) is eliminated. Furthermore, for this 
reason the size of the query is smaller. The security risk is also minimised because if the 
security information the query possesses (credentials) is compromised then the damage is 
restricted since the query only carries enough authorisation for the next hop and not for 
the whole journey, d) the access control mechanism can allow both synchronous and 
asynchronous security. As discussed earlier the computation thread the query represents 
can be split in an authorisation thread and a activation thread. These threads proceed 
asynchronously and they get synchronised at the next hop. Alternatively the links of a path 
could require a key (password) that the query needs to have in order to be authorised by 
the destination agent. In this case the security policy is called synchronous because the 
computation thread is not split as above.
The described architecture possesses inherent mechanisms which quarantee that the 
system will reach a consistent state automatically after a change in its state occurs. 
Existing organisation models fail to provide such mechanisms. In summary the consistency 
mechanisms of this organisation system as follows : A) Each link registers its parent links 
(the name and group manager of every link pointing to that link); This information is 
available because in the context of this organisation system the process of interlocking 
links is destination based rather than source based. In this way if a link is destroyed
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(removed) then ail its parent links are notified and are either removed too or “re-wired” to 
point to another link or resource agent. Such a decision can be taken based on the value of 
a specific user-defined constant stored in the information base of the link. B) Similarly 
with the links, simple group managers record the IDs of all the composite group managers 
which depend on them. This is necessary because if the contents of a simple group 
manager change then these changes need be propagated to all pertinent composite group 
managers such that their contents remain consistent with those of the participating simple 
group managers.
Ease o f implementation inherent in this model is due to the fact that the declarative 
parts of all the components of the architecture (links, queries, name registry, group 
managers) can be represented in the standard XML notation. The functional parts are 
arbitrary programs written in interpreted languages. Because XML is quite simple, a 
prototype implementation of the architecture is straightforward.
The architecture is general purpose and thus it can be applied to organise arbitrary 
entities passive or active. In fact the architecture at its current form has direct application 
to the important area of hypermedia since its main concept of treating links as separate 
objects from the data objects conforms and naturally extends the main principle behind 
hypermedia.
4.14 Implementation issues
1. Scalability. The provision of automatic consistency mechanisms within the 
architecture implies that the update traffic increases with the number of composite 
group managers created. This traffic also depends on the frequency of other user 
actions, such creation and deletion of resource agents, group managers and links. If 
the number of users of the system is high then, in combination with the 
aforementioned factors, efficiency may degrade. To counter that, in a realistic 
implementation the users (and therefore their proprietary agents) must be restricted in 
the number of simple and composite group managers they are allowed to create. These 
restrictions could be enforced at a coarse grain level on groups of users rather than 
individuals.
2. Livelock. As mentioned before, livelock occurs when a user query travels across the 
organisation structure indefinitely without reaching a final destination. This
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phenomenon could occur in our system either because a) the query follows a specific 
access path which is cyclic or b) the query’s destination pattern is inherently cyclic. 
Case (b) may happen due to the group managers in our system not being organised in 
an acyclic hierarchy. In fact, the case (a) livelock can not happen because the access 
paths in this architecture are built bottom up. An access path construction starts from 
the terminal links first which in turn can be re-linked to new links. In this way, it is 
ensured that an access path always terminates on one or more resource agents. Case 
(b) livelock can be prevented by registering in the information base of every query the 
IDs of all the links this query has travelled trough.
3. Duplication. Duplication is the phenomenon whereby the same query arrives at the 
same resource agent more than once. Duplication could appear in this architecture if a 
query specified a multicasting policy which means that it wishes to be replicated and 
traverse more than one links concurrently. If the only types of links in our model were 
the fixed  and multi-links, then the group manager where the multicasting were 
requested could check the path_services parameters of all the relevant links and 
determine whether they present a duplication hazard. Since there are also dynamic 
links, this approach is not guaranteed to be successful. To address the issue of 
duplication, the following decisions have been taken: a) if a query wishes to travel 
through a multi-link then it is forwarded only to one of the destinations the link points 
to. This rule can be relaxed if all the destinations of the multi-link aie different 
resource agents. In a similar manner only one destination is used from a multi-link 
appearing in a composite group manager. In general if the rule of following one link in 
every group manager was enforced then no duplication can occur. However 
duplication has also a positive aspect in this architecture. Let us remember that even if 
the path_,services parameter for two links is the same this does not mean that the 
actual access paths are the same. This means that the constraints and access control 
policies of the two access paths can be completely different. Therefore a query could 
be successful in travelling along one path but unsuccessful in travelling through the 
other. If duplication was permitted then it could be guaranteed that a query would 
reach the eventual resource agent if its characteristics satisfied the requiiements of at 
least one access path to it. If there was no duplication and the access path to be 
followed was decided non-deterministically by the group manager then the system 
would be unfair. The solution to this problem is to allow the group manager to record
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in the query’s information base alternative links it could follow from this group 
manager in case at some stage later it is not allowed to proceed any further. So for 
example if the query can not satisfy the constraints of the required link in one of the 
next group managers then the current group manager could read the query’s 
information base and if there is a list of alternative links (from other group managers) 
then the query is sent to the first alternative in the list. This procedure is similar to 
depth-first searching.
4.15 Conclusions
An agent organisation system is proposed which is based on a set of requirements 
derived from the general application area for mobile agents. The system has the 
advantages of usability, extensibility and integrated security mechanism. Existing 
organisation nodes (Group Managers) can be re-used to produce new more complex ones. 
Moreover the system is dynamic in nature because queries and links are active entities 
which interact with each other as peers. The properties of the system have been discussed 
and its features evaluated identifying the main advantages over the existing models as well 
as the key issues of its implementation.
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Chapter 5
The MASIC Access Control Architecture
5.1 Introduction
The mobile software agent paradigm provides a generic, customisable foundation for 
the development of high performance distributed applications. An efficient, general- 
purpose access control mechanism is required to support the development of a wide 
range of applications. This is achievable if the design of the access control system is 
based on the principles of simplicity, programmability (customisation) and reusability. 
However existing mobile agent architectures either neglect this issue at all or offer 
centralised schemes that do not support adaptive access control on a per-agent basis and 
do not address the issues of secure knowledge sharing and reusing. In this chapter a 
novel, distributed access control architecture is presented based on the concept of 
distributed, active authorisation entities (lock cells) any combination of which can be 
referenced by an agent to provide input and/or output access control. It is demonstrated 
how these lock cells can be used to implement security domains and how they can be 
combined to create composite lock cells.
An agent can be involved concurrently in multiple computations either as a client or 
as a server. Access control must ensure that an entity possesses enough authorisation to 
invoke a specific operation on a specific target entity. The following issues should be 
addressed:
1. Integration with the computational model Any computation that roams across a 
server network presents a security hazard to its recipient.
2. Generality The access-control architecture should be general-purpose so that it can 
meet the security requir ements of a range of applications.
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3. Flexibility Applications should be able to create and dynamically modify their own 
access control policies and mechanisms.
4. Distribution Centralised access control cannot support customisation on a per-entity 
basis since it would have to act across a number of administrative domains.
5. Security-knowledge sharing and reuse Parts of the access control structure of an 
entity can be shared with other entities, possibly for subsequent extension. In this 
way access policies can be applied to groups of entities rather than individuals 
(creating “security domains”).
The existing access control approaches do not possess most of the aforementioned 
properties. Security in general is either neglected, as in [20, 61, 108], or is based on 
complex centralised architectures [51, 106] that contain hidden security holes [34].
The prevailing methodology of inter-agent access control is built around the notions 
of capabilities and Access Control List (ACL) [46, 98]. Each agent carries certain 
capabilities assigned to it by the principal (user) who owns the agent. Access to an 
individual agent is controlled by a single central ACL in every host. This mechanism, 
although simple, is inherently static and passive. An agent usually has to carry all the 
privileges of its principal in the course of its distributed execution. The ACLs are static 
entities, which can be customised only by an administrator. In CORE A, for example, the 
security administration interfaces are hidden from the application objects. Furthermore 
there is no concept of security-knowledge sharing and reuse. Implementing security 
domains on these systems requires the introduction of further entities (security domain 
managers in CORBA), thus making the system more complex. In summary, this access 
control mechanism suits static distributed applications whose access control requirements 
are known before theii' deployment and remain largely constant throughout their lifetime. 
On the other hand, the world of mobile agents is anything but static. The contents and 
functionality as well as the environment of an executing agent can change dramatically 
during its lifetime. The principal, or indeed the agent itself, should be able to update any 
access control schemes to support and protect the changing functionality.
In this chapter a distributed access-control architecture for mobile agents based on the 
abstract access control model described in [5] is presented. Section 5.2 gives an overview 
of the abstract model. In sections 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, the main entities and mechanisms 
of the architecture are described. Section 5.7 illustrates an object-oriented model of the 
architecture. Finally, section 5.8 has the conclusions.
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5.2 Overview of abstract model
Chapter 5
The proposed access control architecture is based on a novel abstract model as shown 
in figure 5.1. The access control model is an integrated component of the agent 
architecture presented in this thesis (MASIC). A cell in the context of this system is a 
trusted agent-wrapper encapsulating untrusted user-defined functionality. Users can 
create wrappers and then use them as containers of passive data entities and active 
program entities. Each cell advertises an interface via which other cells can access the 
contained user-defined functionality through synchronous or asynchronous message 
passing. An important service each cell offers is a synchronisation store, which supports 
the collaboration of cells for invoking a function of the target cell. Cells can provide 
partial invocation data (i.e. function name and arguments) and the target cell has the 
ability to combine these into a single complete function invocation. This form of 
synchronisation/collaboration is exploited in the authentication mechanism of the 
concrete model. Now let us turn to the access-control methodology being proposed.
Cell A CellB
reference
Simple Lock 
C ells
update I use
Composite 
Lock Cells
Lock Set
Figure 5.1 The abstract access control model
Locks and keys. Cells are locked with a lock expression. Each cell maintains a lock 
table. This table assigns different authorisation criteria (lock expressions) to different 
users or groups of users. Messages are provided with a key. The purpose of the lock 
expression in a cell is to restrict the access to that cell only to those messages that possess 
a key that fits  that lock expression. The locking mechanism is based upon the concepts of 
lock cells and locked cells. A cell is said to be locked if it references by name one or 
more lock cells. In its simplest form, every lock is just an independent name-registration 
centre maintaining a list of User Identifiers (UIDs). The registration procedure and
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requirements that a user must follow and satisfy, respectively, in order for his UID to be 
included in the lock’s list can differ dramatically between locks.
The successful registration of a user % with a lock I is equivalent to giving x a 
personal key for I. The possession of a personal key for a lock Z by a user grants him the 
capability of being partly or fully authorised to access any cell that is locked by the single 
lock Z or a combination of locks that include Z, respectively. The functionality of a lock 
cell resembles that of an Access Control List (ACL). The main difference being that, an 
ACL, since it actually represents a column of the Access Matrix, specifies which subjects 
(users) have what access to an object and thus it is bound to a specific object, whereas a 
lock cell is an independent list of registered subjects that can be referenced by any object, 
in combination with other locks, to provide partial access control to that object.
Lock expressions. Whereas individual locks control access by managing key sets 
that open them, there is a further requirement of combining locks for the purposes of 
authorising access on a combination of conditions. Traditionally such restrictions have 
been implemented by introducing multiple membership of users (agents) in access 
groups. This is a highly centralised solution whereby the appropriate grading of authority 
is kept consistent by the central administrator of the system. It is also prone to 
management errors; for instance, a user may be removed from a group that accesses a 
low-security resource while leaving him in another group that has access to a high- 
security one of the same nature. In such systems, it is impossible to express the 
implicative relation between access privileges (i.e. if % is authorised to access A, he is 
automatically authorised to access B, but not vice versa). Access calculation can still be 
done by some database, new privileges worked out and then the access relation as a 
whole updated to the new state. In this chapter we are proposing the following fully de­
centralised solution.
A lock expression is a Boolean expression on locks. It follows the standard set 
theoretical notation:
Z, u  Zg union of locks. The result is a lock that can be opened by any key that unlocks 
Z[ or Z2 .
Z, n  I2 intersection of locks. The result is a lock that can be opened by any key that 
unlocks both Zj and l^.
I' lock complement. The result is a lock that can be opened by any key that does 
not open Z.
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This algebra is homomorphic to the set algebra on key sets, which means that the set 
of keys that unlocks a composite lock can be worked out from the set of keys that open 
the corresponding primary locks by interpreting the lock formula as a set expression. A 
full isomorphism is not required since there may be more keys that open a given lock 
than any lock expression may suggest. This opens up a possibility of having master keys, 
security control keys, etc.
5.3 A generic authorisation scheme
The general mechanism just described is based on the assumption that there is always 
a single owner of a token. However, it cannot represent accurately certain scenaria that 
are likely to arise in a distributed processing environment. For example, let us assume 
that user x has sent a token to cell A that belongs to user y, in order to invoke a specific 
method on that cell. Let us also assume that the method being invoked requires some data 
from another cell and for this reason a token is emitted from cell A to cell B. Immediately 
there is a question of who should be the owner of the token sent from A to B. Is it the user 
who was responsible for invoking the method of cell A, or the user y who is the owner 
of the method that sent the token to 5  ?
All existing systems avoid tackling this problem by declaring that every object has a 
single owner. This position can lead to security problems. For instance, if the token in 
our example is tagged with the UID of x and is authorised to access cell B then instantly a 
method belonging to someone else (y in our example) acquires the capabilities of user x. 
Alternatively, if the token is given the UID of y  and y is authorised to access cell B, then 
the facts that fir stly it is % who initiated the execution thread and secondly that the results 
of the method invoked in B could be going back to x are hidden from the cell B. If B was 
aware of this information it might have rejected the token it had received from A.
A novel solution to this problem is to observe that the ownership of a token can be 
described accurately by a path of UIDs. For instance, assuming that the symbol ‘N’ is 
used to separate UIDs, the ownership of the token in the previous example is:
:\:ll y
This path, which is similar to the hierarchical pathnames encountered in UNIX and 
Windows, shows that the token has been emitted from a cell belonging to user y which 
was activated by a cell belonging to user x. This notation enables more accurate
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authorisation since it presents to the taiget cell the token’s exact ownership ‘path’. 
Hence, the lock tables of the cells, instead of assigning lock expressions to individual or 
group UIDs, can associate authorisation criteria with ownership paths by providing an 
ownership path pattern. For example, if a lock table contains the row a 11 b, /j n  then 
any token coming from a cell belonging to user b which has been activated by a token 
coming from a cell that belongs to user a, must satisfy both locks /, and in order to be 
authorised. In the general case, ownership paths are matched against a conventional 
regular expression that uses UID symbols, the concatenation symbol as well as the 
standard Kleene closure, alternation and “wild card”. Similarly, the lists maintained by 
the lock cells can register regular expressions for activation paths rather than individual 
UIDs.
Note that the responsibility for assigning the appropriate ownership path to tokens is 
given solely to internal mechanisms of the system. The reason being that ownership of a 
token is the primary authorisation vehicle. To give a cell the ability to ‘set’ the owner 
field of a token would render the system vulnerable to security attacks. The authorisation 
process can depend, and indeed in the real life it will, on more complex and even more 
sensitive information. Consequently, the authorisation criteria appearing in a cell’s lock 
table can be much more complex and extensive than the lock expressions described in the 
previous section.
The overall authorisation mechanism is depicted in figure 5.2.
A u th o risa tio n
G raphSecurity Token Security Token
Source
Cell
Target
Cell
Data Token
Figure 5.2 Overall security mechanism
When a source cell wants to send a token to a target cell, it concurrently emits tokens 
containing security information to the input nodes of the appropriate authorisation graph. 
The target cell, upon receipt of the token from the source is not activated automatically 
but it awaits for verification of authorisation. Upon termination of the activity in the 
authorisation graph, its final node(s) send the results of the authorisation process to the
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target cell. The target cell evaluates these results according to the criteria of its lock table 
for that user and if they are imtched the token is given authorisation to activate the cell.
5.4 A security example
Let us assume that a cell A represents a bank account held jointly by users A and B. 
Every transaction, such as withdrawal from the account, needs to be authorised by both 
holders before it can be executed. In such a situation, cell A must be equipped with a lock 
that needs the combination of two keys for unlocking. One of these keys is given to user 
A and the other to B. The security mechanism of this example is illustrated in figure 3. 
Three cells are created, forming a simple dataflow graph. When A needs to perform a 
transaction (say a withdrawal of £500), it sends two identical tokens: one to the bank and 
another one to B for approval. The tokens carry the account number, the transaction 
number in A’s books and the amount to withdraw. Agent B uses its authorisation logic 
(possibly comparing the amount with agreed spending limits, etc.) to figure out whether 
the transaction should be authorised. It then sends a similai' token to the bank placing the 
authorised withdrawal limit in the data field (in this example the full amount £500). The 
bank receives two tokens, one from A and one from A/B, for which the appropriate 
locking structure has been set in the table. Note that neither key was divulged to the other 
party and there was no chance of an agent external to the transaction to interfere in any 
way. Even causing a deadlock by sending a token from a third party to agent B, which 
might be forwarded to the BANK in error and never matched with a token from A is 
totally impossible: the BANK access control patterns will reject it even before the 
business code has a chance to analyse its content.
The figure 5.3 shows agent B initiating another transaction concurrently with the fii'st 
one. The second transaction is a request to withdraw £300 from the account which is 
authorised up to a level of £200 pounds. It is clear to see that these transactions are 
independent as they use different tags. Since the BANK agent is sequential (as is any 
agent in MASIC (chapter 3)) synchronised tokens will be processed one after another.
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BANK
Synchronisation
Tag = Account/TransactionNumber 
Synch Expression = “Receive 2 tokens"
Action — “Get minimum of amounts in token’s data fields’
A#5643/AlCil#-£500# 
B/A#5643/B 202#-£200#
Agent A
Access Control
A/B —^ Lg
B/A —>
A#5643/A101#-£S00#
A/B#5643/A101#-£500#
B#5643/B202#-£300#
B#5643/B202#-£300#
Figure 5.3 Secm*ity protocol example
As this example illustrates, our approach to security has some strategic advantages;
• It is user-defined. A user can use the primary mechanisms, described in the beginning 
of this section, to create arbitrary dataflow graphs that impose a customised security 
scheme to a cell or a group of cells {security programming).
• A security dataflow graph is completely distributed as its nodes can reside in different 
servers.
• Security mechanisms are decoupled from the code and hence can be installed, 
examined and validated irrespective of the program. This adds extra reliability to the 
scheme.
• The cells of a security graph operate asynchronously.
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5.5 The concrete access control model
Chapter 5
The abstract model described in the previous section is based on two assumptions:
• The system is deployed as a network of dedicated trusted servers. In other words it is 
assumed that there are no malicious hosts in the system.
• There are safe interpreters for every language a user can use to encode his programs 
and insert them into the cells. These interpreters prevent an executing cell from 
accessing diiectly the underlying operating system.
Both assumptions are quite realistic. There is already a number of widely available 
safe interpreters such as JAVA, Safe-Tcl, Python, etc.
Figure 5.4 shows the proposed concrete access control model, which clarifies and 
extends the abstract model of figure 5.1. The access control architecture is divided into
CELL
lAC OAC
System
Defined
System
Defined
User
Defined
User
Defined
modifyaccess
User
Interface
Administi'ation
Interfacereference reference
y  modifyaccess
update
I
I
IL
Simple 
Lock Cell
Composite 
Lock Cell
use
Lock Set
Figure 5.4 The concrete access control architecture
two layers; The access control functionality embedded within the cell and the set of 
simple and composite lock cells. As can be observed from figure 5.4, cells can reference 
a combination of simple and composite lock cells for input and/or output access control. 
Furthermore, the cells can access and manage the contents of the lock cells via a standard 
user and administrator interface that all lock cells implement. The simple lock cells are 
aware of the composite lock cells that depend on them so that they can update the
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contents of the appropriate composite lock cells when a change occurs in theii’ contents 
(automatic consistency). As it was mentioned earlier, the composite lock cells need to be 
co-located with the simple lock cells they are based on. In this way the update traffic is 
localised and the period of inconsistency of a composite lock cell when a change occurs 
in one of its constituent simple lock-cells is minimised. Below an analysis of these two 
layers is provided:
5.6 Security features of cell
The access-control related functionality of a cell serves two purposes:
a) to provide and enforce input and output access control to its encapsulated user 
functionality;
b) to participate in the authentication procedure of incoming and outgoing 
messages.
Authentication is a necessary prerequisite for authorisation. Any access control scheme 
has to be based on a reliable, secure authentication mechanism.
The authentication mechanism of this system is based on the notion of ownership 
graph. Each message exchanged between cells has its ownership graph in the form of a 
string appended to the header. The purpose of the ownership graph is to describe the 
principals of the message and the relationship between them. There are two possible 
relationships between the principals of a message. The first one is collaboration. A  
collaboration relationship among n principals indicates that these principals provided 
partial inputs, which were combined to form a complete function invocation. The second 
relationship is nested invocation. Two principals A and B form such a relationship if a 
cell that belongs to A invoked a function from a cell that belongs to B. Any message that 
the invoked function sends during its execution (further nesting of invocations) will be 
appended to the ownership graph showing that this message is the result of principal A 
invoking a function that belongs to principal B which in turn requests the invocation of 
another function at another cell. This relationship is similar to the composite delegation 
scheme in CORBA.
The collaboration relationship between two principals A and B is represented by the 
symbol The nested invocation is represented with the symbol V’. For example the 
string (A,B,C)/D/E represents an ownership graph of a message that was produced as a
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result of principals A, B and C collaborating to invoke a fimction belonging to principal 
D  which in turn invoked a function belonging to principal E ,
Each cell is responsible for ensuring that every outgoing message contains the correct 
ownership graph. The user-defined functions of the cell do not have access to, and as a 
result cannot modify, the ownership graph. The only entities of the cell that can read and 
modify the ownership graph are the Input Access Controller (lAC) and the Output 
Access Controller (OAC) respectively. There are two simple rules which govern the 
transformations of ownership graphs:
a) the reply message a cell sends in response to a message with graph G possesses 
the same graph G as the request,
b) any message that a cell sends while executing a function that was invoked by a 
message with graph G, will have a graph of the form G/H where H  is the 
ownership graph of the cell itself.
The novelty of the described scheme lies in the fact that the ownership graph of a 
message is more informative that the simple list of principals utilised in existing systems. 
The fact that a new relationship (collaboration) is represented in the graph means that a 
cell can enforce more complex access control schemes where, for example, certain 
collaborations are allowed and the others aie rejected.
Furthermore, more complex security protocols can be implemented by accepting 
messages, where untrusted principals provide partial input, but rejecting others where the 
same untrusted principals participate in a simple nested invocation. For example, a 
simple graph of the form (A,B)/C means that the results of the processing in C are 
guaianteed to be returned to both A and B whereby a graph of the form A/B/C  indicates 
that the results of the processing will be returned to A after being further processed in B. 
If we assume that principals A and C are trusted but principal B is not, then the target cell 
could accept the former graph since it guarantees the integrity of the results sent back to 
A. The latter graph could be rejected because the results from C may be modified 
maliciously by B before they are sent back to A, or not sent to A at all.
From the above analysis it is clear that the ownership graph of a message must form 
the basis for the authorisation of messages in cells. The lAC and OAC modules decide 
whether an incoming request is authorised to access the cell and whether an outgoing 
message is permitted to be sent, respectively. The existence of the OAC is another 
novelty of the proposed architecture. Access control can now be source based instead of 
target based which is offered by existing approaches. The OAC allows the principal of a
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cell to forbid any communication attempt with untrusted principals or cells. In the case 
where the “no trust” is mutual (bi-directional) between source principal and target 
principal, this scheme stops messages at theii' source and thus improves error localisation. 
As both lAC and OAC can be decoupled from the business code, the maintainability of
the application is improved. By contrast, the CORBA standaid defines a client-based part
in secure invocations. However, its scheme is centralised and oriented towards providing 
a required “quality of protection” which does not include the capability of rejecting the 
transmission of messages based on theii* destination.
The lAC contains the tables of figure 5.5:
Message
-type
Authorisation
expression
Security
info
Security
value
Access patli Security value Privileges
Privileges Operations
Figure 5.5 Data structure of the input access controller
When a message arrives, its characteristics (i.e. ownership graph and other message 
attributes) are matched against the first table to determine what authorisation expression 
(lock expression) the message has to satisfy in order to be granted access to the cell. The 
lAC may utilise security-information caches or contact the relevant lock cells dûectly to 
acquire items missing in the cache. If the authorisation expression is satisfied then the 
message is assigned a security label. This label, together with the access path [6] that the 
message has followed to reach the agent determine its privileges. Finally it is checked 
whether the function that this message requests to invoke is permitted, based on its 
privileges. The lAC can also reference an input-guarding lock cell. The referenced lock 
cell acts in this way as an input security proxy of the cell. The lAC also implements a 
standard interface via which authorised principals can modify its tables and settings.
In a similar way when an executing function of the cell produces an outgoing 
message, then this message activates the OAC. The OAC decides whether the message 
according to its destination can:
a) be allowed to be sent or
b) be denied transmission or
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c) be forwarded to a nominated lock cell which acts as output security proxy for the 
cell.
If the message is permitted to leave then the OAC can specify any security 
information, pertinent to the specific target cell, to be added to the message (i.e. 
capabilities, access certificates that the target has provided to the source cell, lock cells to 
be contacted, etc.). The OAC also possesses a standard interface via which its contents 
can be customised.
Lock cells
The lock cells in general act as independent authorisation centres. They are classified into 
two categories: the Simple Lock Cells (SLC) and the Composite Lock Cells (CLC). All 
lock cells implement a standard interface that enables:
a) specific principals or graphs of principals to register themselves by following a 
predefined registration procedure and
b) specific cells to register pairs of ownership graph patterns and associated values to be 
used for proprietary access control. Each such pair has an owner field in order to 
distinguish between entries belonging to different cells/principals.
There are two different types of simple lock cells:
1. Binary lock cells. These lock cells contain a list of ownership graph patterns. They 
act as binary security switches. When they are requested to authorise a message they 
first check whether the target cell has registered any entries in their list. If this is the 
case the ownership graph of the message is matched against the sub-list of graphs that 
belong to the target cell. If a match is found then they send the notification that the 
message is authorised.
2. Layered lock cells. These lock cells contain a list of pairs of ownership graphs and 
values. The values belong to a range of security values the specific lock cell utilises. 
Different types of layered lock cells can be defined based on the range of security 
values they associate with the ownership graph patterns. Theii* functionality is similar 
to that of the binary lock cells with the difference that they also return the value 
associated with an ownership graph if a match is found. The layered lock cells act as 
labelling mechanisms for messages. The target cell of an invocation can utilise the 
label that a certain layered lock cell assigned to the incoming message as an input for 
its own proprietary access control mechanism (IAC).
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Both types of simple lock cells also include a data structure, similar to that which the 
OAC maintains, in order to provide output access control. Furthermore, the SLCs 
maintain a list of CLCs that are based on them so that they can notify the composite cells 
o f any changes to theii* contents.
The CLCs behave like SLCs when they are requested to authorise a message. Each 
CLC implements a lock expression. Theii* contents (input and output access control 
structures) aie produced by combining the contents of their component simple lock cells 
such that each entry in their data structures satisfies the lock expression they implement. 
Four simple rules are applied to determine the contents of CLCs:
a) one entry in an SLC A matches an entry in SLC B if their associated ownership 
graphs are identical;
b) if an identical entry occurs in two SLCs A and B, then it will occur in both theii* 
intersection and union,
c) if an entry has a different associated security value in A and B then this entry 
will occur in the intersection with the smallest of the two security values 
whereas in the union it will be associated with the highest value of the two.
d) complement CLC can only depend on SLC diiectly (this can always be 
achieved by using de M organ's transformations on the lock expressions); a 
complement flag is used to mark up the fact that successful matches should 
cause access denial.
Cells can create simple and composite lock cells by sending an appropriate request to 
the lock factory. The functionality of the lock factory is dual:
a) It acts as a lock cell type repository. The type of an SLC is defined as an ordered list 
of security labels it can assign to the ownership graphs that will be registered in it. In 
reality the implementation of the lock factory will provide an interface to an object- 
oriented system like CORBA. In this way, the lock cell types can be defined in a 
standard definition language such as the CORBA IDL. Another advantage of such an 
implementation is that new types can be created by using existing types (inheritance).
b) It ensures that a CLC is created only if the types of the component SLC are identical. 
For example it would be meaningless to attempt to create the intersection or union of 
two SLCs that use different security label system since it is not possible to apply the 
aforementioned four rules to determine the contents of the new CLC.
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Figui'e 5.6 An object-oriented model of the architecture
5.7 An object-oriented view of the architectnre
The object-oriented view of the locking scheme is presented in figure 5.6, which 
displays an abstract lock cell object, the lock factory object and three interfaces. The 
users can only access the lock factory and any existing lock cells. The simple and 
composite lock cell interfaces and the abstract lock cell object are internal system 
entities, which are opaque to the users. All new lock cells inherit the attributes of the 
abstract lock cell object and implement the respective interface. The abstract lock cell 
object interface contains a Java “properties” table, the abstract method “authorise” and 
the method “re tu rn jype”. The method “authorise” is implemented by the respective 
interface, every time a new lock cell is instantiated. The layered LC interface extends the 
binary LC interface, by adding one updating method and overriding an existing one. The 
lock factory keeps an array with the names of all the available types of locks. Its 
“create_LC” method is used to create either a simple or a composite lock cell. The 
methods of a lock cell are divided in three basic categories: administrative, updating and 
informative. The composite lock cell interface introduces 3 methods 
(“return_expression”, “update_LC_contents”, “calculate”). If one of the participating 
lock cells -  in a composite lock cell -  changes an entry, it sends an 
“update_LC„contents” request. The composite lock cell will update the stored LC_table 
of the particular SLC and then recalculate the table.
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5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter the architecture of a distributed access control system for mobile 
agents was presented and analysed. The architecture is based on a natural abstract model, 
which satisfies the principles of simplicity, customisation and security knowledge 
sharing and reuse. The agents can create and dynamically manage theii* own access 
control policy, parts of which can become public and shared with other agents. As a 
whole, the proposed architecture provides a simple, customisable base that mobile agents 
can use to program then security requirements as an individual or as a group.
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Chapter 6
Prototype client side
6.1 Introduction
The client part of a distributed computing system is considered to be an important, 
integral part of the system itself because it provides the interface to the system’s services. 
A successful system design must always provide a comprehensive, uniform and user 
friendly interface via which the potential system users can efficiently access and use the 
system. The end users are after all a critical factor which can determine the overall 
success or failure of a system. Existing bibliography suggests that the developers of 
mobile agent systems have acknowledged the importance of the system interface and 
have started incorporating new or more sophisticated user interfaces into theft systems.
This chapter focuses on the design and implementation of a prototype GUI for the 
MASIC architecture. The presented GUI improves the overall system usability and 
minimises potential unacceptable input from the users. The expected requftements, the 
design methodology and a short description of the main window of MASIC are 
presented. Furthermore the implementation of the GUI is also outlined.
6.2 Design Methodology
The methodology followed for the design was that of prototyping. The prototyping 
method is illustrated in figure 6.1 :
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The fii'st stage of the prototyping method is to define the requirements that the design 
of the system has to satisfy. The second step is to design a limited version of the system 
which is then given to the end users to evaluate. The users provide relevant feedback to 
the system designer who is responsible for incoiporating the suggested changes into the 
design. The system designer and the end users might participate in a number of 
recommendation loops until the design reaches its final form. The prototype design is 
then implemented, tested for bugs and assessed for any possible improvements.
NO
Yes
M eets
req u irem en ts
Design
prototype
Implementation
Get
requirements
User
evaluation
Figure 6.1 Prototyping method
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6.3 GUI Design Requirements
The main specifications the interface should meet were as follows:
• The user should be capable of connecting and disconnecting from the server of the 
prototype system implementation.
• The interface should offer an interactive console (like UNIX command prompt). This 
console should display messages (answers to queries) that cells send to the user as 
well as any information or prompts from the system itself.
• Cell management. The user should be able to create and delete cells from the system. 
In this prototype there are only two types of cells: the data cells and the program 
cells.
• Cell communication. The interface should enable the user to communicate diiectly 
with any active cell in the system by means of message exchange.
• Cell Information. The user should be informed of which cells are currently active in 
the system.
• Cell connections. When a user wishes to communicate with a cell then he always 
needs to specify that cell’s address as the destination of the token he will send. This 
procedure is very inefficient if the user wishes to engage in a dialogue with the same 
cell. For this reason the interface should enable the user to connect to a cell and send 
commands to it without the need of specifying the destination. The interface should 
append automatically the appropriate cell address. The whole procedure should be 
transparent to the cell itself. Furthermore the user should be allowed to connect to 
more than one cell simultaneously and be given tools and information to assist him in 
managing these connections.
6.4 GUI Design Process
The initial prototype design was very simple. It consisted of :
1. one t e x t  A r e a  occupying most of the area of the window. This textArea was acting 
as the interactive console displaying messages from the cells or the system itself.
2. a number of menus. The control menu included all the commands for GUI control 
and cell management (i.e. create/delete cell, clear display, etc.), whereby the
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communicate menu included all the commands for cell communication such as sending 
tokens, connect/disconnect from cells, etc.
3. a number of buttons to enable the user to load and run program scripts. T he///e  and 
edit menus contained typical file processing choices, such as file open, save, close, etc., 
to facilitate the process of program writing, editing and execution. Figure 6.2 shows an 
early version of the main window.
Ül
File Edit Controls Communicate Windows Help
Hello I LOAD | RUN | RUN ALL |(File1 ^
Figure 6.2 An early version of the main window
The described initial prototype design was then delivered to two final year students 
acting as end users of the system for evaluation. The feedback from the students included 
the following main points:
1. The prototype satisfied the main design requirements as they were set out in section 
6.3 but the interface was not adequately user-friendly. More shortcut buttons were 
needed to enable the user to access fast the most common commands. Some aesthetic 
modifications were also proposed.
2. The contents of the menus needed reorganisation. It was suggested that the functions 
related to different types of cells be included in separate menus. Furthermore it was 
recommended that the file and edit menus be merged into one menu since the file 
processing commands do not constitute the main functionality of the interface.
3. The end users identified the possibility that the interactive console of the interface 
could be overflowed with information if a number of cells sent messages to the client
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concurrently. It was suggested that the user should have some message viewing control 
which will enable him to define which messages he wishes to view. The rest of the 
messages should be kept in a queue until the user decides to either view them or delete 
them.
After taking into account the aforementioned feedback, the file menu and the help 
menu were the only ones that were kept from the initial design. The edit menu choices 
were placed under ih&file menu. The rest changed to four new menus: the data cell, the 
program cell, the token and the connected cells. The first one offering all the 
functionality for data cells, the second one for program cells, the third one for sending 
and receiving tokens and finally one for handling the connected cells. After testing the 
window it was proven to be better to add a text field at the bottom of the window so that 
the user can send commands to cells he is connected to. Moreover, an on-line list was 
added at the right hand side of the window so that the incoming tokens could appear 
there. It is better having an on-line list so that incoming messages appear there instead of 
having to go to the token menu and select receive tokens and then check out if any tokens 
have arrived. The user can see the origin of the messages and can decide to either view 
them or delete them. The central console window displays automatically only the replies 
from cells the user is connected to. Furthermore two buttons were added so that the user 
can quickly connect/disconnect from cells. Figure 6.3 shows final layout of the interface:
HelpFile Data Cell Program Cell Token Connected Cells
Connect D l ?  :o n n r  : t
s MAIC version v0.9a Lacal HgsI Is; kenny.ee.surrey.ac.uklli l .ConsBcted to the server...at port: 2 § i i  2525->Welcome to MAIC server «@.1 running on Sola r is
l  I
TË
Load
Run
Terminate
Message List 
TransalD *“ GUID
View Message I
j  Delete Message
Clear
You are nol m nnec tea  lo a lell... . J
Figure 6.3 The final layout of the interface
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6.5 Description of GUI
In this section the main window of the interface will be described more extensively. 
Figure 6.4 shows the main components on the main interface window.
File i a l s C e l l  Program i e l l  Token ionneiüeül ^ells
□  X  
Help
-ttD i o n n e ^  $ )  [)l?  :
Welcome to MAIC version v0.9a 
Local Host is; kenny.ee.surrey.a&uW li l  
Connected to the server...at port; i i i S  
2525->W elcom e to  MAIC se rre r  «©.4 running ma S o la r is
(2)
Load
Run
Terminate |
Message List 
TransalD ~ GUID
View Message
Delete Message
0
You are not connected to a  cell...
Clear
JSi
Figure 6.4 The main window of the interface
The components of the main window
0 .  The active program.
0 .  The Menu Bar.
(D. Main Screen.
0 .  Command Line.
@. Message List.
0 .  Message Buttons.
©. Connect/Disconnect Buttons. 
(Z). Status Bar.
>. Program Buttons.
>. Indication (online/offline). 
). Clear Button.
Below figure 6.4 there is a key list to the components, and a short description. 
Number 0  is a choice box from where the user can select a program already loaded. 
Component 0  is the menu bar. There are six menus in the menu bar: the File, the Data
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Cell, the Program Cell, the Token, the Connected Cells and finally the Help menu. 
Below is a list with all the menu choices under each menu.
File Daia Cell Program Cell lek en Connected Cells Help
Info Create Create Send View Cells List Help
Connect Server Delete Load About
Disconnect
Server
Connect Run
Exit Disconnect Terminate
Active Cells 
List
Run-All
Remove
Remove-All
In the first menu there are four menu items. The first one, “Info”, returns information 
about the operating system version, the default language, the platform type etc. The next 
item, “Connect Server”, is used for connection to the server. The “Disconnect Server” 
disconnects the client from the server. The “Exit” disconnects from the server and exits 
the program.
The next menu is the Data Cell, which consists of five menu choices. The first 
choice, “Create”, brings up an online form for creating a data cell. Figure 6.5 shows the 
online form. The user has to give the general attributes of the cell and then he can give 
the data/methods or the access control list, by clicking the relevant button. Also there is a 
cancel button, so that the user can return to the parent window without making any 
changes. In almost every window, wherever it is necessary, there is a help button, which 
provides a short help on the current window. Finally the “Create” button sends a request 
to the server for the cell creation and returns to the parent window.
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*4^  v ,iv '" 'ÿ v
#  B F g  g ^ i i f i i i t i i i  
NameM:
X
Type:
Data/M ethods
OwnerM: alex AControl List
Life-TlmeC*):
Create] Cancelj Help
Figure 6.5 The data cell creation form
The next choice is “Delete”. It brings up a list with all the active cells so the user can 
select one and delete it. The idea of choosing from a list instead of giving the details of 
the cell in a form makes the task easier and minimises the possibilities for errors. Also, in 
the “Data Cell” menu there is a “Connect” choice. It brings up a small form providing a 
list of the available cells for connection. On the other hand, “Disconnect” brings up a list 
with the already connected cells. Figure 6.6 shows the Connected Cells List window.
zappas |9143
X
Disconnesd
Use It
Cancel help
Figure 6.6 Connected Cells List
“Program Cell” is the next menu. The “Create” item brings up exactly the same form 
as the data cell create item, with the only difference that in the Data/Methods form the 
user can also give the source code of the program. “Load” brings up a LOAD Dialog 
window, for loading a program. Then the name of the program is added to the program 
list, represented in figure 7.4 with number 0 .  “Run” runs the selected program from the
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program list. If the user wants to terminate the program he has to select “Terminate”. 
Similar to “Run”, “Run-All” runs all the programs listed in the program list.
The next menu is the “Token”, where the user can send a token to any cell, by just 
giving the destination. Figure 6.7 shows the “Send Token” window. The user has to 
provide only the destination, the data and some security information.
-  1
File DaLaCell Pmgmm Cell Token ion n e iS ed  Cells
lo n n e^
Welcome to MAIC version v0.9a 
Local Host is: k enny .ee .su rrey .ac .uk /l i l .2 i i . i© .i  
Connected to the server...at port: 2525  
2 5 2 5 -5 G endTblen
OestiislleiH:
M mesns goa m u s t  
iliB  m mm\UB
Send I Cancel] Help
You are not connected to  a cell...
Dl? : omiŸ:!:
DataC-^ ge List 
I  -  GUID
Message
ÎJ  Delete Message
Figure 6.7 Send Token form
The number 0  component is the console where information from the server appears. 
When the program starts a welcome message is displayed and verification is shown that 
connection to the server has been established. The main screen in combination with 
number 0 ,  the command line, acts like an interactive console. The user can send 
commands from the command line and the output will appear on the main screen. 
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the main window before sending a command and after.
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File Data Cell Program Cell Token Connected Cells
Connect Disconnect
Welcome to MAIC version v0.9a Local Host is: kenny.ee.surrey.ac.uk/131.227.50.40 
Connected to the server...at port: 2525  2525->W eicom e to MAIC server vO.4 running on solans 
Connection has been made to cell...., w ith  GUID 34310
Load
Run
Terminate
Message List 
TransalD ~ GUID
View Message
Delete Message
sh o w d a t^ Clear
You are connected to a Cell with  GUID: 34310
Figure 6.8 Sending a command to a connected cell
-W
File Data Cell Program Ceil Token Connected Cells
O X
Helpl  I
BU_j Connect Disconnect
Welcome to MAIC version v0.9a 
Local Host is: kenny.ee.surrey.ac.uk/131.227.50.40 
Connected to the server...at port: 2525 
2525->W eicom e to MAIC server vO.4 running on Solaris
Connection has been made to cell with GUID 34310
z ap i  “ > file! 
zap2 “ > flle2 
zap3 => files
Load
Run
Terminate
Message List 
TransalD ~ GUID
View Message
Delete Message
Clear
You are connected to  a  Cell with  GUID: 34310
Figure 6.9 Answer appears on the main screen
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The idea of combining the t e x t A r e a  and t e x t F i e i d  Java classes to create an 
interactive console was an attempt to offer the user the ability to send commands to 
connected cells without having to fill in forms. The command line is only available if the 
user is connected to at least one cell and that cell is “active” . Number @ is the message 
list. It shows all the incoming tokens. Through that list the user can see all messages of 
the incoming tokens. The list is updated automatically as a new token is received. Then 
the user can use the Message Buttons, number 0  to access the incoming messages. 
Number © shows the two buttons “Connect” and “Disconnect”. Both are shortcuts of the 
menu choices, under the “Data Cell” menu, described earlier in this section. The reason 
for the shortcuts is that both these functions are used frequently and thus they should be 
quickly accessible. If there are no connected cells, the “Disconnect” button is disabled.
Task bar is number 0 .  It informs the user which of the connected cells is active at the 
moment. If there is no active cell then the task bar prompts: “You are not connected to a 
cell...”. All the commands that the user sends from the command line apply to the cell 
shown in the task bar. Under number ® there are three buttons: “Load”, “Run” and 
“Terminate”. All three aie shortcuts of the choice menus described earlier in this section. 
On the top right corner of the windows, under the “Help” menu, it is number ® , the 
connection indicator. It is an animation that shows the connection to the server is active 
when it runs and that there is no connection to the server when is stopped. Finally, the 
“Clear” button, number # ,  is used for clearing the contents of the main screen. Although 
the main screen scrolls down when the data exceed the screen, the user can clear the 
contents at any time using this button.
6.6 GUI Implementation
MASIC v0.9a was implemented using Java JDK 1.1.3. The computer used for the 
implementation was a Sun SparcStation 10 running on Solaris 2.5.1. We decided to use 
Java because it is a powerful object oriented language which includes a package for GUI 
implementation. The platform that the project was implemented on did not support any 
other GUI design package. Of, course a GUI could be designed and implemented using 
the standard X library (Xlib), the C Language programming interface to Version 11 of 
the X Window System but that would restrict the interface to run only under X Window
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systems. On the other hand, a Java implemented interface can run (theoretically) on any 
Java enabled platform.
6.7 Limitations of the implementation
In the current version the model has some limitations, some assumptions that the user 
should be aware of. Firstly, it is supposed that the server is running under 
garak.mcs.surrey.ac.uk and listens to port 2525 for connections. Port 2525 was found by 
a scanning program to be free. We tested it for a long time and found there were no 
problems caused, so it was decided to use it as the communication port between the 
client and the server.
Moreover, although the service is available from the client side, no program cells can 
be created. The only types of cells supported by the current version are:
• File Managers
A cell responsible for managing a group of files. It has some default 
methods for the manipulation of the files, but the user can add more. At 
the current version only the default methods are supported, which are: 
showdata, showmethods, value, showalias, totalwords, mv, cp, rm, 
adddata, renalias, deldata.
• Set Managers
The primaiy function of a set manager is to maintain and update a list of 
aliases. If  a cell is registered in a set manager then effectively the cell has 
created a new access path to itself via this set manager. The set manager 
checks whether any token passing tlirough has sufficient authorisation to 
proceed. If yes, then the token is allowed to proceed towards the target 
cell, if not the token is discaided. At the current version only the default 
methods are supported. But the user will be able to add more in a future 
version. The default methods are: smreg, smunieg, showsm, smupd.
• Lock Cells
Lock cells keep a track of user names and the authorisation values. Lock 
cells have only one method, the showlc.
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6.8 Discussion of source code
In this section a description of the classes and explanation of the algorithms used is 
given. Parts of the code are listed here for quick reference. The program consists of 18 
code files (*.java). These files are listed below followed by a short description.
File Name
maic_client.java
AboutDialog.java
ConnectDialog.java
CreateCellForm.java
CreateProgramForm.java
DelMes.java
PMethData.java
T extEdit App. j ava 
UUEncoder.java 
ViewActiveList.java 
V iewConn_List.java 
checkConn_List_empty.java
clientSocket.java
connectCell.java
help.java
mes_Left.java
sendToken.java
warning.java
Description
The main file of the program. Creates the main 
window.
Creates the window for the About information. 
Creates the window for the authorisation check 
when the program starts.
Creates the online form for creating a Data Cell. 
Create the online form for creating a Program Cell. 
Creates the window to delete a message.
Creates the window for importing the data and 
methods of a Program Cell.
A simple text editor.
Encodes any string with uuencode.
Creates the window with the Active Cells List. 
Creates the window with the Connected Cells List. 
Creates a thread that checks if the Connected Cells 
List is empty.
The thread that runs the connection with the server. 
Creates a window for connecting to a cell.
Creates a window with help for opening a help file. 
Creates a window to inform that messages are still 
in the message list.
Creates an online form to send a Token.
Creates a window displaying a warning message.
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6.8.1 Authorisation check
The maic_client.java file creates the main window. Upon opening, it calls the public 
static void main(Stnng args[]) method which creates the main window, connects to the 
server and finally calls the authorisation() method to check the authorisation. The 
process for the authorisation check calls the authorisation() method which creates an 
instance of the ConnectDialog class which is responsible for checking the username and 
password, and sends an authorisation request to the server. The password is encrypted 
using the uuencode encryption mechanism and is then sent together with the user name 
to the server. The token that carries the information has the following format:
Aut h o r i s a t i o n _ c h e c k ê u s e r n a m e i p a s s w o r d ! !
Then the system waits for an authorisation_check_suc token from the server to 
proceed with the main program. If the authorisation check fails it notifies the user that 
there was an error in the username and password given so that the user can try again. The 
password is passed to the uuencoder through a s t r i n g B u f f e r  i n p u t  s t r e a m  and it returns 
encrypted into a file. Then the program reads the encrypted password from the file and 
sends it to the server. The uuencoding encryption of the password is clearly not secure 
and it was used only for demonstration purpose.
6.8.2 Handling incoming tokens
After the authorisation check has succeeded the connection is established and the 
GUI is ready for user input. The whole connection runs as a single thread, so the rest of 
the program can continue receiving user input without blocking. If the connection is not a 
separate thiead then the user cannot do anything else until the socket stops listening for 
incoming messages.
The technique used here for handling incoming tokens is based on the event loop 
model. There is an infinite loop running, as long as the thread that holds the connection is 
alive. The incoming message is copied to a string and depending, on the format of the 
string, the system acts respectively. Figure 6.10 shows the part of the code confirming 
that the connection is established and the loop that the program uses to listen for 
incoming tokens is running.
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The s t r i n g  t h e T i m e  represents the incoming token. This string is checked from the 
i f  statements, in the figure below, to find out the type of the token. At the end of the i f  
statements there is an e l s e  statement which handles all the unknown types of tokens.
public class clientSocket extends Thread 
{
public int part;
Socket theSocket;
DatalnputStream theTimeStrearn; 
public clientSocket(int port)(
this.port = port;
}
public void run(){
try
{
theSocket = new 
Socket("garak.mes.surrey.ac.uk", port);
AllDisable () ; 
theTimeStream = new 
DatalnputStream ( theSocket. gret Input Stream (} ) ;
while(this.isAlive 0){
String theTime = theTimeStream.readLine ();
if ( theTime. startsWith ( ''cell_connection_suc#" ) == true){
else if..
else....
}
}
catch (UnknownHostException e)
{ output("The system cannot connect to the Server... "); 
maic_client.conCell.setTextC'You are not connected to a cell... "); 
AIIDIsableQ;
}
Figure 6.10 Creation of connection and handling of the incoming messages
Now let us see how the type checking of the tokens works. Every token has a 
standard format. Each field is sepaiated from the others with a “#” except the last field 
which has at the end “!!” and declares the termination of the token. Any carried data are 
between square brackets ([data]). In order to find the token type we tested the “title” of 
the token, which is the first field. The s t a r t s w i t h ( s t r i n g )  method of the s t r i n g  class 
is used for that purpose. It checks if the t h e T i m e  String starts with title# (where title is
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the type of token). When it finds the type of the token discards the title# and keeps the 
rest so that the fields can be separated.
6.8.3 The main window
The main window is created from the m a i c _ c l i e n t  class constructor. There is no 
layout manager used so that each component can be placed anywhere on the window. 
This is a more difficult way of creating a GUI, but it allows the programmer to arrange 
components, in any possible combination. Below is a list of the methods that class 
maic client has:
Method Maine D escsiplisn
P u b l i c  v o i d  a d d f H e  ( S t r i n g  
f i l e )
Adds a program to the program list
P u b l i c  v o i d  r e m o v e f i l e ( S t r i n g  
f i l e )
Removes a program from the program list
P u b l i c  s t a t i c  v o i d  
o u t p u t ( S t r i n g  o u t _ m e s )
Prints out_mes to the main screen.
P u b l i c  v o i d  r u n f H e  ( S t r i n g  
f i l e )
Runs a program in a separated process.
P u b l i c  v o i d  c o n n e c t ( ) It creates an instance of the connectCell class, for 
connecting to a cell.
P u b l i c  v o i d  v i e w m e s s a g e ( ) It shows the contents of the selected message, 
from the message list, in a window.
P u b l i c  v o i d  c h e c k m e s ( ) Checks if the message list is empty.
P u b l i c  s t a t i c  v o i d  T e r m i n a t e ( ) Starts the termination of the program.
P u b l i c  s t a t i c  v o i d  
R e s t o r e C e l l s ( )
Restores the saved cells, from a file.
P u b l i c  s t a t i c  v o i d  
a u t h o r i s a t i o n ( )
Starts authorisation check mechanism.
The main window waits for user input. When an event occurs the event handler will 
take care of that event and perform the right task.
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6.8.4 CreateCellForm and CreateProgramForm classes
This class creates an online form, whose purpose is to create a data cell. The user has 
to give the name, the type, the location and the Life-Time of the cell. There are two 
buttons that create new forms. One for the data and methods and the other for the Access 
Control List. In the data/methods form there are two t e x t A r e a s ,  T d a t a  and T m e t h o d s ,  
where the user can fill in the values. When the OK button is pressed the contents of each 
t e x t A r e a  are Stored in another t e x t A r e a ,  d a t  for the data and m e t h  for the methods, 
which play the role of a buffer.
The Access Control List works in almost the same way. This has three fields, one for 
Authority, one for Access Path and one for Security Expression. The difference is that 
the user has to fill in three fields and then press the Add button so that all the fields will 
be added to the list and the fields cleared for new entries to be given. If the user tries to 
add an entry without completing all three fields the program will notify him to complete 
all o f them and then try again. Also, there is a remove button so that the user can select 
an entry from the list and remove it, in case he has made a mistake. Again after the OK 
button has been pressed the entries of the list are copied to a t e x t A r e a  called l i s t ,  
which plays the role of a buffer.
Finally when the Create button is pressed to the main create c e l l  F o r m  window, 
the program performs a check to find out if a cell already exists with the given name. 
Every time a cell is created, a file with the attributes of the cell is saved on the current 
directory. The name of the file has the following format: username_nickname.inf. The 
program checks if a file exists with the given name. If there is no other cell with the same 
name (nickname) the program checks that all fields are filled and if they are then sends a 
request to the server for a cell creation, otherwise it notifies the user to fill all the fields 
of the form. In every window there is a Help button, which creates an instance of the 
h e l p  class, which we will discuss later.
The C r e a t e P r o g r a m F o r m  class has the same general structure as the 
C r e a t e C e l l F o r m  class. The main difference between the two classes is that the 
Data/Methods window for the C r e a t e P r o g r a m F o r m  class contains the button Import 
Source Code which creates a new instance of the T e x t E d i  tApp class (simple text editor) 
for the user to import the source code of the program that the cell represents.
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6.9 Conclusions
In this chapter the design and implementation of a prototype graphical interface for 
the management of the agent architecture of this thesis was presented. The interface does 
offer some useful functionality but its current implementation is rather limited. It serves 
more as a guide for the future development of the complete agent architecture rather than 
as a complete client-side software. Nevertheless this prototype interface illustrates that it 
is feasible to enable the end user administration and management of our agent 
architecture via a simple, easy to use, graphical environment. At the time of writing of 
this thesis, this point is enforced by the fact that several agent development organisations 
have already started incorporating graphical interfaces into then agent systems. A typical 
example of this is the IBM aglets agent environment. It is the opinion of the author that 
the provision of interactive graphical interfaces is the only way of transforming the agent 
technology into a widely accepted means for doing efficient distributed computing.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Summary
During the past decade the Internet has grown exponentially. It has been transformed 
from a national networking project to a global communications infrastructure which is 
open enough to support the deployment of distributed applications. The Internet 
nowadays is open to commercial exploitation and has akeady become the medium for 
global scale distributed applications (Internet computing).
The main assumption of Internet computing is that the cost of local processing is 
negligible compared to the cost of communication. For this reason the primary Internet 
computational architecture, the client-server, has become inadequate since its main 
mechanism, the RPC, requires ongoing communication. It was in the early 90’s when the 
first serious candidate to replace RPC came to the fore. The concept of making the code 
rather than the data mobile had a clear strategic advantage over RPC. With this 
technology ongoing interaction did not require ongoing communication.
Because of this important benefit hopes were raised in the distributed computing 
research community. Individuals and institutions from all over the world joined a research 
fr'enzy in the area of mobile agents and consequently the result has been somewhat 
chaotic. A large number of agent systems were produced within just five years which did 
not integrate with existing legacy software, nor interoperate with each other. Each system 
suggested its own view of the mobile agent technology. The first standardisation attempt 
appeared in 1997 but until now it has remained largely in the background of
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developments within the field of agent research. In summary the domain of mobile agents 
is indeed very promising but it is still in its infancy. More work is required to transform 
this area into a stable, mature research domain in which real world problems could be 
solved.
7.2 Evaluation
In this section we will attempt to evaluate the agent fr amework presented in this thesis 
by matching its design against the requkements of section 1.2.
The proposed framework (MASIC) is architecture-based and enables the users to 
create component-based agents. In chapter 3 it was shown that each component of an 
agent can either be passive data, in which case it is expressed in XML, or active data 
(program or intelligent black box). In the latter case the programs can be defined in any 
interpreted programming language for which there is a safe interpreter. This characteristic 
enables the users to create agents by using thek existing proprietary programs as building 
blocks. Moreover the users can incoi*porate within an agent the necessary navigation logic 
which is also expressed efficiently in XML. Therefore our framework is language neutral 
and does not define or depend on any proprietary declaiative notation. Thus it can be well 
integrated within the current software scene.
The design of the proposed framework has taken into consideration the end user’s 
perspective as well (usability). In chapter 6, a graphical interface was presented via which 
users can interact and manage the implementation of the framework. The presented 
interface is simple and allows for mutual communication between the agents and the users. 
In general the interface supports the user creation, deletion and management of the 
framework’s agents.
The requkements of reusability and programming efficiency have been addressed at 
various points of the framework design. Fkstly new agents can use the components of the 
existing agents to build up thek own functionality (chapter 3). Thus the concept of 
software re-use is present within the mechanism of agent creation. Secondly both the 
organisation and the access control model support the creation of composite nodes by 
using the existing ones as building blocks (composite group managers discussed in chapter
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4 and composite lock cells discussed in chapter 5). Thirdly the cells are equipped with 
collaborative facilities (token store) and as a result the efficiency of collaboration is 
increased because it takes place where the associated action is located (chapter 3). 
Fourthly, the issues of communication and mobility management are integrated within a 
single agent system component (chapter 4). If these two issues were addressed by 
separate entities then extra communication would have been requked since the 
communication and mobility management entities need to interact. Finally efficiency gains 
are possible because of the agent organisation model. Because the group managers act as 
high level message routers, unwanted messages can be discarded before they reach the 
destination agent. In this way this agent does not need to waste any processing time to 
check and reject such unwanted messages. This characteristic is important since valuable 
Internet bandwidth is wasted nowadays because of unwanted messages that eventually are 
discarded when they reach thek destination.
Care has been taken to ensure the agents have well-structured representation and 
execution. Fkstly, there aie three different types of agents, any mixture of which can be 
used to represent user-defined programs. Agents that are highly mobile have lightweight 
size (token agents) and therefore requke less communication bandwidth to perform thek 
migrations. Secondly collaboration points can be interconnected with each other thus 
allowing the definition of distributed programs as dataflow style graphs. This program 
representation is deskable because parallelism can be exploited during the execution of the 
program (chapter 3).
The framework also supports the requked services of access control, organisation, 
mobility management, collaboration and communication. Each of these services were 
mapped as either a separate layer in the framework’s conceptual model or as a layer 
within the agent facilitator. The services offered by the agent system are adaptive 
(interaction of queries with links in the group managers), customisable on a per-agent 
basis (individual agents can create thek own organisational and access control structures 
as well as customise the message-passing services MARS A offers). A cell’s token store 
provides an efficient mechanism for defining and using collaboration points within the 
agents themselves. Each cell can implement its own access control policies by customising 
the contents of its onboard input and output access controller. Any cell can communicate 
with another by using the simple API MARSA offers. Via this single integrated interface, 
the cell can also request its migration to another physical location. The MARSA
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component (chapter 4) will ensure that there is continuous access to an agent regardless 
of its mobility.
The applicability of the MASIC concepts, entities and mechanisms in the area of 
Electronic Commerce is outlined in Appendix A. In summaiy it is shown how simple and 
composite group managers can be used to structure a generic electronic market place. 
Secure, authorised transactions between producers and consumers are supported through 
the passing of all exchanged messages via the appropriate market place group managers 
which enforce appropriate security policies. The discovery process of available products 
and services is also facilitated by advertising group managers. This application, although 
not reseai'ched to a fuU extent, provides a simple electronic market place model which has 
some important advantages over similar models such as support for anonymity, group 
access control policies and development of more complex market place entities from 
existing simpler ones. Finally an initial investigation of the application of the MASIC 
framework in the area of Knowledge Management is presented in [8, 74].
However, there are five main disadvantages of the proposed framework:
1 There is no type checking mechanism. As mentioned in chapter 3, such a mechanism 
can be implemented by using the XML DOM but it is still slower than type checking 
mechanisms embedded within standard programming languages.
2 The mechanism provided to an executing program for accessing its associated data is 
slow compared to standard object-oriented programming languages.
3 Only a limited number of composite group managers are allowed due to scalability
constraints.
4 There are no simulation results to show the efficiency of the communication system 
MARSA.
5 Finally, the access control model of the framework is identity-based. Again as the
number of users increases it is important to define groups of users or introduce the
concept of roles into the model for scalability purposes.
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7.3 Future research
The presented agent framework of this thesis (MASIC) is still in the early stages of
development. There are many avenues for friture research. Below we mention a few of
them :
• Incorporation of cryptography into the access control model. This would require that
the notion of locks and keys are given cryptographic semantics. Furthermore the
access control model could be extended to incorporate more security features such as 
auditing.
• Investigation on the automatic creation of links in the group managers. The 
framework in its current state assumes that the links are created explicitly by the 
corresponding agents. The organisation model could provide more automation in this 
process by using specialised discovery token agents that visit resource agents and 
connect them to the organisational structure automatically according to then contents.
• The MARSA component incorporates some ground work in the area of agent 
communications and mobility management. Simulations and possibly the development 
of a simple prototype are requked to evaluate the performance of this component. 
Further research is also needed in order to provide a mechanism for the discovery and 
resolution of distributed deadlock scenarios.
• The servers the framework will be deployed on need to have a common server-server 
protocol to support thek interaction. In the same context, standardisation is also 
requked for client-server interaction within the fr amework.
• The framework can be extended and provide more services to the agents such as 
persistence, agent life-cycle, transaction support, etc.
• Portals to legacy software. The framework could be equipped with specialised agents 
that act as portals between the framework and other useful legacy software such as 
databases, object-oriented systems (CORBA), etc.
In conclusion, the proposed framework does offer several advantages over existing 
language-based agent systems. It is hoped that it will offer a good template for the design 
of more advanced and complete frameworks which in turn will help bring the agent 
technology to the masses of ordinary Internet users. Mobile agents will only satisfy the
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great expectations the research community has placed on them if the everyday Internet 
user comes in direct contact with them and experiences the benefits their use brings.
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